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So deep in luveami; 
And I will love thee still, my Dear, 
Till a' the seas gang dry. 
Till a' the seas gang dry, my Dear, 
And the rocks melt wi ' the sun: 
I will love thee still, my Dear, 
While the sands o' life shall run: 
And fare thee weel, my only Luve! 
And fare thee weel, a while! 
And I will come again, my Lurve, 
Tho' it were ten thousand mile! 
(R.Bums 1759-96) 
A Security Advisory System for Healthcare Environments 
Matthew John Warren 
BA (Hons) 
This thesis considers the current requirements for security in European healthcare 
establishments. Information Technology is being used increasingly by all areas of 
healthcare, from administration to clinical treatment and this has resulted in increased 
dependence upon computer systems by healthcare staff. 
The thesis looks at healthcare security requirements from the European perspective. 
An aim of the research was to develop security guidelines that could be used by 
healthcare establishments to implement a common baseline standard for security. 
These guidelines represent work submitted to the Commission of European 
Communities SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in Medicine) 
project, with which the research programme was closely linked. The guidelines were 
validated by implementing them with the Plymouth and Torbay Health Trust. 
The thesis also describes the development of a new management methodology and 
this was developed to allow the smooth implementation of security within healthcare 
establishments. The methodology was validated by actually using it within the 
Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority to implement security countermeasures. 
A major area of the research was looking at the use of risk analysis and reviewing all 
the known risk analysis methodologies. The use of risk analysis within healthcare was 
also considered and the main risk analysis methods used by UK healthcare 
establishments were reviewed. 
The thesis explains why there is a need for a risk analysis method specially developed 
for healthcare. As part of the research a new risk analysis method was developed, this 
allows healthcare establishments to determine their own security requirements. The 
method was also combined with the new management methodology that would 
determine any implementional problems. The risk analysis methodology was 
developed into a computerised prototype, which demonstrated the different stages of 
the methodology. 
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1.1) Introduction 
During the last few decades the use of Infonnation Technology (IT) has become more 
extensive throughout society (Poppel and Goldstein, 1987). There are few people 
today which have no contact with computer systems in modem life, whether from 
personal banking to buying lottery tickets. The future use of the 'Internet' for business 
and leisure wi l l trxily allow the globalisation of IT systems. 
The advancement of IT has also resulted in an advancement of reliability o f computer 
systems. This advancement has resulted in more trust being placed in IT systems 
(Barber and Davey, 1994) and an increased reliance upon computer systems in a 
majority of commercial sectors, i.e. banking, healthcare and within society as a whole. 
These computer systems handle the processing of very sensitive and confidential 
information which affect the lives of people. Society seems poised to tolerate greater 
reliance on computer system as IT restructures peoples role at work and at home and 
helps to improve their quality of life (Poppel and Goldstein, 1987). 
The use of IT within the healthcare sector has developed at the same pace as other 
commercial sectors and IT systems are now in widespread use. However, healthcare 
information is of a very personal nature sometimes concerning very sensitive details 
£md it is therefore of the utmost importance to protect this data. Healthcare security is 
primarily concerned with the following issues. 
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Confidgntiality 
Ensuring that unauthorised persons (including staff) do not have access to 
sensitive data or personal data. 
Ensuring that the data produced by and used within a healthcare system can be 
trusted as being accurate. 
Avpilability 
Ensuring that the computer systems are able to provide the necessary data 
when and where it is needed. 
A l l computer systems are at risk of their security being compromised. These risks are 
defined as being (IMG, 1992): 
- threats to the system - e.g. fire, theft, unauthorised system access, 
system error; 
- vulnerabilities of the system to threats - e.g. inadequate control of 
access, poor supervision; 
- impact on system assets i f a threat succeeds -e.g. destruction or corruption of 
data. 
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From a clinical point of view the most important healthcare security problems have 
been identified as described below (Gaunt and France, 1993). 
Physical security 
The open nature of hospitals and clinics make them vulnerable to theft, 
damage and unauthorised access. 
Risk to the patient 
The failure of a healthcare computer system could affect the treatment given to 
patients, with potentially dire results. 
Confidentialitv 
Medical data contains information that may be extremely sensitive to an 
individual, i.e. the person may be mentally i l l or have HIV. Disclosure of this 
information could be embarrassing for the individual in the extreme and could 
result in them being ostracised by society. Also, any disclosure could destroy 
the trust between the clinician and the patient and possibly result in legal 
action being taken against either the clinician or the health care organisation. 
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The consequence of security breaches vary enormously between sectors, systems and 
the use of those systems. Various consequences may result from security breaches, as 
indicated below: 
- financial loss; 
- disruption of organisational activities; 
- infringement of privacy; 
- personal safety; 
- failure to meet legal obligations; 
- embarrassment or loss of business goodwill. 
(Barber and Davey, 1994) 
A l l of the above points suggest a real need for security within the healthcare 
environment and highlights its complex nature in terms of threats, requirements and 
consequences. 
Information security is primarily concerned with protecting data stored on computer 
systems, but other factors such as physical security, disaster protection and staff 
security must also be considered. Information security is also a human issue and is 
concerned with educating users and making them aware of the issues (Warren and 
Gaunt, 1993). 
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The European Union (EU) believes that fragmented national approaches to IT 
research and development (R&D) results in duplicated efforts and do not allow for 
cross-fertilisation (Poppel and Goldstein, 1987). This perception, combined with the 
need for European IT Standards, has resulted in the development o f extensive 
European IT research programmes (including countries fi^om EU, EFTA (European 
Free Trade Association) and former COMECON (Council of Mutual ECONomic co-
operation) countries). The increased concern about computer security has resulted in 
several research and development programmes specifically looking at the area of HCE 
security, such as SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in 
MEDicine) (SEISMED, 1994). It has been recognised that the production of 
European-wide security standards and guidelines wil l help address the HCE security 
problems currently present, as well as ensuring that security levels are standardised 
across the whole of the EU. 
A key issue within the EU is how to transfer knowledge about security to the HCE 
staff and educate users about computer security. This forms the basis o f a new EU 
project called ISHTAR (Implementing Secure Healthcare Telematics Applications in 
euRope), which aims to increase computer security awareness in HCEs. 
A overview of information security and the issues affecting HCE organisations is 
presented in chapter 2. 
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1.2) Aims and Objectives of Research 
This research is concerned with the issues of implementing security within HCEs and 
providing security knowledge within computerised systems. The research 
demonstrates the importance of proving security knowledge to HCE staff and 
establishing security standards within the EU. 
The overall research program can be divided into the following areas: 
1. developing security guidelines, then validating these 
guidelines with HCEs acting as validation centres; 
2. developing a method for the implementation of security with an HCE; 
3. developing a risk analysis method to enable HCEs to carry out their own 
security reviews. 
A principal objective of the first phase was the validation of security guidelines. This 
involved working extensively with the staff of the Plymouth and Torbay Health 
Authority in determining their applicability. The second phase concerned the 
validation of the new method (called SIM-ETHICS) to be used for the implementation 
of security. The validation process consisted of using the method to help implement 
new security measures within the HCE and determining the impact that these would 
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have upon staff. The main aim of the third stage was the development of a working 
prototype, embodying the risk analysis methodology that was developed. 
The full objectives of the present research programme can be listed as follows: 
1. to assess the general need for information security within various types of 
HCE; 
2. to assist in the production and validation of security guidelines which would 
help improve the levels of security that exist within HCEs; 
3. to develop and validate a new methodology that could be used in the 
implementation of security within various HCEs; 
4. to assess the current use of security risk analysis packages and whether they 
can be applied to healthcare; 
5. to develop a new security risk analysis method which allows HCEs 
to determine their own security requirements; 
6. to implement the above method into a fully working prototype 
computer system. 
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The above points are reflected by appropriate chapters of the thesis, which wi l l be 
discussed in the next section. 
The research has involved significant liaison with HCE staff from Plymouth and 
Torbay Health Authority, Plymouth Community Trust and various General 
Practitioners (GPs). This liaison has occuned in the context of the A I M SEISMED 
project, which was concerned within improving healthcare security within HCEs. The 
research has also involved liaison and correspondence with security experts from the 
following countries: 
- Canada; - Netheriands; 
- Denmark; - Serbia; 
- Eire; - Slovenia; 
- France; - Sweden; 
- Germany; - UK; 
- Greece; - USA. 
- Israel; 
1.3) Thesis Structure 
This thesis describes the research that has resulted in the formulation o f a complete 
system that can be used to assist HCE security. The research helps HCEs to determine 
their organisational security requirements and allows the smooth implementation of 
security measures within HCEs. 
Chapter 2 begins by explaining the need for security within HCEs. The chapter also 
highlights the steps that can be taken to improve security within HCEs. The A I M 
SEISMED project is described, as well as the major security guidelines which the 
project has produced. Finally, the more recent ISHTAR project is described as a way 
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of enabling the transfer of security knowledge to HCE staff throughout the EU and 
indeed the rest of the worid via the use of the Internet. 
Chapter 3 describes the role of security management within HCEs. I t includes 
descriptions of several surveys that have been undertaken at Plymouth and Torbay 
Health Trust, as part of a study of security awareness of managers and users. The 
chapter also looks at security culture and the impacts that this has upon management, 
staff and the HCE establishment as a whole. 
Chapter 4 describes the managerial concept of participational management. It explains 
what it is, the countries where it is used and the experiences that they have had. The 
future of participational management in general is also discussed. The development of 
a new method called SIM-ETHICS is considered, which may be used for 
implementing security. This chapter also includes real life examples o f the use of 
participational management within the Plymouth and Torbay Trust. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with security risk analysis. The chapter considers the nature of 
risk analysis and the different fundamental types followed by an evaluation of various 
different methods. The use of risk analysis within healthcare is also examined. The 
chapter ends with a suggestion as to the future of security risk analysis methods. 
Chapter 6 then proceeds to present a major area of the research, namely a new risk 
analysis methodology specifically developed for use within the healthcare 
environment. It explains the need for a simplified system to be used by HCE staff to 
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evaluate their security requirements, rather than imdertaking extensive risk analysis 
reviews. The development of the ODESSA (Organisational DEScriptive Security 
Analysis) methodology is described in detail, as well as the underlying theoretical 
points. The methodology is based upon the concept of classification of systems and 
offers baseline security advice for those systems. It also uses techniques such as 
determination of data sensitivity, organisational profiling to enable specific 
countermeasures to be offered and incorporates the use of the SIM-ETHICS method 
(see chapter 4). The perceived advantages and disadvantages of the ODESSA 
methodology are also described. 
Chapter 7 explains how the new methodology was embodied in a working prototype 
computer system written in Visual Basic. The chapter describes different parts of the 
system and finally looks at the areas where the prototype could be improved. This 
serves to increase the potential usefulness of the method and show its applicability for 
HCEs. 
Having described the main areas of research, chapter 8 describes the validation of the 
research programme. It describes how SIM-ETHICS was validated by using it within 
the Plymouth and Torbay Health Trust and how ODESSA was validated by experts 
throughout Europe. 
Finally, chapter 9 presents the main conclusions of the research programme, 
highlighting the principal achievements of the work as well as suggesting areas for 
potential fiirther investigation. 
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The thesis also include a number of appendices which contain additional information 
to support the research, as well as a bibliography of references used for the thesis. 
Copies of published papers relating to the research undertaken are also appended. 
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2.1) Introduction 
Healthcare within the EU is important since its affects the entire population. The 
following summary shown in table 2.1 relates to the state of the EU healthcare 
system, this was based upon 1990 figures (Acosta, 1994). 
Population of EU 
Healthcare Workers 
344,000,000 
Doctors 800,000 
Dentists 156,000 
Nurses 1,600,000 
Other (technicians, 
administrators, 
cleaners, etc) 
3,860,000 
Healthcare Rgsources 
Hospitals 15,000 
Beds 2.600,000 
Table 2.1. The size of healthcare within the E U 
The above figures excludes data relating to Austria, Finland and Sweden which have 
subsequently joined the EU in 1995. The tables shows the population of the EU, for 
each person shown a unquantifiable amount of computerised data is kept. The table 
also shows the extensive number of HCEs and HCE workers within the EU, they also 
produce extensive quantity of data. There is therefore a unquantifiable amount of 
information that potentially needs to be protected. 
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2.2) The need for security within healthcare 
The need for security with healthcare has been explained in chapter 1. The sections 
that follow wil l now consider two specific areas: 
past problems of security within healthcare; 
steps taken to improve security within healthcare. 
2.2.1) Past problems of security within healthcare 
Within the UK there has been no detailed study relating to incidents of healthcare 
security breaches. There have however been attempts to study computer fraud within 
the UK, notably the Audit commission. In the 1991 report, 327 organisations in the 
NHS responded to the Audit commission, of these 18 (5%) recorded some form of 
security incident (Manuel, 1991). In the 1994 report, 334 organisations in the NHS 
responded, of these 127 (38%) recorded some form of security incident (Audit, 1994). 
This shows that breaches of computer security within HCEs is on the increase. 
In France there have been studies of healthcare security undertaken by insurance 
companies breaches These studies provide a comprehensive review o f healthcare 
security breaches that have occurred in France, as shown below (APASAIRD and 
CLUSIF, 1988). 
• Hardware (accidents, breakdowns, vandalism) 
Twelve day breakdown of a minicomputer managing beds in a ward caused errors, over and under 
allocation for two months. Loss of profit and adverse publicity was valued at £400,000. 
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Explosion of a minicomputer used for the control and analysis of an imaging system caused by the 
indirect spread of lighming into a comms link joining the machine to another for access to a database. 
Hardware loss was put at £200.000 and consequential losses at £300,000. 
A series of acts of vandalism and thefts perpetrated on small items of specialised and vital hardware 
amounted to £80.000. 
• Fraud 
Creation of false invoices in a hospital by an employee who has noticed that the access key to an 
application was the date. The employee obtained money from the so-called suppliers who disappeared 
after a year. The embezzlement was in the region of £ 150,000. 
Fraudulent use of a utility to change fields in a file containing allocations of invitations to tender. The 
total loss was £200,000. 
• Theft of Goods 
Modification of dosage tables for certain patients taking opiate derivatives and also of tables of 
anaesthetic dosages. Over a year the value of drugs stolen amounted to £ 100,000. 
• Sabotage of Programs and Data 
£50,000 blackmail relating to a logic bomb on a system essentially dedicated to physical security 
control/monitoring, the management of alarm calls and liquid food in a hospital. 
• System Development Errors 
During migration from one system to another, certain buffer areas were truncated. When programs 
dealing with medical analysis were run, incorrect results were obtained and the consequences, although 
not measurable, were very serious. 
• Operating Errors 
Disks left on top of a laser printer in a computer room were damaged. The disks were very difficult to 
read and it was necessary to reinput large volumes of data. Supplementary costs came to £200,000. 
• Personnel Problems 
After the departure of the person running a small data centre in a hospital, the state of the 
documentation did not allow him to be satisfactorily replaced (there were only three people in the 
department). The main functions has to be moved to another centre. Adapting to the change took six 
months and cost £600,000. 
Within the National Health Services (NHS) there are concerns about future IT 
projects, there is growing concern about the NHS network that is being implemented 
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and its minimal security features (Sunday Times, 1995). In 1992 the Department of 
Health decided that data encryption was not necessary because the risk of hacking was 
minimal (Davies, 1995). Because of this stance the British Medical Association 
(BMA) is urging the government to make breaching confidential health information a 
statutory offence (Milton, 1995). 
2.3) Steps taken to address the problems of security within healthcare 
Steps are being taken to address the problems of security at a local, national and a 
European level. 
At the local level steps are being taken to address the problems of physical security. 
The Royal Devon and Exeter Healthcare NHS Trust is paying Devon and Cornwall 
police £60,000 a year for round-the-clock protection (Guardian, 1995). This 
protection takes the form of two police officers being permanently based at a Exeter 
hospital. 
Within the UK, the Information Management Group (IMG), part o f the NHS 
Management Executive, are addressing this problem. As part of this initiative they 
have developed a Security Policy for use by the NHS. Some of the issues put forward 
by the policy are governed by legislation and steps must be take to ensure compliance 
(IMG, 1992). The most notable UK acts are: 
- the Data Protection Act, 1984; 
- the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988; 
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- the Computer Misuse Act, 1990. 
The IMG run a series of training seminars for NHS staff looking at the various IT 
security and data protection issues. It has also produced documentation relating to IT 
security, which can be distributed to all NHS staff. 
At the European Level, the Advanced Informatics In Medicine ( A I M ) research 
programme is concerned with applying information and communication technologies 
to medicine and healthcare. The exploratory phase of A I M lasted from 1989 to 1990, 
with 20 million ECU funding from the European commission. The main phase was 
for three years (1992 - 94) with 97 million ECU backing (Rossing, 1994). One of the 
research and development projects was entitled SEISMED and this was specifically 
concerned with European HCE IT security. 
2.3.1) The Role of SEISMED 
The objective aims of the A I M SEISMED project (SEISMED, 1994) were: 
- to examine across Europe, the legal issues of data protection within 
healthcare IT systems in order to develop a common code o f ethics; 
- to develop a High Level Security Policy to enable organisations using 
information systems to follow a consistent path; 
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- to perform risk analysis at four healthcare centres to identify the 
opportunities and needs for improved security; 
- to develop specific guidelines to enhance security looking at: 
- existing systems; 
- design and implementation of future systems; 
- the use of networks. 
- to develop an encryption prototype for use by HCEs. 
The partners for the SEISMED project came from Czech Republic, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK, as shown in figure 
2.1. 
Key 
BE = Belgium 
CR = Czech Republic 
GR = Greece 
HO = Holland 
UK = United Kingdom 
SW = Switzerland 
GERMANY 
FRANCE / : SW 
Figure 2.1.The countries involved in the SEISMED Project. 
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There were five reference centres within the project, which provided medical 
knowledge and allowed for the validation o f the research. These reference centres 
were: 
- Plymouth and Torbay NHS Trust (UK); 
- The Royal London Hospital NHS Trust (UK); 
• Leiden University Hospital (The Netherlands); 
- GEN Hospital Cantonal Universitaire de Genenve (Switzerland); 
- Institute for Clinical and Experimental Medicine (Czech Republic). 
A major aspect of the project was the development of security guidelines. These 
guidelines allow a harmonised approach to be taken to security through the EU and 
provide the same level of protection. Two of the most important guidelines produced 
by the project were: 
- the High Level Security Policy; 
- the Existing Systems guidelines. 
The author was personally involved in developing the existing system guidelines. The 
author was also involved in validating the above guidelines within the Plymouth and 
Torbay NHS Trust. 
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2.3.3.1) The High Level Security Policy 
The High Level Security Policy (HLSP) is a policy that a HCE should use in order to 
implement security efficiently and indicating to management how a HCE should be 
run (Katsikas and Gritzalis, 1993). The HLSP aims at protecting human rights of 
patients^ ensuring the confidentiality and quality of personal health data (Katsikas and 
Gritzalis, 1994). 
The HLSP for SEISMED was developed by: 
- an attitude survey of healthcare professionals in Europe; 
- results of risk analysis reviews carried out at reference centres; 
- the results of the analysis of existing and emerging data protection 
legislation throughout Europe; 
- relevant international literature, i.e. US Department o f Health 
Automated Information Systems Security Program Handbook. 
The SEISMED HLSP consists of a set of nine principles, v^th each principle further 
detailed by a set of guidelines. The principles of the HLSP are shown in table 2.2: 
Code Principle 
PlOO Code of good Practice 
P200 Contractual Regulations 
P300 Data Protection Authority 
P400 Education - Awareness 
P500 Limited data circulation 
P600 Patient Rights 
P700 Quality of health data 
P800 Medical research 
P900 Security regulations 
Table 2.2. HLSP Principles 
Page 21 
Chapter 2 An Overview of security within Healthcare 
The development of the HLSP was helpftil to form the basis of a consistent, 
harmonised and transferable framework which can be used to efficiently implement 
security and privacy in automated Health Information Systems throughout Europe 
(Katsikas and Gritzalis, 1993). The HLSP does not suggest security guidelines but 
rather a set of mandatory conditions to ensure adequate security of information 
processed by HCEs. 
2.3.3.2) Existing System Guidelines 
The problem of securing existing systems was also addressed by the SEISMED 
Project. Whilst various guidelines and standards for IT security have previously been 
developed, none have specifically targeted the needs of the medical community at a 
European level. The new guidelines are intended to provide a conmion source of 
reference for European healthcare establishments and are relevant to (and wi l l affect) 
all categories of personnel. 
The existing system recommendations were developed to satisfy the following aims: 
- to represent a minimum acceptable standard for the security of operational 
healthcare systems and their associated environments; 
- to be usable by all HCEs and staff within Europe; 
-to allow a straightforward means of validating existing systems security to 
ensure compliance. 
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The development of the resulting guidelines was based upon an interactive approach, 
in close co-operation with the SEISMED Reference Centres and in consultation with 
other independent healthcare professionals. 
2.3.3.3.1) An Overview of Existing Systems Guidelines 
The final Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems (Fumell and Sanders, 
1994) are grouped under 10 key principles of protection, representing the main 
elements governing the security of existing healthcare information systems (having 
been agreed in detail with the Reference Centres). The principles are denoted by ESP 
followed by a unique reference code, as listed in table 2.3: 
Code Title 
ESPOlOO Security Policy and Administration 
ESP0200 Physical and Environmental Security 
ESP0300 Disaster Planning and Recovery 
ESP0400 Personnel Security 
ESP0500 Training and Awareness 
ESP0600 Information Technology Facilities 
Management 
ESP0700 Authentication and Access Control 
ESP0800 Database Security 
ESP0900 System Maintenance 
ESP1000 Legislation Compliance 
Table 2.3. Existing Systems Security Principles 
Each of the principles has a number of associated guidelines. These represent the 
specific security concepts or countermeasures that should be considered by the HCE 
to meet the requirements of a given principle. As established earlier, the consideration 
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of existing systems encompasses a very broad range of issues and the overall coverage 
consequently extends fi"om general concepts to specific technical measures. 
The 10 protection principles are described in more detail below (Fumell et al., 1995). 
In each case the general purpose of the principle is stated, along with a list o f the main 
issues that are covered by the underlying guidelines (the overall number of guidelines 
pertaining to each principle is given alongside its title). 
1. Security Policy and Administration (5 guidelines) 
General Principle 
A formal policy wil l provide clear direction and support for security within the 
HCE. Policy is formulated fi^om the senior managerial level, with subsequent 
guidance provided to all levels of staff. Correct administration of and adherence 
to the policy should ensure the effectiveness of HCE security controls. 
Main issues: 
- the need for a security policy; 
- policy awareness issues; 
- co-ordination and administration of security; 
- use of specialist security personnel. 
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2. Physical and Environmental Security (22 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The generally open nature of HCEs and their high degree of public access dictates 
that physical security measures are a vital first stage o f protection to prevent 
unauthorised access to computing equipment and facilities. Systems must also be 
safeguarded against a variety of environmental hazards that may adversely affect 
operation. 
Main issues: 
- physical access control; 
- security of HCE equipment; 
- protection against natural disasters; 
- environmental controls; 
- various procedural measures. 
3. Disaster Planning and Recovery (7 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The continuous availability of Information Systems is essential to the operation 
of a modem HCE. It is essential that adequate plans are made to ensure the level 
of availability needed by the HCE can be maintained in the event of any 
catastrophe. Recovery of IT systems should be a component of an overall HCE 
disaster / recovery plan. 
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Main issues: 
- continuity planning (development, testing and update); 
- fallback arrangements; 
- post-disaster procedures and controls. 
4. Personnel Security (8 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The major security weakness of many systems is not the technology but the 
people involved. Many organisations are extremely vulnerable to threats fi-om 
their own staff and, as a result, even the most comprehensive technical controls 
wi l l not guarantee absolute security. There are, however, a number of personnel-
related measures that can be introduced to help reduce the risks. 
Main issues : 
- staff recruitment; 
- contractual agreements promoting security; 
- security during normal working practices; 
- staff appraisal and monitoring; 
- termination of employment. 
5. Training and Awareness (6 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Information systems security can only be maintained i f all personnel involved in 
their use know, understand and accept the necessary precautions. Many breaches 
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are the result of incorrect behaviour by general staff who are unaware o f security 
basics. The provision of security training and awareness wi l l make it possible for 
staff to consider the security implications of their actions and avoid creating 
unnecessary risks. 
Main issues: 
- the need for general security awareness; 
- specific areas that must be addressed (job training, use of information 
systems); 
- recommendations for internal / HCE training and awareness initiatives; 
- use of specialist training courses; 
- assignment of responsibilities for training. 
6. Information Technology Facilities Management (31 guidelines) 
General Principle 
A variety of activities can be identified that are related to the normal day-to-day 
use and administration of information systems. A l l categories of HCE personnel 
(management, technical and general users) have responsibilities that must be 
addressed in order to maintain security in this area. 
Main issues: 
- system planning and control; 
- the importance of maintaining back-ups; 
- media controls; 
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- auditing and system monitoring; 
- virus controls; 
- documentation issues. 
7. Authentication and Access Control (28 guidelines) 
General Principle 
It is essential that IT systems are protected by comprehensive logical access 
controls. Access should be guaranteed for legitimate users and denied to all 
others. A l l classes of user must be identified and authenticated before any access 
is granted and further mechanisms must control subsequent reading, vmtmg, 
modification and deletion of applications and data. There should be no method 
for by-passing any authentication or access controls. HCE users are unlikely to 
be satisfied with controls that intrude upon working practices and chosen schemes 
should be transparent and convenient in order to gain acceptance. 
Main issues : 
- requirements for user identification and authentication; 
- password issues; 
- system and object access restrictions; 
-methods of control; 
- access in special cases (e.g. system management, third parties, temporary 
staff). 
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8. Database Security (21 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Database security is concerned with the enforcement of the security policy 
concerning the disclosure, modification or destruction of a database system*s 
data. Databases are fast becoming very important for HCEs. Over 90% of today's 
IT systems contain some kind of database and the value of information stored is 
now widely recognised as a major asset, far more important than any other 
software. However, databases also introduce additional security concerns (e.g. 
granularity, inference, aggregation, filtering, joumaling etc.) and therefore 
warrant specific consideration. 
Main issues: 
- control of medical database software; 
- organisation and administration of HCE database systems; 
- database operation issues. 
9. System Maintenance (5 guidelines) 
General Principle 
System maintenance activities merit special consideration given the opportunities 
that exist to affect the operation of the system. Unauthorised or uncontrolled 
changes to any aspect of an operational system could potentially compromise 
security and, in some cases, endanger life. Maintenance must therefore be carried 
out in accordance with well-defined procedures. 
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Main issues: 
- controls to prevent unauthorised changes to and upgrades of HCE software, 
vendor software and operating systems; 
- requirements for testing and acceptance. 
10. Legislation Compliance (5 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Specific levels of protection may be demanded in order to comply with national 
and European legislative requirements, as well to satisfy internal HCE policy. 
Whilst the guidelines highlight the most basic requirements, this principle 
represents an ongoing process which must take account of any new legislation 
that may be relevant, as well as ensuring compliance with existing standards. 
Main issues : 
- data protection; 
- abuse of information systems; 
- prohibition of "pirated" software; 
- compliance with internal security standards; 
- retention and protection of business records. 
It should be evident that many of the issues covered are not relevant to all HCE staff. 
Therefore the guidelines are broken down into following groups (Fumell, et al, 1995). 
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• A general guideline set, aimed at the majority of HCE staff, including 
clinicians, administrators and general system users. Guidelines are presented 
for user reference during day-to-day use of HCE information systems, 
highlighting what they can do to safeguard security. 
• A management guideline set, primarily targeting the senior decision makers 
within the HCE, who wil l be responsible for defining security policy 
(although a significant number of points wi l l also be relevant at department / 
line management level). This set is intended to highlight areas in which 
management should be directly involved and also improve management 
security awareness by explaining / justifying the importance of other more 
technical guidelines (for which management approval wi l l be required). 
• An IT and security personnel set, aimed at IT staff, system administrators, 
security officers and other support staff who wil l be most likely to have the 
lower level responsibilities for implementing security. This is the most 
detailed of the guideline subsets and should be a key source of reference for 
implementation and validation of security. 
2.3.3.3.2) Implementing the Guidelines 
The Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems could be applied in any 
European Healthcare Establishment with existing operational information systems 
(where the term Healthcare Establishment refers to any establishment providing 
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medical services, research, training or health education). They will be relevant even 
where systems are thought to include security provision, so that the level of protection 
can be validated against the recommendations. 
As for the implementation strategy itself, it would obviously be impractical to attempt 
to address all of the suggestions at once due to constraints of cost and likely disruption 
to services. A phased approach is, therefore, advised in which each principle is 
considered in turn to identify the areas in which the HCE / department is currently 
deficient. The individual guidelines may then be assessed to detennine 
implementation priorities based upon local requirements. 
Whilst the new recommendations are intended to provide a simple and straightforward 
means of addressing healthcare security issues, it is recognised that problems may 
exist. 
Firstly, many establishments may currently be operating with security significantly 
below the recommended level and progression to the required level may be a non-
trivial task. As mentioned in the discussion of implementation, HCEs may face a 
number of constraints that affect their ability to address security requirements. For 
example, cost (in terms of finance, performance and practicality) will be a significant 
factor in determining acceptability (Fagen, 1993). Financial cost be particularly 
relevant, given that expenditure for direct care activities is likely to receive higher 
priority than security. 
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Conversely, some environments and / or applications may demand a level of security 
significantly higher than the proposed baseline. In these cases a risk analysis review 
is recommended in order to determine the level of additional protection that is 
necessary. 
2.2.3) The Role oflSHTAR 
As mentioned in previous sections there is a problem ensuring that security 
information can be property disseminated to reach the HCE staff that it is intended 
for. The use of the Internet vnW allow vast amounts of information to be transferred 
efficiently and economically effectively. 
This objective has formed the basis a forthcoming EU project to be called ISHTAR 
(Implementing Secure Healthcare Telematics Applications in euRope) which intends 
to use the WWW as a dissemination mechanism for healthcare security knowledge. 
The main aims of ISHTAR are (Fumell et al, 1996): 
- to allow on-line access to healthcare security guidelines and related security 
papers (including SEISMED documents and guidelines); 
- to develop an on-line healthcare security discussion forum; 
- to act as a repository for automated security demonstrators and security 
programs, i.e. risk analysis systems; 
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- to act as a link to other security WWW sites; 
- to advertise any healthcare security training seminars or healthcare security 
conferences. 
The use of the Internet will allow a new dimension in the area of healthcare security 
and will allow for the globalisation of EU security guidelines (which may help in the 
development of world-wide security standards). 
2.4) Conclusion 
In conclusion this chapter has explained the need for security within healthcare, it 
shows within the UK there has been an increase of computer fraud and misuse within 
HCEs. 
The chapter has shown the steps that are being taken at a local, national and European 
level to address these security problems through: 
- development of security guidelines; 
- the use of new technologies to transfer security knowledge. 
These new security guidelines form a basis by which a HCE can implement a certain 
security level. Once this basic security level has been implemented, a risk analysis 
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can be undertaken by using a new healthcare risk analysis method (see chapter 6). 
This will then determine the HCE need for security. By the use of a new management 
method (see chapter 4) the organisational impacts of implementing security can also 
be determined. 
Page 35 
Chapter 3: An Overview of Security Management 
Chapter 3: Overview of Security Management 
Page 36 
Chapter 3: An Overview of Security Management 
3.1) Introduction 
Security management can be defined as viewing and managing risks in terms of the 
cause, effects, and therefore costs, of a loss of security (Robson, 1994). From this 
statement it is clear that organisations need to manage the risk exposure of every IT 
element and this may be carried out by using risk analysis (see Chapter 5). In 1992 a 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) sponsored survey suggested that the true 
level of UK losses from computer fraud and misuse is around £1.1 billion a year 
(Robson, 1994). 
There are distinct differences between security management goals in different sectors. 
In a commercial environment, the aim is to introduce security controls at the most cost 
effective basis. The aim of military security is to minimise losses, irrespective of the 
costs associated (Von Solms et al, 1990). The aim of commercial security is to 
primarily ensure the integrity of data to prevent fraud and errors (Clark and Wilson, 
1987). 
3.2) The need for security management 
Security management is an issue affecting all countries. Of particular importance is 
computer fraud, usually undertaken by the companies employees (Audit, 1994). The 
risk from employees is due to: 
- staff being familiar with systems; 
- staff being familiar with security procedures; 
- staff holding a grudge against their employer. 
The level of computer fraud and misuse is indicated by the following studies. 
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United Kingdom (Audit, 1994) 
Total losses to computer misuse £3,822,213 
Total losses to computer fraud £3,042,318 (79.5%) 
Australia (Kamey and Adams, 1992) 
Total losses to computer misuse (A$) 16,908,029 
Total losses to computer fi^ud (A$) 13,660,543 (80.8%) 
Security management is primarily concerned with protecting the organisation against 
outside and inside threats, e.g. hackers or unhappy employees. The main areas for 
security management can be broken dovm into: 
- risk assessment (See Chapter 5); 
- implementing security; 
- developing corporate security policies; 
- security awareness and training. 
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3.2.1) Managing Security 
To manage computer security there should be appropriate management duties and 
responsibility allocated within the whole organisation. Typically, organisations will 
appoint a single, central IT security manager. In many instances, IT security is 
combined with responsibilities for other aspects of IT management, and the role may 
well be part time (Fagen, 1993). 
Only a limited amount of research has been conducted in this area, but that which has 
been done identified the following national characteristics. 
Germany 
Who is responsible for IT Security ? 
Information Manager 78% 
Executive Manager 10.5% 
Data Security Commissioner 8.5% 
Data Protection Commissioner 8% 
Security Manager 3% 
(Gliss. 1990) 
(Note: The data which totals 108% shows that some organisations have more than one person 
concerned with security). 
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Slovenia 
Is there someone directly responsible for computer security? 
No person 23.3% 
One Person 31.5% 
More than One Person 8.2% 
Without Answer 37% 
(Hudoklin and Smitek, 1992) 
These limited studies suggest that a more structured approach to security management 
was taken by countries with an already developed use of using IT. This area has to be 
researched even further to explore more of the national issues. 
3.2.2) Implementing Security 
Any new technology that is being implemented, including security would cause an 
organisational impact. The impact would be top down and would affect the 
organisation as a whole. Security is a human issue and should therefore be considered 
in the context of the staff and the organisation. It is important to ensure that the 
introduction of the new security systems and procedures does not hinder the staff 
(Warren and Gaunt, 1993). Any implementation plan should take into account the life 
cycle of the security system as described below (Wylder, 1992). 
Page 40 
Chapter 3: An Overview of Security Management 
The Introductory Phase 
This is when the security features are initially introduced and is important 
because it establishes the organisational emphasis on security. This stage 
affects few users. 
Thg Karly Growth Phase 
This is when security features are added to a limited number of systems. 
This stage affects some users. 
The Rapid Growth Phase 
This is when security features are added to all existing systems. This stage 
consequently affects all the users of the systems. 
The MatMrity Phase 
This is when the system is fully developed, so that post development features 
will be added, affecting a varying number of users. 
The importance in determining the impact of security suggests that some methodology 
should be used, such as SIM-ETHICS (See Chapter 4). 
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3.2.3) Developing Corporate Security Policies 
A security policy is a statement of belief that the organisation adheres to, and a series 
of objectives that the organisation strives to comply with. The security policy also 
states the responsibilities that staff have (directly and indirectly) for organisational 
security. The assignment of security responsibility is dependent upon the structure of 
the organisation. The purpose of a computer security policy has been defined as 
follows. 
A computer security policy serves as a vehicle to demonstrate senior management's 
involvement in introducing, implementing and maintaining a secure computer 
systems environment throughout the organisation. 
(Eloffand Badenhorst, 1990) 
Computer security is only obtainable by having a corporate security policy, as without 
it no cohesive and cost effective security can be achieved (Smith, 1989). The content 
of an organisations security policy will have a significant affect upon its 
management's attitude to security (Plant, 1993) and also upon its workforce. 
There are various ways of developing a security policy. Formalised methods have 
been developed, which allow for policy development and installation. An example of 
this is the CS-methodology (Eloff and Badenhorst, 1990), which describes the main 
steps in compiling a computer security policy as given below. 
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Petcrming conimpn framgwork of tgrminology 
Agree on a common framework of terminology that can be understood by all 
members of the organisation. 
Determine purpose for computer security 
Determining the security requirements of the organisation: 
- identifying areas of the organisation that are dependant on computer 
systems; 
- identification and protection of data which is considered an asset; 
- ensuring continuation of business operations; 
- establishing the relationship between computer and other policies 
already in existence. 
Defining the scope of computer security 
Senior management and IT staff have to determine the scope of applicability 
of computer security to their business organisations. 
Agree accountability and responsibilitv 
To define the responsibilities of parties involved in the computer security 
policy. Accountability lies with line management, whereas responsibility 
should be in the hands of experts, e.g. IT staff. 
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3.2.4) Security Awareness and Training 
Within the new workplace protection of information is a new skill which many 
employees do not understand or accept (Lafleur, 1992). To ensure that staff are given 
these skills there are two approaches. 
Training 
To give new staff basic computer security skills and an understanding 
of the wider security issues. 
Awareness 
To remind staff of the security issues and also to educate thenn about 
new security issues. 
This process has to be on-going to ensure that once staff are given these new skills 
that they do not lose them because of lack of awareness or continued training, 
3.3) Studies undertaken for Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority 
Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority was established by the amalgamation of 
Plymouth Health Authority and Torbay Health Authority in 1993. The main 
collaboration was with Plymouth Hospitals NHS Trust based at Derriford Hospital, 
Plymouth. 
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As previously mentioned in chapter 2, the work conducted by the SEISMED project 
identified three principal divisions of HCE staff that should be considered when 
introducing security (Fumell and Sanders, 1994) : 
- general HCE staff (e.g. clinicians, nurses, administrators); 
- HCE management; 
- IT and Security personnel. 
It was decided that the most effective way of eliciting information from staff was by 
the use of surveys. It was considered most important for the first survey to assess the 
attitudes of the general users and IT staff, so that management would then be able to 
determine which security concepts needed to be promoted to their staff and where 
resistance or problems would be likely to occur. It was also considered important to 
specifically look at the attitudes of system managers as it was thought that i f their 
knowledge of security was limited then so would that of the system users. 
It was anticipated that the staff within Derriford Hospital would possibly be more 
security aware than those within many other European HCEs, given that the 
establishment participated as a reference centre in the SEISMED project, involving 
many of them in the implementation and validation of the recommended guidelines. 
3.3.1) General Users Study 
The first investigation attempted to determine the attitudes of the general staff within 
the reference environment. The survey document contained four pages and included a 
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total of 37 questions ('pumell et al 1995). This survey formed the basis of a final year 
project at Plymouth University (Holben, 1995), the author was involved in its 
supervision and provided input into the design of the questionnaire. 
These were divided into four sections, which obtained general background 
information followed by responses to questions in three key areas of security 
awareness, as summarised below. 
1. General 
Obtained information on general computer usage (in terms of system, 
application and data access) and opinions on basic aspects of security. 
2. Physical 
A small section which collected basic information concerning attitudes 
towards the physical protection measures employed within the HCE. 
3. Logical / Computer system security 
This section concentrated upon respondents awareness of security breaches 
and their use of passwords (the latter being the prime method of 
authentication and access control used in operational systems at the time 
and, therefore, expected to be well imderstood by the staff). 
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4. Personnel 
Assessed staff security awareness in respect of their own role within the 
HCE, including specific security and data protection responsibilities and 
their attitudes towards the level of security training provided. 
Although it would have been desirable to explore some areas in more detail, it was 
considered that the inclusion of too many questions would serve to make the 
questionnaire appear daunting and consequently reduce the potential response rate. 
Amongst the staff targeted were consultants, doctors, nurses, administrators and 
secretaries, with respondents being asked to identify their discipline to allow potential 
for subdivision of the final results. 
A total of 200 questionnaires were distributed and responses were gathered over a 
period of about a fortnight. At the end of this time, a total of 75 usable responses had 
been received. The distribution of responses from within the individual staff 
categories was rather uneven and, in some cases, the number of responses was too low 
to allow any confident analysis (for example only 4 responses were received from 
doctors, whilst a more healthy 18 responses were obtained from nurses). For this 
reason it is difficult to assess attitude differences between the staff groups and so 
analysis was restricted to the general domain. 
From the basic introductory questions there was a general consensus amongst the 
respondents that information security was of most importance to help preserve patient 
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safety and confidentiality. Only 10% of staff felt that the current levels of security 
restricted them in their work. Respondents were generally more confident in the 
effectiveness of the HCEs logical security controls than the physical and personnel 
measures, but even in these cases the consensus appeared to be that the measures were 
at least adequate. 
From the responses to the physical security questions, it was established that almost a 
third of staff do not wear their identity badges. However, some 83% claimed that they 
would challenge someone not wearing a badge - indicating that many staff do not 
follow the practice that they expect others to observe. Some 16% of respondents 
were unaware that areas of the HCE were monitored/under surveillance - which 
provided a first indication that security awareness was not all that it could be. 
In terms of logical security the results firstly established that only 5% of staff were 
aware of security breaches within the HCE. However, this figure is still worrying in 
that it represents violations perpetrated by HCE staff. The results relating to the use 
of passwords and general observance of system security were of even more concern. 
Some 59% of respondents admitted to leaving their terminals logged in and 
unsupervised, whilst an even greater proportion (65%) claimed to have used someone 
else's system when left in such a condition. These factors indicate lax attitudes 
towards the protection and privacy of individual accounts. 
Proceeding from the basis that a password is supposed to represent secret knowledge 
known only to the legitimate user, the survey proceeded to assess how carefully the 
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HCE users attempted to abide by this concept. The responses established that some 
21% of respondents legitimately shared a group password with other users. However, 
a further 18% admitted that their password had been shared with other users without 
authorisation and 15% claimed to know other peoples passwords illegitimately, again 
indicating scant regard for the purpose of the controls. 
Other statistics were that 18% of staff felt that their password could potentially be 
guessed (on the basis that it was related to their name, hobbies or a dictionary word) 
and almost a third of respondents admitted to keeping a written record of their 
password (which further defeats the point of having one - especially if the information 
is left around for others to read). 
Finally, respondents were asked what they considered would be a reasonable length of 
time between password changes. Opinions here varied dramatically, as indicated in 
figure 3.1 below, and it should be noted that only 26% of users concurred with the 
view of 30 days that is advocated (Smith, 1989). 
19% 
30 days 
50 days 90 days 
Fig 3.1. Respondents opinion of password changes 
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The responses to the final section, personnel security, were also rather mixed. Some 
64% of staff were aware of security-related clauses in their contracts of employment 
(this would appear to be quite encouraging in the sense that, at the time of the study, 
the reference centre was still in the process of revising contracts to incorporate such 
clauses and. therefore, a fair proportion would genuinely not have incorporated them). 
Also encouraging was that almost all staff (92%) claimed to be aware of the Data 
Protection Act and how it applied to their information. 
However, problems were still apparent in that approximately two thirds of staff were 
unaware of the existence of local or general H C E security dociunentation. This 
represents a problem irrespective of whether the views were actually correct or not, as 
it means that the HCE is either failing to provide the documentation or promote 
sufficient awareness of its existence. 
The final questions in the survey actually concerned the issues of security training and 
on-going awareness initiatives. Unfortunately, the indications in both cases were 
disappointing, with only 25% of staff having received security training and 15% 
claiming to receive adequate security awareness. These figures would tend to explain 
some of the significant weaknesses observed elsewhere (e.g. the poor use of 
passwords). 
3.3.2) System Managers Survey 
This element of the investigation concentrated on the HCEs technical personnel, 
obtaining information regarding the security awareness and attitudes of the local 
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system administrators. The potential response base in this case was obviously 
somewhat smaller than that of the general user population. The survey was sent to all 
twenty system managers, who collectively run 36 computer systems in operation 
within Derriford Hospital. After a period of three weeks, a total of 14 responses had 
been received (i.e. a successfiil retum of 70%). 
The content of this survey was considerably different in that it was intended to elicit 
information from those who were responsible for selecting and implementing security, 
as opposed to those who were ultimately affected by it. As such, the prime issues 
covered were the respondents confidence in their own knowledge of security and the 
factors that they considered important when trying to incorporate it into their systems. 
As a result, few opportunities existed for direct comparison with the general staff 
responses. 
The survey intended to determine: 
- managers level of computers security knowledge; 
- organisational level of security training; 
- identification of security cost components; 
- human impact of introducing security; 
- departmental security set-up. 
(*Fumell etal. 1995) 
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The first questions of the survey related to security knowledge. In these 64% of 
system managers felt confident in their security knowledge and 71% of managers 
would like specific training relating to security. This seems strange as it implies that 
system managers require specific security training in order to improve their security 
knowledge and that of their users. 
The next section was concerned with costs and this section showed that 50% of 
system managers felt that consultants costs were very important when implementing 
security and 30% of system managers thought that training costs were irrelevant. This 
is important since it shows that more emphasis is placed on the cost of implementing 
security by outsiders, rather than the issue of training several hundred staff in how to 
use the security features. 
When it comes to implementing security, the most important issues is that of ease of 
implementation and here 85% stated that this was very important. The level of 
training required by staff was also considered to be very important (but not financially 
important) by 77% of system managers. 
When it came to training itself, 75% of managers felt that the level of training given 
and the cost of training was important and 50% of managers felt that the number of 
staff to be trained was important. This is shown in fig 3.2: 
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Rcipondants (%| 
80 
• Level 
• Number 
C o s t s 
Fig 3.2. Training Costs 
This implies that managers are more concerned with training costs, i.e. in-depth 
training is expensive and the time lost through training, rather than the number of 
people being trained. 
When the issue of the user impact of introducing security was considered, it was found 
that 92% of system managers were concerned if it would affect the way users use the 
system. Some 61.5% were concerned that the security would change the users job and 
30% were concerned if new security features created new jobs or responsibilities. This 
shows that managers were concerned to ensure that any change would not put users 
off using the system. 
This section of the questionnaire was concerned with departmental security set-up. 
The survey found that 77% of departments had a person concerned with security, 46% 
of departments has a general computer security policy and 20% had a policy dealing 
with portable PCs. The use of portable PCs was considered because they are the only 
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items of IT that are regularly taken off site. The response to these questions are shown 
in figure 3.3: 
Respondants (%) 
80 
• Sec Person 
• Sec Policy 
• PC Policy 
Fig 3.3. Levels of Security 
The chart shows even though 77% of the departments have a person concerned with 
security, these persons do not have the appropriate knowledge to develop 
departmental security policies or specific security policies. This implies the people 
concerned with security should be given further training to assist them. 
The final section of the questionnaire was concerned with users security training. This 
found that 71% of user were given initial security training but only 23% undertook 
regular security awareness programs. This is shown in fig: 3.4: 
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R»spond«nts {%) 
80 
• Training 
Awareness 
Fig 3.4. User Security Training 
This chart implies that after staff are given their initial security training they are not 
given any other security training. Hence staff may become less security conscious 
because they are not as aware or reminded about the security issues. 
3.4) Solutions to Problems Identified 
Within the Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority there are 36 main systems in 
operation (including radiology, ward nursing, pharmacy, library) from a number of 
suppliers. The users of the different systems seek guidance from the system managers 
about security and the quality of the advice that they are given varies. The lack of 
security knowledge within the system managers can be related to their non IT 
background. The trust personal has a good understanding of data protection principles 
and have a Data Protection Officer to help enforce the Data Protection Act (DTI, 
1993). 
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ixisting problems within the Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority 
jwing points have been determined by the two surveys, interviews with all the 
managers and interviews with a cross section of users: 
:owing describes the problems that existed within the Plymouth and Torbay 
\ulhority and within some systems: 
- no formal policy relating to IT security; 
-110 formal policy relating to PC security; 
- no formal training directly related to security; 
L: complete lack of any procedures relating to security matters; 
! K ) Jbrnial source of knowledge relating to security within the 
organisation, i.e. an IT security officer; 
i'oor use of passwords, e.g.; 
- the passwords are never changed; 
- passwords are shared between users; 
- a written record of passwords is kept by users; 
; ' j r use of levels of access; 
levels of access once set are never changed or checked; 
: • use of audit trials on systems; 
; ^ •^  use of VAX security features; 
:; :or ical problems with physical security, i.e. equipment being stolen; 
;:is*.orical incidents of'attempted hacking' by members of staff and outsiders 
using remote links; 
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- historical incidents of unauthorised data modification by members of staff; 
- historical incidents of vims infection on PC computers; 
- historical problem of data duplication effecting the accuracy of the data on 
the computer systems; 
- no formal virus checking procedure on most PCs; 
- problem with information control, staff able to dovm load 
information fi-om the main computer onto floppy disc. 
3.4.2) Steps towards improving security 
The following steps were taken to improve security within the Plymouth and Torbay 
Health Authority. 
SEISMED Project 
The role of the SEISMED has been mentioned in previous chapters. 
IT Security Committ^g 
A special committee was formed to look at issues of IT security. This committee has 
produced an IT security policy for the whole organisation (using the high level policy 
produced by the SEISMED project as a basis) and will also be looking at producing a 
PC securit>' policy. Some members of this committee will also produce and run 
security awareness seminars for system managers and users. 
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Trust Status 
As mentioned before Plymouth Health Authority were given independent trust status, 
becoming Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority. This meant that staff had to sign 
new contracts. In these new contracts are clauses relating to IT security and these 
would help to increase staff awareness, i.e. staff being held responsible for their 
actions. 
3.5) Security Cultuire 
Culture is defined as being values and beliefs which provide people with a 
'programmed way of seeing' (Pheysey, 1992). The function of culture within an 
organisation changes as the group matures. When a group first forms, its evolving 
culture creates a stable, predictable envirormient and provides meaning and identity. 
That same organisation many generations later may find that its culture has become so 
embedded that its serves only to reinforce the values of the older elements of the 
organisation (Schein, 1985). In these conditions counterculture is created by younger 
elements of the organisation, these countercultures are then absorbed into the main 
culture. A security culture is an example of one of these countercultures and is driven 
by both the dependence upon IT and by younger elements of the organisation who 
have greater understanding of IT. 
At a general level culture is defined by following (Pheysey, 1992): 
- national cultures; 
- value, goals and behaviours. 
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National Cyltyre 
National culture relates to different national management styles, the management of 
IT varies fi-om country to country. Research into the impact of culture and security is 
extremely limited. An example of Saudi Arabian national culture and security is 
described in Appendix E. 
Value, goals and behaviours 
In terms of security culture the use of an appropriate type of power encourages a 
certain type of behaviour, see fig 3.5: 
Organisational Goals 
Protection of Data 
Order Goals 
Legality 
Conforming 
Control 
Ideological Goals 
Involvement 
Understanding 
Fig 3.5, Security culture goals 
The diagrams show that there are different reasons for the protection of data. The data 
can be protected for legal reasons and also for the data can be protected because it is 
understood that disclosure of data is wrong. 
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Security culture can be defined as being a set of goals, i.e. understanding security, 
confirming to security guidelines in support of an overall goal, i.e. protection of data 
held by the organisation. 
3.5.1) Security Culture within the British NHS 
There are major security problems within the NHS (Barber, 1992), which are 
summarised below. 
Trends in NHS Systgms 
The trends in NHS computing are leading to more extensive use of I T systems. 
Within the NHS there are now more: 
- systems and terminals; 
- networks and database; 
- non-expert use of IT systems; 
- clinical systems; 
- safety clinical systems. 
Assets at Risk 
Systems used by the NHS are vital to its operation and they represents assets 
that need to be protected against all possible risks. 
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NHS Reforms 
The NHS reforms require IT in order to achieve the desired goals in a wide 
variety of areas: 
- registration of NHS trusts; 
- contracting and field maintenance; 
- data protection compliance. 
Securitv Concerns 
There are a number of reasons within healthcare why security is beginning to 
become important: 
- data protection; 
- draft E U directive on data protection; 
- health care evidence of security lapses; 
- audit commission reports. 
Security culture with the NHS is aimed primary at ensuring that staff are aware of 
security and what their responsibilities are in accordance to it. The NHS IMG 
(Information Management Group) suggests a fi-amework by which a security culture 
can be established within an HCE. The steps are shown below (Barber, 1992). 
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Establish Securitv Awareness and Responsibilitv 
The steps are: 
- determine the responsibility of senior management; 
- increase staff awareness of security issues; 
- review threats to data security and data protection. 
Hstahlish Computer Securitv Policy 
The steps are: 
- implement NHS top level policy; 
- make security a component of overall IT strategy; 
- specify an approach to security management; 
- produce an organisational security policy; 
- produce local systems security policies. 
Address the Computer Security Issue 
Look at ways of improving technical, physical, procedural and staff 
security. 
Address Staff Aspects 
Look at areas of: 
- staff selection; 
- security training; 
- security awareness; 
- motivation and leadership. 
Page 62 
Chapter 3; An Overview of Security Management 
Address Risk Assessment 
Undertake CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis Management Method) 
security review and develop security expertise. 
Appoint st^ff for security man^gemgnt 
Appoint: 
- data protection officer, 
- computer security officer. 
Svstems Development 
During development: 
- design in IT Security; 
- use formal development methods; 
- undertake software quality assurance. 
The IMG approach is being promoted within the NHS to help develop a security 
culture. But the main problem within the NHS is that it has a culture of co-operation 
and sharing information. Many staff find the concept of restricting data use and data 
access an alien concept and they are hostile to the introduction of security. There has 
to be a greater understanding of the NHS culture to ensure that it is easier for staff to 
accept the introduction of IT and security. Further research into this area is needed to 
help in the introduction of large NHS IT projects, e.g. the national NHS network 
(Sunday Times, 1995). 
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Chapter 4: Development of the SIM-ETHICS Method 
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4.1) Introduction 
An area of security management that has been considered is the implementation of 
security and the effect that this has upon staff, but thishas not been resolved. I t became 
apparent during the SEISMED project that this issue needed to be resolved. The 
authors interviews at the Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority showed an alienation 
between users and newly implemented computer systems. The reason for this was that 
users were not involved in the decision making or the design stage of the systems 
(Warren and Gaunt, 1994), It then became apparent that users would feel exactly the 
same about new security features that were being implemented. 
Research into the problem looked specially at two areas: 
- the use of different participational management techniques; 
- development of a methodology that could be used for the 
participational implementation of security. 
4.2) Participational Management 
At a theoretical level participational management is co-operation between 
management and staff. The advantages of such an approach are: 
- staff have ideas which can be useful; 
- effective upwards communications are essential to effective decision 
making at the top; 
- staff may better accept decisions i f they participate in them; 
- staff may work harder i f they share in decisions that affect them; 
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- workers participation develops a more co-operative attitude amongst 
workers and management; 
- staff participation may act as a spur to managerial efficiency. 
(Adams, 1984) 
Participational management can be used to manage small organisations or run national 
economies and the method has been used throughout the world. 
4.2.1) Example uses of Participational Management 
Co-operatives 
Co-operatives started in the UK in about the 1850s and tliey were formed by artisans 
to provide particulcu* services, e.g. food retailing, printing. Typically within a co-
operative there are three levels of participation: 
- workers; 
- other individuals (e.g. former workers); 
- other organisations (e.g. trade unions). 
(Jones and Svejnar, 1982) 
Each member has a equal vote when it come to decision making (usually conunittee 
based) and each member has an equal share of the profit. The co-operatives allowed 
for shared resources, experiences, skills and profits. 
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Co-operatives are common throughout the world, e.g.: 
- France (e.g. farming co-operatives); 
- Italy (e.g. engineering co-operatives); 
- Spain (Mondragon co-operatives (started and based in the Basque 
region of Spain)); 
- Israel (Kibbutzim); 
- former Soviet Union (Collective farms). 
The former Yugoslavia 
In the 1950's a law was passed entitled *Basic Law on the Management of State 
Enterprises by Working Collectives'. This law allowed the workers to participate in 
running the organisations for which they work. Further reforms in 1965 and 1970 
allowed for greater decentralised control of organisations by workers. Workers within 
the organisations were involved in decision making at every level via the use of 
worker committees. Within small organisations the system of self-management was 
effective (Stanic, 1988) but within the large state-run organisations the result was 
chaos. The organisation structure is shown in fig 4.1.: 
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Director 
Management 
Board 
Workers 
Council 
Workers 
Assembly 
Permanent 
Committees 
Fig 4.1. Yugoslavia Model of Self-Management (Zeffane, 1988) 
Self management implemented across the whole country has caused problems, this 
can be seen in table 4.1. 
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1953-64 1965-73 1974-79 1980-90 
Industrial 
Production 12.7 6.9 7.6 2.4 
Labour 
Productivity 2.2 3.2 1.7 -1.3 
Unemployment 
Rate 5.2 7.9 12.5 15.3 
Consumer 
Prices 4.0 14.2 18.2 208.7 
Table 4.1. The Decline of the Yugoslavia Economy (Average annual Growth rate %) 
(Zizmond, 1992) 
The table shows that between the period 1950-90 industrial production had collapsed, 
labour productivity also collapsed and the unemployment rate increased as consumer 
prices increased. The problems that self-management caused within organisations 
were due to: 
- bureaucrats and managers having privileged status; 
- inter-organisational relations and external contracts being 
handled by bureaucrats and managers; 
- workers having a lack of understanding and skill in handling 
and understanding decision making; 
- decisions being put forward without alternatives solutions; 
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- rampant bureaucracy within organisations; 
- increased strikes concerned primary with wages; 
- increased corruption. 
(Stanic. 1988, Rojek and Wilson, 1987) 
4,2.2) Conclusion 
After study of different participational management techniques it may be concluded 
that it would only work within small organisations or departments (Stanic, 1988) . The 
future of self-management is certain and the co-operative method wi l l continue to be 
used and is successful in areas where it has been used. The national use of self-
management seems limited to the countries of the former Yugoslavia but even this 
v^ill change. 
4.3) Development of SIM-ETHICS 
In order to combat the alienation between users and newly implemented computer 
systems, a new methodology was developed based on ETHICS (Effective Technical 
and Human Implementations of Computer based Systems) (Mumford, 1985). ETHICS 
had only been used for designing computing systems. Therefore a new methodology 
had to be developed, to handle the implementation of security and IT within 
organisations. The resulting methodology is called SIM-ETHICS where SIM stands 
for Security Implementation Method. 
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The philosophy behind SIM-ETHICS is that the development o f new technology is 
not only a technical problem but also an organisational issue. This issue is concerned 
with the effect that the process of change could have upon the organisation as a whole. 
The use of the SIM-ETHICS method allows for the hypothetical implementation of 
security countermeasures. This allows for the assessment of certain factors: 
- organisational impact of security; 
- technical problems of implementing security v^thin the organisation; 
- training issues related to security; 
- SIM-ETHICS grading of security countermeasures by a set criteria. 
SIM-ETHICS works through the use of committees to discuss group issues. Fig 4.2 
shows how the SIM-ETHICS committee fits into the existing healthcare managerial 
structure: 
Security 
Committee 
Implementation 
Committee 
SIM-ETHICS 
Committee 
Level 1 
Security/ 
tnplcmcnUtioB 
CoBunitee 
SIM-ETHICS 
Committee 
Level 2 
Fig 4.2. Participationa! Management Models 
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Level 1 represents a comprehensive managerial method of implementing security. 
Where a series of committees consider different aspects of security implementation. 
Security Committee 
The aim of this committee is to consider security at an organisational level and 
then oversee the implementation. 
Implementation Committee 
The role of this committee is to implement a particular security project, e.g. 
findings of a security review. 
f>IM-ETHICS Committgg 
The aim of this committee is to allow for user participation in the 
implementation of security. 
Level 2 represents a less rigid organisational structure as the role of the security 
committee and the implementation committee have been combined. The role of the 
SIM-ETHICS committee stays the same. 
4.3.1) The SIM-ETHICS method 
The following are the steps used by the SIM-ETHICS method. 
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1) Initial Committee Consultation 
The committee wil l be made up of a cross section of staff directly involved or 
affected by the implementation of the new security features, e.g.: 
- representatives of staff from the different departments affected by 
the change; 
- representatives of the IT department; 
- representatives of the other users who wi l l be using the new security 
countermeasures. 
The SIM-ETHICS method uses the participational approach in order to allow user 
input into the process of change. There are various levels of participation. 
Consultativg 
This is when an existing body, e.g. security committee, is used to implement 
the change process. This will then consult users on the effect that change wi l l 
have upon them. 
Representative 
This is when a cross selection of users effected by change are brought together 
into a design group. This ensures that representatives effected by change have 
the same powers in the committee as those bringing about change. 
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Consensus 
This is when all the staff effected by the change are involved in the design 
process. Representatives of the staff effected are elected to form the design 
committee. 
(Mumford, 1983) 
The committee wi l l decide initially on what should be considered the major impacts, 
e.g.: 
- the impacts of introducing security countermeasures; 
- U-aining of users; 
- cost of new equipment; 
- compatibility with existing clinical and administrative computer systems. 
Areas of consideration within the SIM-ETHICS method at this stage are as follows. 
Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is defined as the attainment of a good "f i t" between what employees 
are seeking from their work (their job needs, expectations and aspirations) and what 
they are required to do in their work; their organisational job requirement. 
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Effectivgngss 
This is defined as ensuring that tasks already being carried could be carried out in a 
more effective manner. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency is a set of support services which help individuals to work in a organised 
way with all the necessary back-up facilities which they require. These w i l l include 
information, materials, technical aids, specialist knowledge and supervisory help. 
Employees who do not receive support services which they regard as essential to their 
job performance are likely to become frustrated and dissatisfied. 
(Mumford, 1993) 
2^ Managerial consultation 
The intended security countermeasures are evaluated against the SIM-ETHICS criteria 
(see Appendix A) to determine the level of impact its implementation wi l l have. The 
criteria relate to: 
E^sg oflmpiemgntation 
How easy can new security features be added to a system and/or new security 
procedures added to an organisation? 
Training Issues 
What are the training requirements needed by the staff to use these new 
security features? 
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User Impact 
What is the impact that security could have upon users, e.g. how does it affect 
user satisfaction, efficiency or effectiveness? 
Organisational Impact 
What wi l l be the affect that security features could have upon the organisation, 
e.g. changing of the organisational culture? 
Human Issues 
What is the impact that security has upon a user firom the human perspective, 
e.g. changes of peoples jobs, creating new management roles? 
A representative of the committee would meet the following people: 
- system managers of existing clinical systems; 
- specialist IT managers, e.g. network managers; 
- managers and staff involved in implementing the 
new security features. 
At these meetings, issues relating to the introduction of the security countermeasures 
are discussed (as determined in Stage 1) as well as any other possible problems that 
managers could foresee. 
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3) Committeg Stage 
The views of the managers are discussed within the committee. It is now that 
initial problems are discussed, e.g. problems of introducing new security swipe cards 
(see chapter 8). 
The committee decides on how to approach the user consultation stage, such as: 
- what questions to ask; 
e.g. how do you feel about having to use new security swipe cards. 
- the type of user to be questioned; 
e.g. ward clerk. 
- the number of users to ask; 
e.g. every ward clerk. 
4) Users consultation 
A representative of the committee then meets the users to explain the 
proposed security countermeasures and then ask them a series of predecided 
questions. 
The security countermeasures are then re-evaluated against the SIM-ETHICS 
criteria to take into account the newly raised user issues. 
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5 ) Committeg Stage 
The views of the users are discussed. I f problems are found concerning the system, 
ways would be discussed on how to overcome the problem, e.g. increase the level of 
training. 
6) Post implementation review 
This meeting takes place after the implementation to determine i f any unforeseen 
problems have occurred and i f so discuss ways in which to rectify them. 
4.3.2) The use of SIM-ETHICS 
SIM-ETHICS was used to determine the impact of two new security countermeasures 
and a new computer information system at Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority. 
The new security countermeasures and IT system implemented were as follows. 
Countermeasurgs 
Physical Access Control Cards 
This considered the use of 'Swipe Cards' (see chapter 8) to control access of 
staff and visitors within the hospital. These wi l l be used mainly after working 
hours and in sensitive areas, e.g. maternity wards. 
Password? 
Users perception of the need for and use of passwords as a form of access 
control for computer systems. 
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IT System 
Information Display System 
A universal information display system that can be used by all users. The 
information that wi l l be displayed relates to: 
- general administration notices; 
- general guidelines, e.g. what to do in case of fire?; 
- clinical practices and protocols; 
- clinical guidelines, e.g. nationally produced guidelines. 
SIM-ETHICS was used to evaluate the security countermeasures and new computer 
system against a pre-defined criteria (see Appendix A for the fu l l set). These looked at 
the following issues: 
- ease of implementation; 
- training issues; 
- user impact; 
- organisational impact; 
- human issues. 
A full description of how the SIM-ETHICS methodology was used to evaluate the 
previously mentioned countermeasures and IT system can be found in Chapter 8. 
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Multimedia Healthcare Record System 
SIM-ETHICS was also used to suggest problems with the implementation o f a new 
multimedia system that was being developed as part of an NHS research project. The 
aim was to develop electronic health care records for all patients treated within the 
Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority for certain types of cancers (Plymouth and 
Torbay Health Authority, 1994). The medical record is the most important repository 
for information covering patient's healthcare. The traditional paper-based system 
suffers from serious drawbacks, relating to factors such as duplication of information 
and illegible handwriting (Ceustres, 1993). The system wi l l be PC based to allow for 
integration v^th existing medical computer systems. 
The perceived advantages of the system are that it: 
- is simple to use, so any member of staff should be able to use it; 
- allows for more accurate and complete storage of patient details during their 
treatment in different areas of the hospital; 
- allows for greater access to patient details by staff involved in the treatment, 
e.g. by general practitioners, community nurses; 
- improves the quality of patient data records, e.g. by reducing duplication 
and improving illegibly; 
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- improves the working relationship that exists between the clinical teams 
providing cancer services; 
- allows long term follow up of patients; 
- allows for instant access to medical records, 24 hours a day. 
(Warren etal, 1995) 
Fig 4.3 shows an overview of the system, including the main functional areas and 
illustrating the different types of data that exists. This data wi l l be contained within 
the new multimedia health record. 
The diagram shows that, although the system is being designed for the treatment of 
certain cancers, it wil l have a direct effect upon general practitioners, neighbouring 
trusts and several departments within Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority. The 
users could number several hundred staff with different requirements and needs from 
the system. 
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Fig 4.3. Medical Multimedia System 
Problems with implementation 
The main problems identified through using SIM-ETHICS to analyse the system 
specification are listed below. 
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1. Designing a system that meets user requirements and can be used by many 
different types of staff e.g., 
- doctors; 
- nurses; 
- laboratory staff; 
- radiographers; 
- community nursing staff; 
- general practitioners. 
2. Designing a multimedia record that incorporates data from the following 
information sources: 
- general practitioners; 
- hospital clinics and wards; 
- pathology and radiology departments; 
- oncology department; 
- community nurses. 
3. Determining the training requirements of users, such as: 
- determining the level of training needed; 
- number of staff to be trained. 
4. Initiating awareness programs to educate staff about multimedia and its 
implications. 
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5. Integrating with various existing computer systems. 
(Warren etal, 1995) 
4.3.3) Future use of SIM-ETHICS 
SIM-ETHICS has been combined with a risk analysis methodology to produce a new 
security advisory system (see chapter 6). The SIM-ETHICS stages of the system 
determines the impacts of the suggested security countermeasures. The security 
advisory system wil l allow non-security staff to carry out risk analysis reviews and 
then determine the impact that the security countermeasures could have. This new 
combination is at the forefront of risk analysis development, it is fully explained in 
chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5: Critical Review of Risk Analysis 
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5.1) Introduction 
Risk analysis is often the fu^t step that is taken in developing an organisational 
computer security policy. Risk analysis also determines the threats to IT systems, the 
vulnerabilities of IT systems and the countermeasures needed to protect them. It 
provides the justification for management in order to invest money in security. The 
aim of risk analysis is to help management strike an economic balance between the 
impact of risks and the costs of protective measures (FIPS 65,1979). 
Risk analysis is also concerned with protecting the information contained on the 
computer systems, especially the following aspects (explained in earlier chapters): 
- confidentiality; 
- integrity; 
- availability. 
An issue that has to be considered is the management of risk. This is concerned with 
selecting the best mix of security in order to achieve the greatest risk reduction for the 
lowest cost. 
5.2) The Theory of Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is based upon certain basic principles that are defined as follows 
(Pursall, 1992): 
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Any resources, item or information of value to an organisation, which 
i f compromised in some manner, would result in a loss. 
Threat 
A potential action manifested by a natural act, or an accident that could 
result in loss. 
Vulnerability 
Any weakness in security and controls which provides an opportunity 
for a threat to manifest itself in the form of a loss. 
The undesirable product of a threat that has occurred resulting in one or 
any combination of the following. 
Denial of access to information or systems for different time 
periods. 
Pgstrygtion. 
Destruction of information or systems. 
Disclosure 
Unauthorised disclosure of information. 
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Modification 
Accidental or deliberate alteration of data. 
Risk 
The measurable uncertainty of loss, expressed in terms of both the 
number of occurrences over a given unit of time, and the amoxmt of 
potential loss to the identified assets. 
Safeguard/Countenneasure 
A protective measure designed to reduce the possibility o f a loss of an 
asset. 
Risk analysis methods tend to be structured in a similar manner and are broken down 
into the following stages (Pursall, 1992). 
Asset Identification and Valuation 
This is concerned with identifying the assets of the organisation, e.g. 
IT hardware, systems etc. These assets are analysed to produce a 
prioritised list according to the criticality to the organisation. This 
prioritisation is based upon the loss of the system to the organisation, 
for example: 
vital system - its loss will be vital to the organisation; 
important system - its loss would cause severe disruption; 
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minor system - inconvenient but having no major impact. 
Thrgat Assgssmgnt 
In order to determine the potential threats to the organisation, the 
threats are classified as natural, accidental or deliberate. The 
threats are then separated by their probability of occurring and the 
seriousness of their impact. An example is shown in table 5.1, in 
relation to a hospital organisation. 
Threat Impact Probability 
Aircrash High Low 
PC Virus Outbreak Low/Medium High/Medium 
Burglary Low High 
Table 5.1 Example Threat Assessment of Hospital 
Vulngrability Analysis 
This is an analysis of vulnerabilities, highlighting flaws and weakness 
in existing and planned security, e.g. users share passwords. 
SafeguardXCountermeasure Selection 
Existing or proposed countermeasures are selected based upon their 
effectiveness against the threats and vulnerabilities that they are trying 
to combat, e.g. installing CCTV (Close Circuit Television) to protect 
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against a high risk of burglary. These countermeasures should also be 
evaluated against the cost/benefits, e.g. it may be cheaper to install 
improved physical security than a CCTV system. 
There are two types of risk analysis methods, as suggested by Anderson and Shain 
(1991). 
• Quantitative Risk Analysis Methods 
These risk analysis methods use data and also produce data expressed 
as a level of severity, e.g. high to low, or a scale of one to ten. These 
type of methods can also model other losses, i.e. damage to morale, 
political embarrassment. 
• Qualitative Risk Analysis Methods 
The risk analysis method uses and produces data via known quantities, 
e.g. monetary values, numeric estimates, frequencies of occurrences. 
These methods can only be used to model certain types of losses. 
Risk analysis systems have developed through several stages, including the following. 
Checklists 
These are a list of security options from which the reviewer would select the options 
appropriate for their organisation. At the end of the review the aggregated scores 
would be calculated and, from this, a list of appropriate countermeasures determined. 
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The advantage of using this method is that reviewers do not have to be specially 
trained and also the reviews are cheaper to undertake (Baskerville, 1993). 
Elementary Information Securitv Risk Analvsis 
The development of risk analysis provide a formal basis for evaluating vulnerabilities 
of computer systems and was attractive because the need for countermeasures could 
be justified. During this stage of risk analysis development, elements of risk were 
defined. Courtney (1977) defined two major elements of risk R: where P, the 
probability of an exposure occurring a given number of times per year, and C, the cost 
of loss attributed to such as exposure. Risk is then calculated as: 
The probability P is determined with the aid of Probability Range Tables which 
provide various subjective frequency times and an equivalent annual loss multiplier 
(Baskerville, 1993). These methods have been implemented as computerised decision 
support systems, e.g. LRAM and SPAN (see section 5.4). These methods 
oversimplify more complex information systems and also require a level o f 
maintenance to make them current. The methods suggest the 'best-fit' solution to the 
problem, which may be not be the actually required solution. (Baskerville, 1993) 
Mechanistic Engineering Methods 
These methods focus very much on the system requirements, (e.g. taking into account 
existing physical security) and they also focus on the security project life cycle 
(Baskerville, 1993), as shown in table 5.2. 
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Stage 1 Asset Identification and Valuation 
Stage 2 Threat Assessment 
Stage 3 Vulnerability Analysis 
Stage 4 Countermeasure Selection 
Stage 5 Implement and maintain countermeasures 
Table 5.2: Security Project Life Cycle 
These methods are also computerised and the systems are more advanced containing, 
databases of threats, assets and countermeasures. Such methods include C R A M M and 
RiskPAC (See section 5.3). These methods are very comprehensive and are useful for 
carrying out reviews of very complex systems. The different impacts, (e.g. 
modification, disclosure) are easily determined. The drawback is that the methods are 
very complex. Teams of staff are needed to carry out reviews and these require a high 
level of training. The software and licences needed to carry out the reviews can also 
be very expensive (Baskerville, 1993). 
Logical Transformation Models 
The aim of these models is to show the security problems and the solutions. The 
'logical' aspects of these models relate to the security process, whilst the 
'transformation' aspect relates to how the security process can be transformed in the 
work place. Examples of these models include ODESSA (See chapter 6) which was 
developed as part of this research programme. This method determines the security 
requirement of the organisation and then determines the various organisational 
impacts, (e.g. user impact, training requirements) by using SIM-ETHICS. Models 
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such as ODESSA are very new and, as such, research is still on going (Baskerville, 
1993). The perceived advantages are that they allow a more flexible approach of 
security design and there is less conflict between security and system usability. 
Disadvantages are that because they are still new, there is a general lack of experience 
about them. Because of the 'Transformation' aspect of the models, cost benefit 
evaluation is more difficult to carry out (Baskerville, 1993). 
5.3) Critical review of Risk Analysis methodologies 
A complete critique of the main risk analysis methods could not be carried out for a 
number of reasons. These were: 
- risk analysis methods are very expensive so that, it would be expensive even 
to buy a few risk analysis methods to evaluate; 
- the developers of the risk analysis methods would not provide information 
since it was commercially confidential information; 
- companies which have used the methods would not disclose information 
since it could undermine their security. 
Previous research into the area of comparing risk analysis reviews is extremely 
limited, with the only notable exception being the work undertaken by Wahlgren of 
Stockholm University, Sweden. He evaluated twelve of the most widely used risk 
analysis methods using the following criteria (Wahlgren, 1990). 
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5.3.1) Background 
This is the area for which the system was developed, e.g. government, military, 
consultancy etc. 
5.3.2) Type of System 
This describes the type of approach that the risk analysis system uses. As previously 
mentioned, there are two different types: 
- quantitative approach; 
- qualitative approach (both approaches are explained on page 90 
earlier in this chapter). 
5.3.3) Supported by a method 
As a risk analysis review is very time consuming and rather complicated, it is 
important that the system is supported by a method informing the user of which steps 
they should take. 
5.3.4) Size of System 
The size of the system relates to how extensive the systems are in terms of factors 
such as the number of questions etc. 
5.3.5) Automated Cost/Benefit 
One of the main purposes of systems using the quantitative approach is to find out i f 
new proposed countermeasures can be motivated in terms of cost benefit. 
Page 94 
Chapter 5 Overview of Risk Analysis 
5.3.6) Degree of Automation 
Some of the described systems are simply tools to help the analyst undertake a risk 
analysis reviews and this requires a lot of work by the reviewer. Some o f the systems 
already contain a considerable amount of knowledge built into them. This occurs 
typically when expert systems are used to build systems using the qualitative 
approach. 
5.3.7) Possibilities to change the systems 
Some risk analysis methods check the system under analysis to see i f they have any 
countermeasures in place, but these countermeasures can differ between organisations. 
Some methods allow the countermeasures to be remodelled to reflect a particular 
organisation. 
5.3.8) Gathering of Input Information 
For systems that use the quantitative approach to risk analysis, a vast amount of 
information is gathered (relating to asset values, threat frequencies etc.). This can be 
ver)' difficult to find within the system. It is important that the system models threats 
and assets in such a way that it is possible for the user to find accurate information 
easily. 
5.3.9) Reduction of processed infomiation 
While undertaking a risk analysis review, a lot of information such as threats, assets, 
threat-asset pairs etc. is obtained. The majority of this information has little 
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significance for the final results of the analysis. Some systems can reduce the level of 
information that is produced for the final analysis. 
5.3.10) Degree of Completeness 
Systems using the qualitative approach may have a set of required countermeasures 
for the system under review. These countermeasures should cover all aspects of 
security, e.g. physical, logical, disaster. 
5.3.11) "What i f Functions 
When a new system is developed, risk analysis is used to ensure it has the right level 
of security. In such cases it is important that the risk analysis system has a "What-if ' 
function, so the analyst can model different security solutions on different scenarios. 
5.3.12) Why function 
The results of a risk analysis can be very confusing for the user. When a rule-based 
expert system is used an important feature of the system is the ability to explain why 
it reached certain decisions. 
5.3.13) Dynamic threats 
Most systems model all threats in a static way, which means that a threat always has 
the same frequency of occurrence. Some systems use a more dynamic way to model a 
threat, by taking into account such factors as the motivation and the capability of the 
perpetrator. 
Page 96 
Chapter 5 Overview of Risk Analysis 
5.3.14) Multi valued loss 
Many systems not only use money to measure expected losses, but also qualitative 
values like loss of morale, political embarrassment etc. 
5.3.15) Recommendation of safeguards 
One of the main purposes of the quantitative system is to find weaknesses in the 
system being reviewed. I f a weakness is found, it is possible to recommend new 
countermeasures to reduce it. 
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5.3.16) Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods 
The most widely used risk analysis methods are shown below 
Number Area of 
of users Application 
MARION 15,000 Consultancy 
RiskPAC 1.000 Consultancy 
RiskWatch 800 Consultancy 
Rank-IT 600 Consultancy 
Predict 350 Consultancy 
Control - IT 300 Consultancy 
CRAMM 200 Government 
Melisa 200 Military 
Risiko 100 Consultancy 
Buddy System 80 Consultancy 
Risan 55 Consultancy 
BDSS 25 General 
Feros 17 Consultancy 
AnalyZ 15 Consultancy 
Analyes des Risque 11 Consultancy 
Programmes 
Arome+ 10 Consultancy 
DAFI 10 Consultancy 
X R M (eXpert Risk 10 Consultancy 
Management) 
BIS Risk Assessor 7 Consultancy 
SBA 5 Military 
SISSI 4 Consultancy 
Table 5.3. The most commonly used Risk Analysis Methods 
References: (S2014, 1993), (Computer Select, 1995) 
The above shows that most risk analysis methods are used in a consultancy role and 
are not specially used for healthcare. It is the general case that most consultancy 
methods are used within a business environment (Wahlgren, 1990). A comparison of 
the criteria used in the evaluation is given in table 5.4. Tlie above methods are fully 
described within the appendices. 
Page 98 
Chapter 5 Overview of Risk Analysis 
C o s s a c CRAMM Expert IST/ LAVA LRAM MARION M E U S A Control R I S K R I S K X s e c 
Auditor RAMP Matrix C A L C P A C 
1 Background Consult Gov. Consult Consult Gov. Military Consult MDitary Consult. Consult Consul t Consult 
2 Type of System Qua]. Oual. Qua). QuanL Both QuanL Both Qual. Qua]. QuanL QuaL Qual. 
3 Method Support Low High Medium Medium High Medium High High Low Low Low Low 
4 S ize Medium Large Medium Medium Large Medium Medium Medium Small SmaO Medium Medium 
5 Cost/beneTil No No No No No Y e s Y e s No No Y e s No No 
6 Automation High Medium High Low Medium Low Low HQh Medium Low High High 
7 Change Y e s No No n/a No n/a No No Y e s n/a Y e s No 
8 Input Low Medium Low High Low Medium Medium Medium Low Low Low Low 
9 Reduction n/a High n/a Low n/a High n/a n/a n/a Low n/a n/a 
10 Com^eteness High High Low n/a High n/a High High Medium n/a Low High 
11 Whal/If No Y e s No n/a No n/a Y e s Y e s No n/a No Y e s 
12 Why Y e s Y e s No n/a No n/a No No No n/a No Y e s 
13 Dynamic Threat n/a Y e s n/a No Y e s No No Y e s n/a n/a n/a n/a 
14 Multiva]. losses n/a Yes n/a No Y e s No No No n/a No n/a n/a 
15 Safeguard Rec Y e s Yes Y e s n/a Y e s n/a n/a Y e s Y e s n/a Y e s Y e s 
Table S.4 Comparison of Risk Analysis Methods 
Recommgndmions 
Wahlgren makes no recommendations about the use of a particular method for 
undertaking security reviews. The main reason for this is that the methods are 
developed for particular uses and cannot be used properly in domains other than those 
intended. For this reason, the methods are largely inappropriate to healthcare which 
has its own unique problems (as defined in chapter 1). 
The reasons why each of the above methods are inapplicable to healthcare are 
examined more specifically below. 
Page 99 
Chapter 5 Overview of Risk Analysis 
. CRAMM. L A V A . LRAM. MELISA 
These methods have been developed specially for use by the military and government. 
The problem is that they were developed for their own particular data usage, e.g. 
C R A M M was developed to handle the following data groups (CESG, 1992): 
Official Information Undefined. 
Restricted The compromise of this information would be 
likely to : affect diplomatic relations; make it 
more difficult to maintain the operational 
effectiveness of security organisations, 
etc. 
Confidential The compromise of this information would be 
likely to : damage diplomatic relations; damage 
the effectiveness of valuable security or 
intelligence operation, etc. 
- Secret The compromise of this information would be 
likely to : raise international tension; seriously 
prejudice public order, etc. 
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- Top Secret The compromise of this information would be 
likely to: lead directly to widespread loss of 
life; to cause severe long-term damage to the 
UK economy. 
CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis Management Method) was developed by the CCTA 
(Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency) in 1985. The system was 
designed to be used by central government departments (CCTA, 1992). Whilst 
CRAMM has been adopted for use within healthcare by the UK Department of 
Health. This may have been due to government departmental pressure and not the 
healthcare applicability of CRAMM (the use of CRAMM is discussed v^dthin the 
appendices). 
• COSSAC 
This system is extremely limited in its application and has not been developed fully. 
The versions of COSSAC that have been developed have been aimed at US 
governmental departments (this method is fully explained within the appendices). 
• Expert Auditor. Xsec 
These systems are auditor tools they are used to check the consistence and quality of 
existing countemieasures. These methods are not applicable for healthcare (these 
methods are fully explained within the appendices). 
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>IST/RAMP. RISKCALC 
These systems use a quantitative approach to determine the impact loss. Although 
RISKCALC was used during the SEISMED project to evaluate its performance 
(Kantzavelou, et al, 1993) the results were unconvincing. The main reason for this 
was the way RISKCALC expressed loss of healthcare data in monetary terms, it did 
not look at other implications, e.g. would loss of data affect patients treatment (these 
methods are fully explained within Appendix F). 
• MARION 
This method uses data produced by French insurance companies to determine risk 
levels and impacts. The majority of this data comes fi-om non-healthcare 
organisations, which means that the method is not healthcare specific (this method is 
fully explained within the appendices). 
• Control Matrix. RiskPAC 
These methods are used by consultants to determine the basic secuiity requirements of 
the organisation. This systems are very basic and determine loss e.g. loss o f patient 
data by monetary means. Because of their general nature these methods are not 
suitable for use within healthcare (these methods are fully explained within the 
appendices). 
Conclusion 
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None of the main risk analysis methods evaluated are suitable for use within 
healthcare. The reason for this is the special nature of healthcare and the data used 
within its environment (the use of risk analysis within UK HCEs is described in 
section 5.5). The majority of the risk analysis methods discussed in table 5.4 are of a 
very general nature and not suitable for healthcare. The risk analysis methods 
developed for the military and government are not suitable for healthcare because of 
their data requirements. 
5.4) Risk Analysis Methods 
This section presents an extensive and unique study of all the known risk analysis 
methods. This methods are grouped by their area of origin. 
Companies Own 
These methods have been uniquely developed for particular 
company's needs to carry out risk analysis reviews. Sometimes 
the method is also used by the company's customers (see table 5.5). 
These methods have been developed as generic methodologies that can 
be used by any organisation to carry out security risk reviews (see table 
5,6). 
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These methods are general risk methods, not specifically designed for 
security. However security systems can be reviewed by using these 
systems, but the problem first must be modelled (see table 5.7). 
Government 
Methodologies developed for the government tend to reflect their high 
requirements for national security (see table 5.8). 
Healthcare 
Methodologies developed specially for use within healthcare (see table 
5.9). 
Miliary 
Military risk analysis methods are designed to protect the highest 
level of data security classification (see table 5.10). 
Research 
These are methods that are still under development (see table 5.11). 
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The methods are as follows. 
CQPip^nigs Own 
Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type of Method 
ASIS Germany Paper 
BULLRAM France Computer 
Citicorp Operations Risk 
Assessment 
USA Computer 
Data Center Evaluation Checklist UK Paper 
I B M Methodology (Spain) Spain Computer 
Bureau IFAL Insurance Technical USA Computer 
PSICHE France Computer 
REASSURE Canada Computer 
Sofine Netherlands Computer 
Table 5.5 Companies own Risk Analysis Methods 
(The above methods are fully described in Appendix F). 
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Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type of Method 
Analyse des Risques Programmes France Computer 
AnalyZ UK Computer 
AROME+ France Computer 
BIS Risk Assessor UK Computer 
Buddy System USA Computer 
COBRA UK Computer 
Control Matrix Methodology for 
Microcomputers 
USA Computer 
Control - IT USA Computer 
COSSAC Canada Computer 
CRITI-CALC USA Computer 
DAFI France Computer 
DDIS Germany Computer 
EDV-Sicherheits-Check Germany Computer 
Expert Auditor USA Computer 
Feros France Paper 
GRA/SYS USA Computer 
IST/RAMP USA Computer 
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IS Case France Computer 
Janber USA Computer 
MACS France Computer 
MARION France Computer 
MicroSecure Self Assessment USA Computer 
MINIRISK USA Computer 
Predict! USA Computer 
QuikRisk USA Computer 
RA/SYS USA Computer 
RANK-IT USA Computer 
RISAN Netherlands Computer 
Risiko France Computer 
RiskCALC USA Computer 
RiskPAC USA Computer 
RiskWatch USA Computer 
SISSI France Computer 
SOS USA Computer 
SPAN USA Computer 
X.R.M (eXpert Risk Management) France Computer 
Xsec Sweden Computer 
Table 5.6 Consultants Risk Analysis Methods 
(The above methods are fully described in Appendix F). 
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Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type o f Method 
©Risk USA Computer 
BOSS USA Computer 
PRISM USA Computer 
Risk USA Computer 
Table 5.7 General Risk Analysis Methods 
(The above methods are fully described in Appendix F). 
GoYgrnmgpt 
Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type of Method 
Baseline Security UK Paper/Computer 
CRAMM UK Computer 
FIPS PUB 65 USA Paper 
L A V A USA Computer 
PARJS UK Paper 
RiskPAC (Federal) USA Computer 
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Table 5.8 Government Risk Analysis Methods 
(The above methods are fully described in Appendix F). 
Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type o f Method 
ZIP UK Paper 
Table 5.9 Healthcare Risk Analysis Methods 
(The above methods are ftilly described in Appendix F). 
Mil i tary 
Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type o f Method 
ANSSR USA Computer 
ARES USA Computer 
LRAM USA Computer 
Melisa France Computer 
SDC US Navy Risk Assessment 
Methodology 
USA Paper 
Security by Analysis (SBA) Sweden Computer 
Table 5.10 Military Risk Analysis Methods 
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(The above methods are fully described in Appendix F). 
Research 
Risk Analysis Name Country of Origin Type of Method 
SARA European Union Paper 
SEISMED Risk Analysis Method European Union Paper 
SESAME HYPERVIEW France Paper/Computer 
Table S.I 1 Research Risk Analysis Methods 
(The above methods are fully described in Appendix F). 
5.5) Use of Risk Analysis within UK Healthcare 
Within the UK, the NHS use two main risk zmalysis methods (described in 5.4). These 
are: 
5.5.1) CRAMM 
CRAMM has been adopted by the NHS IMG (Information Management Group) as the 
'de facto' standard for risk analysis. The reason for this is that it has been developed 
for civil service use. The IMG suggested that when organisations carry out risk 
analysis reviews they should use CRAMM (IMG, 1992). The method is computer 
based and runs on an IBM PC. 
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The advantages of using CRAMM are: 
- allows for extensive security risk analysis reviews to be undertaken; 
- allows "What - I f facilities to allow reviewer change the data values and 
determine the impact that this has; 
- CRAMM allows for backtracking, in that a review can backtrack 
any earlier stage in order to determine the reasons for the findings. 
- produces cost-benefits details. 
The disadvantages of using CRAMM are (O'Connell and Patel, 1992): 
- that it was designed for use within a government/commercial environment 
and it may not really be suited for healthcare environment. It does not 
take into account specific security problems within the healthcare 
environments in the following ways: 
- does not suggest how the countermeasures may be 
implemented; 
- CRAMM was designed as a consultants tool; 
- in order to use CRAMM staff have to go on training courses; 
- some of the countermeasures produced by the system are not 
very descriptive; 
- the impact analysis of assets is designed for a civil service 
perspective, 
e.g. an example question asked relating to political 
embarrassment 
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"Would disclosure of data cause civil unrest or cause 
the government to resign?" 
- i f the skills do not exist within the organisation already to 
carry out a CRAMM review then expensive 
consultants have to be hired; 
- reports produced by CRAMM are not easy for staff to 
understand. 
5.5.2) ZIP 
ZIP has been adopted by the NHS Information Centre as a standard risk analysis 
security method. The aim of ZIP is that it is used in security reviews o f small PC 
systems (less than 8 machines). The ZIP methodology is based upon the principles of 
CRAMM. 
The actual methodology is paper based and is contained within a single booklet, 
simplistic Also contained is a questionnaire that is used to value the system assets. 
The advantages of using ZIP it is; 
- cheap to use; 
- simple to use; 
- no training required to use method; 
- quicker then undertaking a ftiU security review; 
- covers a area that CRAMM neglects such as PCs. 
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The disadvantages of using ZIP are: 
- the method is limited due to the fact that it is contained in a single booklet 
and due to its size does not address the healthcare issues (mentioned in 
previous chapters); 
- designed for use within a government/commercial environment may not 
really be suited for healthcare environment. It does not take into 
account specific security problems within the healthcare environment; 
- does not suggest how the countermeasures may be implemented; 
- problems with determining impact values e.g. applying the same figure to 
determine general security, local area network and financial system; 
- does not contain cost benefit details. 
5.5.3) SEISMED Risk Analysis Method 
Work within the A I M SEISMED Project has produced a risk analysis method that 
may in the future be used within the NHS. The risk analysis method was developed 
specifically for healthcare (Davey and King, 1995) but is at the moment not widely 
used. 
The advantage of using this method are: 
- designed specifically for use v^thin healthcare; 
- cheap to use; 
- simple to use; 
- no training required to use method; 
- quicker then undertaking a fiiU security review. 
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The method also has disadvantages, which are; 
- the method is paper based; 
- the method is a cut down version of CRAMM and so includes the 
weaknesses of CRAMM and amplifies them; 
- does not suggest how the countermeasures may be implemented; 
- some of the countermeasures produced by the system are not very 
descriptive; 
- determination of impacts and threats is very simplistic; 
- limited number of countermeasures. 
5.6) Problems of Using Risk Analysis 
The biggest problem of risks analysis is that staff have to be specially trained in order 
to use the method. The major resource required for risk analysis is man power - highly 
skilled manpower. I f management want meaningful results they must be willing to 
commit the resources necessary for such an undertaking (Pursall, 1992). 
Research into the use of risk analysis has shown that industry needs 'smart' risk 
analysis tools, capable of modelling the system environment in a few broad strokes 
(Anderson and Shain, 1991). In short what is a needed is a risk analysis tool that is: 
- *user friendly', so that general management and technical staff can 
use the system; 
- able to produce easy to understand reports; 
- complete with an extensive on-line help facilities; 
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- inexpensive to buy; 
- able to run on a standard PC machine. 
(Warren et al, 1996) 
5.7) Conclusion 
This chapter has explained what risk analysis is, why it is used and the problems that 
can occur. This chapter has also evaluated twelve of the most widely used risk 
analysis methods and has shown that none of them were suitable for use within 
healthcare. The current state of risk analysis within the UK NHS was also reviewed 
and again it was found that current methods used were not really suitable for 
healthcare. 
In conclusion the use of risk analysis allows the identification of problems within an 
organisation and also suggests countermeasures that can be used to reduce risk. It is 
still the job of management to decide what to do with the information that they are 
given; poor security is often linked to poor management. The next chapter describes a 
new risk analysis methodology developed for use within healthcare. 
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Chapter 6: Development of the ODESSA 
(Organisational DEScriptive Security Analysis) 
Method 
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6.1) A new risk analysis method for healthcare 
Chapter 5 has demonstrated that there is a need for a computerised risk analysis 
method that is healthcare specific. 
The development of this healthcare methodology and computerised system proceeded 
in tv '^o main phases. 
Stage 1 Development of a generic risk analysis method for HCEs 
This paper based method was developed as part of the SEISMED Project 
(Fumell et al, 1993) and is explained fiiUy in section 6.2. 
Stage 2 Development of the ODESSA method 
This method was developed as a progression of the HCE generic risk method. 
Some problem associated with the HCE method was corrected and major new 
concepts added. The method is described in section 6.3 and the prototype 
computer system is described in chapter 7. 
6.2) The Generic Risk Analysis method for HCEs 
As stated in 6.1 there was a need for a methodology that could be used for the 
identification of security requirements in healthcare computer systems. The method 
developed was an attempt to allow system administrators or computer security staff to 
carry out a security review of their own system (Fumell et al, 1994). 
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6.2.1) The HCE method 
The major rationale behind developing the method was that security-relevant elements 
of existing systems are (Fumell et al, 1994): 
Information = Computer + Operational + Data 
System Configuration Environment Sensitivity 
The rationale of the methodology is that similar organisations/systems wi l l have 
similar security requirements and a key factor in the approach was to devise a number 
of predetermined security "profiles" for each element of existing systems. 
The main elements of the methodology are now considered in more detail. 
Computer Configuration 
This refers to the IT assets (both hardware and software) of the organisation. At a high 
level it is possible to identify a relatively small number of elements which may be 
included in any given computer configuration, as shown in figure 6.1. Individual 
systems would be considered to determine which elements are applicable, and 
counlermeasures selected accordingly. 
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Computer 
Configuration 
System Type Netwofic Type 
Mintcompufer 
/ Mainframe 
Desktop PC Portable 
/ Laptop 
StandJone Networlced Stand^one Networked 
Fig 6.1 : Computer Configuration group 
Examples of associated baseline countermeasures were identified for each 
configuration and are grouped around the following areas: 
- physical; 
- disaster planning; 
- system; 
- procedural; 
- personnel. 
Operational Environment 
This considers the nature of the environment in which the IT assets are actually located 
and used. It has a significant effect on the types and levels of protection that are 
required. The factors relate to the location of the site, the type of buildings and the 
people who have access to the site. Appropriate combinations of these factors can be 
used to describe the majority of health care establishments (i.e. fi*om GPs to general 
hospitals). 
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Data Sensitivitv 
The sensitivity of data is determined by its type and the way that it is used. 
• Data type 
In consultation with a number of HCEs within Europe, the general care activities 
carried out by hospitals, general practitioners, conmiunity health care centres, and 
various other support services were examined. This enabled a generic model o f 
medical data to be developed as the basis for further investigation (Sanders and 
Fumell, 1993). The model is comprised of 12 main data groups, as described in table 
6.1. The purpose is to allow a simple means of specifying what data is available 
within a system and help in the allocation of appropriate sensitivities, thus simplifying 
the process of identifying how and where data is located in different computer systems 
and networks. 
The information used by the HCE may be of varying levels of sensitivity and this wi l l 
again be highly dependent upon the cases involved, i.e. data ranging from information 
about to HIV/AIDS patients to information relating to book loans from a hospital 
library. 
The model groups are of a (necessarily) broad nature (see section 6.3.1), but they may 
be divided into further levels of detail as required. For example : 
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Patient Care 
Episode information Specific needs 
Dates of admissions / discharges Health Care Delivered 
Staff Involved Drug Therapy 
Diagnosis including clinical coding/s Outcome of the treatment 
Care Plan Consultants and anaesthetists reports 
The model provides a generic framework that should encompass all data required by a 
HCE. Specific medical applications may store and communicate information from all 
of the data groups, or a particular subset of them. It is consequently possible to map 
such applications onto the model, indicating the data groups that are involved and 
from this derive the basic sensitivity of the information. 
Incorporating this factor of data sensitivity into the methodology demands that an 
appropriate range of general uses can be identified. Related work within the 
SEISMED project (Gaunt and France, 1993) has determined a high level set of data 
uses that are appropriate for our purposes. A total of 9 categories are considered, as 
described in table 6.1. 
Data Use Description 
Operational Clinical Used in the planning, delivery and monitoring of patient healthcare. 
Emergency Care Provision of care in a clinical emergency, where optimal conditions and / or 
information cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, only a mininHim set of essential 
data is required, with HCE*s relying on their own training and experience. 
Critical Clinical Control of instrumentation / systems in direct feedback loops (e.g. control of 
radiation dose administration to cancer patients). Data availability and 
integrity essential in such contexts. 
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Expert Systems Use in decision support tools or neural networks, which aid clinical diagnosis 
and interpretation or general management of H C E . 
Operational non-clinical Use of information that supports the H C E infrastructure, but does not directly 
influence the care of individuals. 
Financial Use of data in financial systems for contract management, purchasing and 
patient billing. 
Planning & resource 
management 
Systems used for aggregation of patient data for planning and clinical review 
purposes. 
Quality Management Systems using data for clinical audit, assessment of care efficiency and 
outcome. 
Clinical Research Identifiable or anonymised data used for research purposes. Normally utilises 
aggregated data. 
Table 6.1 : General categories of medical data usage 
Sensitivity rating 
Sensitivity is quantified in terms of several different types of impact that may relate to 
the data in the system. As previously identified in chapter 5 four main types of impact 
can be used, with appropriate countemieasures being given in each case. 
Disclosure Unauthorised disclosure of information to HCE staff or 
outsiders. 
Denial Denial of access to the information for varying periods. 
Modification Accidental or deliberate alteration of the information. 
Destruction Destruction of the system or information. An extreme form of 
unavailability. 
The type and use of the data will have different influences over the protection 
requirements in each of these cases. 
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Disclosure 
Data type is the most significant factor in determining the confidentiality 
requirement, as data wil l generally portray the same information in all contexts. 
The protection afforded should, therefore, remain constant regardless of which 
application uses it. However, data usage may still have some effect as it can 
influence problems arising through data aggregation. It is conceivable that i f 
certain data elements are combined, then the impact of disclosure may be 
greater than that of any one element in isolation. 
Denial, Modification and Destruction 
The requirements for these are primarily determined by the data usage, as the 
context wi l l determine the seriousness of the impact, e.g. modification of 
medical treatment notes could seriously harm a patient. 
Impacts are rated low, medium or high (where low indicates that the baseline 
countermeasure level is satisfactory, and high is the maximum protection that can be 
provided). The level is determined by considering a number of potential influencing 
factors : 
- confidentiality (both personal and commercial); 
- disruption; 
- embarrassment; 
- financial loss; 
- legal; 
- personal safety. 
For example, the disclosure of sensitive patient care information to HCE outsiders 
could be seen as a serious risk in terms of legal action, patient personal privacy and 
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embarrassment to both the patient and the HCE. The level of impact w i l l in turn 
determine the level of countermeasure. 
Countermeasures 
Actual security countermeasures are identified and refined at various stages within the 
methodology, they are categorised under three headings. These are distinguished as 
shown below: 
- baseline countermeasures; 
- appropriate countermeasures; 
- selected countermeasures. 
(These are explained flilly in section 6.3.1). 
Methodology Implementation 
The following describes the specific steps by which the methodology would be 
implemented when considering individual existing systems. In order to apply the 
method the following factors would need to be identified for the specific system / 
application being considered: 
- computer configuration involved; 
- type of operational enviroimient(s); 
- data groups involved; 
- purpose of application (data use). 
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Countermeasures would then be derived as shown in figure 6.2. 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Identify 
Computer 
Configuration 
Identify 
Operational 
Environment 
Establish 
Data 
Sensitivity 
Detemiines 
Determines 
Configuration 
Countermeasures 
(CMS) 
Environmental 
CMS 
Detennines 
Sensitivity 
CMS 
Stage 3 
Appropriate 
CMS 
Fig 6.2 Methodology Implementation Steps 
At each stage appropriate countermeasures would be selected from corresponding 
categories (NB: it is likely that some duplication may occur in terms of the 
countermeasures suggested within different categories). 
The stages of the methodology are expanded as follows : 
Stage 1 : Determine basic system profile; 
Inputs : None; 
Output : Baseline Countermeasures; 
Description : Categorise computer configuration and operational environment of 
the existing system according to pre-determined profile categories. 
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For computer configuration choose appropriate elements from : 
- laptop / portable; 
- desktop PC; 
- mini / mainframe; 
- network. 
For operational environment categorise elements o f : 
- location; 
- buildings; 
- people. 
Stage 2 : Determine Data Sensitivity; 
Inputs : None; 
Output : Data-related countermeasures; 
Description : Establish data types and uses, Select countermeasures based upon 
sensitivities encompassed. 
Choose appropriate level from each of (as shown below): 
- disclosure countermeasures; 
- denial countermeasures; 
- modification countermeasures; 
- destruction countermeasures. 
Stage 3 : Determine appropriate system countermeasures; 
Inputs : Baseline Countermeasures, Data-related Countermeasures; 
Output : Appropriate System Countermeasures; 
Description : Generate countemieasure set that would satisfy the requirements of 
the existing system. 
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Stage 4 : Select system countermeasures; 
Input : Appropriate Countermeasures; 
Output : Selected (final) System Countermeasures;. 
Description : Refine countermeasure set by considering any HCE specific factors 
/ constraints that may apply. 
6.2.2) Problems with HCE method 
Developed as a paper based method, it was only when the method was being assessed 
for use as a possible model for a computerised system that the following problems 
were found: 
- the "Data Sensitivity" concept was weak when tested, the combination of 
data type and data use would not in practice since there are too similar; 
- the concept of generic group "mapping" for particular systems would not 
work in practice; 
- the use of the disclosure, denial, modification and destruction impacts 
within the method would be difficult to use in real life; 
- the countermeasures groups needed to be amended; 
- some of the operational envirormient categories would be difficult to 
implement, i.e. people factors; 
- no specific section of the methodology relating to threat assessment. 
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6.3) The ODESSA Methodology 
The ODESSA methodology was the continuation of the work carried out on the HCE 
generic risk analysis model. The rationale of ODESSA (Organisational DEScriptive 
Security Analysis), is that at a basic level, organisations wil l have similar security 
requirements, but beyond this basic level the security countermeasures are unique to 
each organisation. 
Within ODESSA, security is examined from the context of the whole organisation, 
with all factors that influence the organisation being considered. These may range 
from the location and age of buildings, to the sensitivity and type of data. The method 
was developed as a generic methodology that could be used within most 
organisations, but initially it was developed for use within healthcare. 
6.3.1) The Method 
The key elements have been incorporated into a framework as shown in figure 6.3. 
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Operational Organisational 
Environment Type 
Baseline Organisational 
Countermeasures Requirements 
Appropriate Organisational 
Countermeasures Impact 
Selected 
Countenneasures 
Figure 6.3. ODESSA melhodology overview 
This illustrates the steps involved (at a theoretical level) in determining the security 
requirements for an organisation. The ODESSA system suggests three sets o f security 
countermeasures. 
1) Baseline Countcrmeasures. 
These represent the minimally acceptable security countermeasures that an 
organisation should have implemented. These countermeasures are applied in 
a generic manner, e.g. every hospital should have the same baseline security 
countermeasures. 
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2) Appropriate Countermeasures 
These represent the unique organisational security countermeasures. They are 
based upon of questions from which data sensitivity profiles are formed. The 
countermeasures reflect the type of organisation, e.g. a GP would not have the 
same countemieasures as a hospital. 
3) Selected Countermeasures 
These represent the selected countermeasures from 1) and 2) that have been 
applied against the SIM-ETHICS impact criteria and then accepted by the 
user. The impact varies between organisations, e.g. the impacts of a 
countermeasure would be different between a GP and a hospital. 
The relationship of the countermeasures are shown in fig 6.4. 
Appropnate 
CMS 
Basehne Cbuntermeasures 
Fig 6.4: Relationships of the Countemieasures 
The main elements of the methodology are now considered in more detail. 
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Organisational Environment 
This considers the environment in which the organisation's assets are located, which 
may affect the level of protection required. Table 6.2 gives examples of environmental 
considerations that have to be considered for a medical environment. 
Type Options Comments 
Location Inner City Location may indicate risk of vandalism, theft. 
- may result in a need for increased 
physical security. 
Urban 
Rural 
Location may indicate risk of theft. 
- may result in a need for a C C T V 
system. 
Location may be many miles from emergency 
services, i.e. fire station. 
- may result in increased fire drills, fire 
awareness schemes, automated fire 
fighting system, etc. 
Building Old/Modem Age of building may indicate risk of fire, 
disasters, etc. 
-may result in a review of buildings, 
looking at electricity wires, water 
pipes, etc. 
Table 6.2. Organisational Environments 
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Organisational Type 
This relates to the different organisational types that exist within a business sector. 
The baseline security countermeasures are tailored to these different organisations. 
Within the SEISMED project a comparison was made of past healthcare security 
reviews, which helped to form the baseline security needs for the different types as 
shown in table 6.3. 
Type Description 
C P (Single) 
OP (Practice) 
Community 
Hospital 
A single doctor working amongst the community, location of surgery is 
within the community, i.e. in converted house. 
A group of doctors working in the community, location of surgery is 
within the community, i.e. purpose built surgery, large converted house. 
Units used for specialist patient health care , i.e. special home nursing, 
speech therapists. Community units are based within the community, 
within a variety of different sites. 
Units used for the direct treatment of patients, i.e. specialised surgery, 
general surgery, radiotherapy, etc. These organisational types tend to be 
in very large units and based in one location or within a variety of different 
sites. 
Table 6.3. HCE Organisational Types 
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Organisational Baseline Security 
Work on the SEISMED project has shown that within a healthcare environment that 
certain HCEs have the same countermeasure installed at lower levels. The concept of 
baseline within ODESSA relates to the minimal security levels requirements that a 
HCE organisation should have installed. These levels were determined by comparing 
results of different HCE security reviews and examining different HCE security 
guidelines, such as: 
- A I M SEISMED Guidelines for Information Systems Security in Existing 
Systems (Sanders and Fumeli, 1993); 
- A I M SEISMED High Level Security Policy for Healthcare Establishments 
(Katsikasand Gritzalis, 1993); 
- CCTA Baseline Security for IT Systems (CCTA, 1993); 
- DTI (Department of Trade and Industry) A code of practice for Information 
Security Management (DTI, 1993); 
IMG Basic Information Systems Security (*IMG, 1992). 
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The ODESSA baseline security countermeasures are divided into particular groups, as 
shown in table 6.4. 
Security Type Sub groups Description 
Disaster 
Physical 
Hardware 
/Software 
Human 
7 
5 
10 
Relates to disaster prevention, contingency planning. 
Relates to physical protection of sites and assets. 
Relates to protection of computer systems and the data 
contained within them. 
Relates to training, procedural issues, etc. 
Table 6.4. Security Groups 
The countermeasures are defined as being physical, procedural, programmable or 
communicational countermeasures. 
Organisational Requirements 
At this stage the use of the data is considered. Organisations use similar data types, 
which require similar countermeasures, e.g. encryption of personal data. The 
ODESSA system uses a set of HCE generic data types (Sanders and Fumell, 1993), as 
described in table 6.5. 
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Data Use Description 
Patient identification 
Patient administration 
Patient care 
Clinical services 
Finance 
Staff 
Resource management 
and planning 
Library and information 
systems 
Expert Systems 
General information relating to patients. 
Information used in patient day-to-day scheduling of 
non-clinical activities. 
Contains medical history, diagnosis care decisions and treatment 
information relating to patients. 
Information used for planning of clinical services (not patient 
related). 
Information relating to all aspects of finance that are involved in 
the operations of HCE. 
Personal information relating to HCE staff. 
Information used in the management, monitoring and planning of 
HCE. 
Details of existing medical knowledge that is used by clinical. 
staff. 
Information used by decision support systems or neural networks 
used within the HCE. 
Table 6.5 HCEs generic data types 
Once the type of data has been decided, its sensitivity has to be defined. The 
sensitivity impacts of the data are as follows: 
- denial; 
- destruction; 
- disclosure; 
- modification. 
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The data impacts are also determined as percentages, in addition as being rated low, 
medium and high. The sensitivity values and data types are determined from a series 
of questions to the appropriate staff of the organisation, which then are used to 
produce a security profile of the organisation under review. Figure 6.5 shows the steps 
involved in determining the organisational requirement 
Determine 
Data Usage 
t 
Data 
Sensitivity 
Overall 
Disclosure 
Impact 
Overall 
Denial 
Impact 
Overall 
Modification 
Impact 
Appropriate 
Countermeasures 
Overall 
Destruction 
Impact 
Appropriate 
Countermeasures 
Figure 6.5 Organisational Requirement 
The stages involved are detailed below. 
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Stage 1 Determine Data Usage 
The user of the system picks the data types that the organisation uses, which are 
associated with certain countermeasures, e.g. levels of access, encryption. 
Stage 2 Data Sensitivity 
The user answers a series of security related questions. The replies determine the 
overall impact of disclosure, denial, modification and destruction. The 
countermeasures are generated from the answers and the overall levels of impact. The 
questions relate to possible threats that could affect the organisation. 
Organisational Imp9Ct 
Any security countermeasure that is being implemented wi l l effect the organisation as 
a whole. The impact is determined from a set of impact criteria that has been used as 
part of SIM-ETHICS (See chapter 4), 
The use of this criteria allows management to determine the impact of introducing 
security. It relates to the following questions. 
Ease of Implementation 
How easy can new security features be added to a system and/or new security 
procedures added to an organisation? 
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Training Issues 
What are the training requirements needed by the staff to use these new 
security features? 
User Impact 
What is the impact that security could have upon users, i.e. how does it affect 
user satisfaction, efficiency or effectiveness? 
Organisational Impact 
What wi l l be the affect that security features could have upon the organisation, 
i.e. changing of the organisational culture? 
Human Issues 
What is the impact that security has upon a user from the human perspective, 
i.e. changes of peoples jobs, creating new management roles? 
Example Scenario 
The scenario is that of a single GP (General Practitioner - primary community care 
provider), based in an old building located in an inner city. 
Stage 1: Determine Baseline Countermeasures 
Stage 1.1 Determine Organisational Criteria 
Determine baseline security criteria from the above information. 
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Organisation type: GP Single 
Building Type: Old 
Location: Inner City 
Stage 1.2 Determine Baseline Countermeasures 
Summary of some of the baseline countermeasures identified for the GP. 
Pisastgr and Damage Protection 
Physical Coyntgrmgasyre 
Adequate site fire protection. 
Fitting of smoke detectors. 
Hardware/Software 
Programmable Fgaturgg 
Use of passwords to protect systems. 
Software Training/Use 
Procedural Countermeasures 
Offence to use imauthorised software. 
A l l users should be trained in the packages which they wi l l use. 
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Special Consideration 
Inner City 
Physical Access Control 
Physical Countermeasures 
To counter an increased risk of theft and vandalism improved 
physical security should be introduced, i.e. window locks, 
secure locks on doors. 
Stage 2: Determine Organisational Requirement 
Stage 2.1 Determine Data usage 
The data types are selected from a list of nine data types (see table 6.5). In this 
example the GP uses the following data types : 
- patient identification; 
- patient administration; 
- patient care. 
Stage 2.2 Determine Data Sensitivity 
The data sensitivity impacts are determined by answering a series of questions related 
to the sensitivity impacts. 
i.e. I f there were problems with your system, would the delay cause any of the 
following: 
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a) patients may be kept waiting for treatment; 
b) patients may receive inappropriate treatment; 
c) patients may receive inappropriate treatment resulting in additional time 
spent in hospital; 
d) patients may suffer immediate harmful problems due to lack of treatment. 
The hypothetical sensitivity impacts for the scenario are as follows. 
Denial 
Destruction 
Disclosure 
Modification 
Medium 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Stage 2.3 Determine Appropriate Countermeasures 
Certain countermeasures are specific to the type of data used and its function, i.e. 
Data Usage Example Countermeasures 
Patient Identification 
Patient Administration 
Patient Care 
Encryption of data 
Use of levels of access to ensure only 
authorised staff have access. 
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The next step is to determine the countermeasures for data sensitivity. The type of 
countermeasures for a particular sensitivity would be dependant upon the impact 
level. 
The following are examples of some countermeasures. 
Data Sensitivity Level Example Countermeasures 
Denial 
Destruction 
Disclosure 
Modification 
Medium Disk shadowing. 
Resource control. 
Medium Alternative process arrangements. 
Contingency plan development. 
High Encrypted storage. 
Secure disposal of media/paper. 
Medium Checksums of data. 
Audit of modifications. 
Stage 2.4 Determine Security Profile 
The next stage is to determine counlermeasures which are unique to the organisation. 
These are determined by having the user answer a series of questions. For example: 
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Question 
Hardware/Software Related Questions 
Are special provisions made for the use of portable PC's? 
Countermeasures 
Hardware and Software Related 
PC Protection 
Physical Countermeasure 
Ensiu-e portable PC is secured when in transit. 
Procedural Countermeasure 
Removed important information when portable PC is in transit. 
Programmable Countenmeasure 
Encrypt the contents of the hard disc. 
Implement password protection system. 
Stage 3: Determine Organisational Impact 
The countermeasures are reviewed and the appropriate SIM-ETHICS criteria 
selected. The impacts are dependant upon the type of organisation and each 
countermeasure would have a unique impact description. 
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Example use of SIM-ETHICS criteria 
Sample Counlermeasure 
Introducing security awareness program. 
Criteria 
Ease of Implementation 
Once the basic program framework has been determined i t can be repeatedly 
used. 
Training Issues 
Awareness program may be included as part of initial computer training for 
new staff. 
Training seminars should be held on a regular basis, i.e. once every two 
months. 
User Imp^gt 
Users wi l l be more aware about security, therefore security problems should 
be reduced, i.e. virus outbreaks, passwords naming conventions. 
Qiganisationgl Impggt 
The program wi l l help raise security awareness amongst all staff and help 
establish a security culture within the organisation. 
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Humffl Issues 
Expertise for such a training scheme might not exist with the GP's staff, 
therefore outside help would be needed in setting up the awareness program. 
6.3.2) Analysis of the ODESSA method 
ODESSA as a Logical Transformational System 
The concept of "Logical Transformational Risk Analysis" system is explained in 
chapter 5. ODESSA is one of these systems since it determine the security 
requirement of the organisation and then determines the various orgemisational 
impact, i.e. user impact, training requirements by using SIM-ETHICS. 
Security Expertise 
The knowledge used for the ODESSA system were acquired from a number of 
sources, these were: 
- formal risk analysis security reviews of major systems within Plymouth 
and Torbay Health Authority and Plymouth Community Trust; 
- personal experience of implementing security and interviewing staff 
within the Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority and Plymouth 
Community Trust; 
- knowledge gained from research undertaken within the EU (Europeem 
Dnion) SEISMED Medical Security Research Program; 
- discussions with commercial organisations about security issues; 
Page 145 
Chapter 6: Development of the ODESSA Method 
- discussions with security consultants about security issues; 
- knowledge obtained from literature review of security guidelines; 
- results obtained from security questionnaires; 
- SIM-ETHICS criteria evaluation of security countermeasures lists 
produced by various security risk analysis methodologies, i.e. 
CRAMM. 
(Warren, Sanders and Gaunt, 1994) 
Advantages of ODESSA 
The advantages of the ODESSA system are: 
- designed for use with healthcare by healthcare personnel; 
- designed to be easy to use; 
- overcomes the problems of the HCE generic risk analysis method (as 
described in 6.2.2); 
- incorporates the SIM-ETHICS "change control" methodology. 
Disadvantage of ODESSA 
Because of the Logical Transformation' aspect of the melhod,.cost benefit evaluation 
is more difficult to carry out, but this problem has to be resolved in order to give 
management the information that they require. 
Page 146 
Chapter 6: Development of the ODESSA Method 
6.4) Conclusion 
The chapter has described the development of risk analysis method that has been 
designed specifically for use within healthcare. The chapter also describes in detail the 
development of: 
- HCE Generic Risk analysis method; 
- ODESSA. 
ODESSA was not designed as a paper based method, it was designed to be 
computerised so that HCE staff could easily use the system. This logical continuation 
is described in Chapter 7, which describes the development of the ODESSA computer 
prototype. 
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Chapter 7: Development of the ODESSA 
Prototype System 
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7.1) Introduction 
Chapter 6 described the development of the paper based ODESSA methodology. 
However it was considered that the method should also be computerised in order for it 
to be effectively used by HCE staff. It was therefore decided to develop a prototype 
computer system that would encapsulate the ODESSA methodology. The ODESSA 
prototype, was designed : 
- to be 'user friendly', so that general management and technical staff 
can use the system; 
- to be able to produce easy to understand reports; 
- to have extensive on-line help facilities; 
- to be inexpensive to buy; 
- to be used on a standard PC machine (see below). 
(Warren, etal 1996) 
To run the ODESSA system the user needs the following minimum PC requirements: 
-486SX PC or better; 
- 4MB main RAM; 
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- 4MB free hard disc space; 
- 1MB video card running at 1024 x 768 screen resolution. 
ODESSA vvill run on a lower screen resolution, but some text may be missing or not 
aligned correctly. This is because the layout of the screens wi l l change between 
different screen resolutions. 
7.2) Design Considerations 
During the development of the ODESSA system the following areas were considered. 
Expert System 
At the early stages of the system development it was envisaged that an expert system 
would be developed (Warren et al, 1994) (see chapter 8). Later it became apparent that 
ODESSA would not have to be an expert system but a system that gave "expert" 
advice. During this time several system design methodologies were assessed but 
known were suitable for developing ODESSA. 
Visyial ggsig 
Visual Basic was chosen as the language in which to develop the system because it: 
- allowed for the development of PC windows based systems; 
- allowed for the development of powerful user interfaces; 
- was able to produce independent stand alone systems; 
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- was compatible with other packages being was using, e.g. 
Microsoft Access; 
- was easy to use. 
Prototyping 
A prototype is defined as being: 
- a working model of an information system, which emphasises aspects o f the 
system. 
(Vonk, 1990) 
A prototype approach to developing the ODESSA system was selected because of the 
advantages this method gives, as summarised below: 
- it allows for the quick development of computer systems 
(especially when using a languages such as Visual 
Basic); 
- it reduces uncertainty about the nature of the problem; 
- the testing phase of system development would be shorter; 
- it is easier to develop the ful l system with skills learned from 
prototype development. 
(Vonk, 1990, Avison and Fitzgerald, 1989) 
The inherent problems of developing a prototype were accepted, but it was decided 
that the problems would not have a major impact on the work. These problems are 
that: 
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- prototyping is inefficient for developing large systems; 
- the prototype model is not complete and only performs certain 
tasks; 
- the prototype would be unsuitable for integrating with other 
systems or packages. 
(Avison and Fitzgerald, 1989) 
7.3) Explanation of ODESSA System 
The ODESSA system is split into three mains sections: 
- stage 1 - baseline security determination; 
- stage 2 - security impact/profiling determination; 
- stage 3 - impact analysis. 
The system was designed so that the separate stages can be run independently. The 
ODESSA system interfaces with the following packages; 
- Microsoft Access (a database system); 
- Microsoft help creation system. 
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The sections of the ODESSA system are described using the following format: 
Screen - relates to the name of the screen v^thin the system; 
Function - relates to the function of the screen within the system; 
ODESSA Function - relates to the function of the screen in terms o f the 
ODESSA methodology. 
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7.3.1) ODESSA Stage I 
This stage of ODESSA is concerned with determining the baseline security 
requirements for an organisation and is made up of the follov^ng screens. 
Screen: Introductory Screen 
Function This screen is the opening title page for the system. 
ODESSA RISK ANALYSIS SYSTEM 
by Malthew Warren 
Network Research Group 
Fig 7.1. Introductory Screen 
ODESSA function: None 
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Screen: 
Function: 
Choice Selection 
The screen allows the user to decide which options they wish to 
use: 
Baseline review - goes to baseline security review; 
Overview - goes to CM overview area; 
End - ends program. 
ODESSA Risk Analysis System 
Baseline Review 
uver\rtew 
End 
Fig 7.2. Choice Selection 
ODESSA Function: None 
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Screen: Baseline Review Selection 
Function: User has to select options from the criteria below in order to determine 
the organisations security requu-ement. 
Organisation type: GP(Single); 
GP(Practice); 
community; 
hospital. 
Organisational Buildings: old style; 
new style; 
mixture. 
Location of organisation: inner City; 
urban; 
rural. 
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OpOoni 
Oro*niJ*IionAJ Type 
Baseline Security Advice 
Ofgantt^tontl BuMngi | | Locatton o< 0rfltntt4llon | 
Fig 7.3. Baseline Security Requirements 
ODESSA Function: Selections from this screen determine the organisational criteria 
for selecting baseline security countermeasures. 
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Screen: Baseline Security Selection 
Commands: The user can look at selected Countermeasures (CMs) by selecting: 
Disaster 
Hard/Software 
Physical 
Himian 
Special 
shows baseline disaster CMs; 
shows baseline hard/software CMs; 
shows baseline physical CMs; 
shows baseline human CMs; 
shows special CMs relating to the 
organisation. 
Options 
Baseline Security Selection 
Fig 7.4. CM Selection 
ODESSA Function: By viewing the CMs the user can select the ODESSA baseline 
CM details for future use. 
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Screens: Baseline countermeasures for: 
Disaster; 
Hard/Software; 
Physical; 
Human; 
Special screens. 
Function: The user can interrogate the baseline countermeasures they 
have selected. They can also print the CM details. 
Options 
Hospital Baseline Security 
Disaster Countermeasures 
,Escn b o a of c i i o l i imcH etnutd be pcoiccBid bytn ftpttmpriaio fuse a d i o t t broahct. 
T l K i u c f a u u l i l l w . . 
& M f i w w f a i n p r o y t t m i D M w i t h B g r i g n w d turn m J fcwfc^y u f c u i ^ . 
w q i i l B T f >toq and •airrtiBBno plfc» p t o w d u f t and •q i i ip i—rt»<l i parte nla/ a a i r t M to b w l d m i i wnaznaban: 
h wqulM Ut>*q ot taw aJamt: 
aaevmmmma flw pipfrtiM tmrratMomt dltphivd hHudlaq q flaw pkc trt fiw •q^mMoiid ndn; 
nJy 1 m pmfcBi* Oin wrwilqlnq fir* dn/wy 
t rcQUla d o a ^ boocatti O o o A g oad c f t n u v u l A c r o l a f l u m b l i } wasto RttSrt&ls mof arcMBBlaTo: no ccmbvsdUo Bs ic i tdb OOKIS I> a ooai c i l c i a l or b s u i d o u s afcaa . 
I bin <WM* and tmrm: b w . 
R e m n r o DoKOlaa u d A l f t n s 
L^lA]r=adceaokfl dcf f icBre B i d ataras cbooW ba bstal lBd to eo t invr ia tc pocMons ro p n M d o certy« 
Fig 7.5. CM details 
ODESSA Function: The user can look at the results of the baseline review. 
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Screen: Countermeasure overview screens (selected from main screen). 
Function: The user can view all the baselines security CMs, e.g. look at 
all disaster countermeasures groups. 
Disaster Planning 
Countermeasure Groups 
HRre Protection 
•Water Protection 
•Disaster i - Damage Protection 
•Continuity ol Operation 
• Eqiapment Failure Protection 
BlPower Proteclionl 
• Contingency Planning 
Cancei; 
Fig 7.6. C M Groups 
ODESSA Function: None. 
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7.3.2) ODESSA Stage 2 
This stage is concerned with suggesting countenneasures which are unique to the 
organisation. The unique countermeasures are defined by determining: 
- organisations data usage; 
- organisations data sensitivity; 
- organisations security profile. 
Screen: Organisational Selection 
Function: This informs the user of their organisational type that they choose in a 
previous stage (useful i f the user is running stage2 again). 
Options 
Organisation Selection 
Organisational type for this stage is GP(Slngle) 
Fig 7.7. Organisational Selection 
ODESSA function: None 
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Screen: Data Usage 
Functions: This section of the prototype is not fully implemented (due to 
time constraints). In the complete system the user would select 
the data types and this would result in certain countermeasures 
and predefined risk levels being set. 
n 
Options 
Data Usage 
I PallBnl Idantincatlon 
I Patient Administralion 
I Pallem Care 
COnlcaJ Services 
| n n » n c e 
[gjSgSS] I Resource Manageflient | |o5:^5a| 
I Ubraiy Systems | |p^c i»a to ' i | 
Expert Syitem | |o6tBgo»| 
"^Tfr?— 
Fig. 7.8. Data Usage 
ODESSA function: This determine the data use of the organisation. From this data 
security countermeasure and risk levels can be defined, e.g. 
data used for clinical decisions would be regarded as more 
important then administralion data, since clinical data is used 
for the treatment of patients. 
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Screen: 
Function: 
Data Sensitivity 
The user must answer a series of questions. The questions relate 
to responses to different considerations and scenarios, such as: 
- embarrassment; 
- safety; 
- privacy; 
- legal; 
- commercial confidentiality; 
- financial loss; 
- destruction of physical components. 
The user must answer the questions relating to the scenario and 
its impact on the following: 
- denial of service; 
- destruction of equipment; 
- disclosure of data; 
- modification of data. 
j2ptlons 
Data Sensitivity 
Safety 
This ¥ri]l be relevant to safety critical or medical treatment. Modification ol such data 
would be important but its unavailability or destruction may also be relevant. 
There would bo DO ealat/ 
i n p liCBlioo I . 
An individBQl would Buffef aiaot 
tnQltreo.tineot or Injury. 
[DEN] DES PI 
ml m 
M 
An iBdrwidnal would tuSor mors 
lliaa minor maltraatmanl or bjnry. 
Thoro would bo aoltniotmoirt or 
inituy to covQrel pooplo. 3V 
T h i r o w o d d ba «arioita 
irmltraalnm&l or death ol st toast 
one peraoa. 
LVCancel^' 
Fig 7.9 Data Sensitivity Screen 
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ODESSA function: This stage of ODESSA determines the risk levels that are used 
later within the system to allocate the level of required 
countenneasures. 
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Screen: Summary of Risk levels 
Functions: Once all of the questions have been answered a summary of 
risk levels are shown. These are rated as low, medium or high 
and as percentages. 
Options 
The user also has the option of viewing the risk levels as a 
graph. 
Summary of GP(Single) Risk Level 
Risk Score « RUc l^vel 
Dcnia] Level 
I Destfuction Levd | 
Dlidoturft Level | 
I Moifificalion Level | 
I Overall Level [ 
60 
63 
60 
60 
61 
Medhjin 
Uedlum 
Medum 
Medium 
Uedhim 
Cancel 
Fig 7.10. Summary of risk levels 
ODESSA function: This informs the user of the risk levels, so when the 
countermeasure are suggested they have an idea of their 
magnitude. 
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Screen: Impact countermeasures 
Function: User has the option to look at impact countermeasures relating 
to: 
- denial; 
- destruction; 
- disclosure; 
- modification. 
ODESSA function: Allows the user to look at the countermeasures determined by 
the data sensitivity. 
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Screen: 
Function: 
OpUons 
Security Profile Selection 
In order to determine a unique security profile, the user must 
answer a series of questions. The questions relate to the 
following areas: 
- disaster; 
- hardware/software; 
- physical; 
- human. 
Security Profile Selection 
Disaster 
Hardware /Software 
m % Physical 
Human 
m view Profile CM's 
End 
Fig: 7.11. Security Profile Choice 
ODESSA function: The user must answer a series of questions that are unique to 
their organisation. Countermeasures recommened are 
dependant upon their replies. 
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Screen: Disaster, Hardware/Software, Physical and Human Profile 
questions. 
Functions: The user must answer a series of questions by selecting 'Yes' 
or 'No'. 
Options 
Security Profile Selection 
.options 
GP(Slngle) 
rtnna ynnr rwijrmiataiim bnn iwiJiliij U 
Fig 7.12. Security profile questions 
ODESSA function: This part of ODESSA produces countermeasures that are 
unique to the organisation. This is because they are asked about 
existing equipment or procedures. 
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Screen: Profile Countermeasure Selection 
Function: The user can select which profile countermeasure groups they 
wish to see. The groups are: 
- disaster; 
- hardware/software; 
- physical; 
- human. 
ODESSA function. The user can look at the countermeasures which have been 
produced via the profiling section of 0DESSA2. 
7.3.3) ODESSA Stage 3 
The stage is used to review the countermeasures organisational impact. The SIM-
ETHICS methodology is used to evaluate the impact of the countermeasures. This 
stage will currently only work GP (single) and GP (Practice) because of time 
constraints during the development of the prototype. 
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Screen: ODESSA Impact Analysis Screen 
Function: The user can select the following: 
- view baseline countermeasures; 
- view ODESSA stage 2 countermeasures. 
Options 
ODESSA Impact Analysis 
1 A Stage 1 (Baseline Countermeasures) 
Stage 2 (Security Analysis) 
End 
Fig 7.13. Impact Analysis Choices 
ODESSA Function: None. 
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Screen: Baseline countermeasure screen 
Function: The countermeasures groups selected from ODESSA stage 1 
are displayed. I f a group cannot be selected, a message appears 
infomiing the user of this fact (the screen is displayed over the 
previous screen). 
Options 
£S>tlons 
GP(Slngle) Baseline 
Data Available Data Not AvaDable 
heasures) 
hard/Son 
^ Physical CM Data 
Human CM Dala 
f:c^i=| 
Fig 7.14. Baseline Coumermeasure Groups 
ODESSA function: None. 
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Screens Disaster, Hard/Software, Physical, Human countermeasures screens. 
Functions: Shows baseline countermeasures. By clicking on a countermeasure the 
SIM-ETHICS impact is described (the screen is displayed over the 
previous screen). 
Options 
GP(Single) Baseline 
Disaster CM's 
opuons 
1-dwwnwnlMl b i d 
I I 
f.*»/BiiUiaMq FittL 
Eacfc Item B< cqt^ 
n J — to pioMb< 
Sto/GulMIng RR | 
r.»i/Buiiifcq rv»| 
RoonWaaaS 
LwLHDyiKrtdl. 
Overview of Impact Analysis 
A r m akrtutHlOT n a p r r ^ n i n n a t i N r a RianUw] Im p^mland. wt t ttnad n> n^kTnfyr: 
|Ea;ootlmplo«icnTBacn 
Tnunitni h t i U L l 
I t a M o t m i M C t 
Expand 
No M r inpad 
Fig 7.15. Impact analysis of countermeasure 
The user can expand the impact analysis details by clicking on the 
expand button. This gives a more descriptive analysis of the 
countemieasures impact, as shown next. 
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TIJ9-
ilpUons 
Overview of Impact Analysis 
* • ! « iboiM b* a «p»cac ana «*ar» MMUnq h p » » k w i t mm » B M 1 b M or s M a y t ; 
|Tr.^.im Imparl Ha ImpBO. 
UMfUnMO Mu 
I l l M i a w l ^ M C t I N n t m p n n 
C«fK«l 
M l 
Fig 7,16. Expanded Impact Analysis 
ODESSA Functions: This part of the system demonstrates the SIM-ETHICS 
analysis of the data. The analysis determines the organisational 
impact of introducing baseline security. 
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Screen: ODESSA Stage 2 Countermeasure details 
Functions The user can select which countermeasure to look at. The 
countermeasures are: 
- sensitivity countermeasures; 
- profile countermeasures. 
This screen is displayed over the ODESSA Impact Analysis 
Screen. 
OpUons 
ODESSA Impact Analysis 
i 
Lilians 
^res) 
Stage 2 CM Details 
I Sensithrity Counlenneasurei 
I Profile Countermeasures 
Fig 7.17. ODESSA Stage 2 Coumermeasure Selection 
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Screen: Sensitivity countermeasure screen 
Function: The user can look at the different sensitivity countermeasures 
that were chosen. The countermeasures relate to the following 
impact areas: denial; destruction; disclosure; modification. 
The user can select a countermeasure which then simunarises 
its organisational impact. The user can expand this to a more 
descriptive analysis. 
ODESSA ftinction : This part of the system demonstrates the SIM-ETHICS analysis 
of the data. The analysis detemiines the organisational impact 
of introducing impact security counlermeasures (the screen is 
identical to Fig 7.15). 
Page 175 
Chapter 7: Development of the ODESSA Prototype System 
Screen: Profile countermeasures screen 
Function: The user can look at the different profile countermeasures 
that were chosen. The countermeasures relate to the following 
profile groups: 
- disaster; 
- hardware/software; 
- physical; 
- human. 
The user can select a countermeasure which then summarises 
its organisational impact. The user can expand this to a more 
descriptive analysis. 
ODESSA function : This part of the system demonstrates the SIM-ETHICS analysis 
of the data. The analysis determines the organisational impact 
of introducing the unique profile countermeasures (the screen is 
identical to Fig 7.16). 
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7.4) Limitations of the ODESSA system 
As described earlier the system was designed as a prototype. This means that the 
system is not fully developed and the following issues wi l l have to be resolved to 
develop a complete system: 
- stage 3 of ODESSA wil l currently only work for CPs and new 
data wil l have to be created to extend stage 3. The system wi l l 
then be able to determine the impact analysis for community 
healthcare units and hospitals as well; 
- a full set of countermeasures wi l l have to be developed; 
- the help facilities wi l l have to be extended; 
- certain features of the system have yet to be implemented (e.g. 
data usage in ODESSA stage 2); 
- some print routines are not fully implemented. 
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7.5) Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the development of the ODESSA prototype, it explained: 
- the design considerations; 
- analysis of the separate stages of the ODESSA system; 
- limitations of the ODESSA prototype. 
Future areas of development are explained in chapter 9, which presents the 
conclusions of the research. 
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8.1) Introduction 
The development of new methodologies as the solution to a problem is insufficient in 
itself. The solution must be validated in order to determine its quality and worth. The 
validation of the new methodologies previously described took the following form: 
- the SIM-ETHICS methodology was validated by using it within a 
HCE environment; 
- the ODESSA methodology was validated by sending details and in some 
cases the prototype system to security experts for evaluation. 
8.2) Validation of the SIM-ETHICS method 
The follov^ng countermeasures were being implemented within the Plymouth and 
Torbay Health Authority. It was decided to use the maternity ward as a pilot study 
area to elicit views from users via the use of SIM-ETHICS regarding the following (as 
described in chapter 4). 
1. A new access control system; 
2. A new password procedure; 
(this was changed to the concept of password use 
and the users were only approached about this matter) 
3. A new computerised information system. 
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In total 15 users were interviewed from the maternity department representing a cross 
section of users within a very small department. These are broken down into the 
following groups; 
Management 2 
Administration Staff 4 
Medical Staff 9 
The questions asked in the review can be found in the Appendix. 
8.2.1) SIM-ETHICS Review 
The maternity managers were interviewed relating to the introduction of: 
- access cards; 
- computerised information system. 
The aim of the review was for the users to raise concerns which the management 
could resolve. 
8.2.2) Managers view of Access Cards 
Overview 
These cards wil l have dual use as they wi l l be used to enforce access control of 
selected areas and will also be used as identification cards. 
Page 181 
Chapter 8: Validation of Research 
Access control systems are being implemented in the following areas: 
-child health; 
- maternity units; 
- certain extemal doors. 
At the moment access card control systems are used in: 
- pharmacy; 
- hospitals main computer suite. 
The access control cards will be conU-oUed by a central computer system based in the 
main security office. This system wil l record details of which areas staff have access 
to and where staff are present. 
Training 
Training wil l consist of a talk to a number of users. This talk wil l explain the basic 
operation of the system and how the cards work. 
Problems 
Ensuring that staff are made aware of wider issues, e.g. the fact that the card expires i f 
it is not used for 30 days. 
The number of people being trained could cause problems, e.g. child health 
directorate has around 1000 staff. I f the access control system is implemented across 
the whole organisation, around 4000 staff wi l l have to be trained. This excludes the 
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use of cards by visitors. It is planned that all 15 external doors would be controlled by 
the use of access cards. 
Comments 
The system managers have to inform security about new staff so that they can be 
given a card. 
Problems may occur in the future i f all the access card systems are not standzu-dised. 
8.2.3) SIM-ETHICS evaluation of Access Cards 
Ease of Implementation 
Implemented with an extensive amount of effort. Therefore certain areas of the 
hospital wi l l have access control before others. 
Training 
Training is needed on one of two levels, departmental or the whole organisation. 
Training could be implemented by a mixture of: 
- demonstration of cards to certain staff, e.g. system managers within the 
department, so these staff can train the rest of the department; 
- circulation of leaflets explaining how to use the cards and what to do in 
unusual circumstances, e.g. staff losing their card. 
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Organisational Impact 
The countermeasure could affect the way minor tasks, e.g. cleaning staff may feel it is 
inconvenient to use an access card. 
The countermeasure wil l change the culture of the organisation. It wi l l help to enforce 
the 'Security Culture' concept to staff and may be combined with security awareness 
programs to promote this even further. 
8.2.4) Users view of Access Cards 
Overall 
Access cards were accepted as being needed and there was overall support for 
implementation. It was also accepted that it would help raise security awareness 
amongst staff. 
Ixmlng 
It was the general consensus that managers should be trained on how to use the 
system. They could then train the remaining staff and help with any problems, e.g. 
loss of cards. 
Issygs Raised by Users 
Users would like the following; 
- procedures should be in place to quickly cater (i.e. in and out of normal 
working hours) for staff replacement of cards; 
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- procedures to quickly change individual access rights within the wards. 
General questions raised by users were; 
- how reliable is the access card equipment? 
- how easily could be the card be damaged accidentally or just through general 
use? 
Operational Questions raised by users: 
-how would access cards be issued to visitors and how should they be held 
accountable for these cards? 
- how can staff verify that visitors are related to children, e.g. an uncle? 
- would there be an override facility on the access control system in case of 
emergency? 
- would the access cards system become inoperative during a fire or large 
medical emergency? 
Other Points 
The use of access cards could help to stop children leaving the wards and wandering 
around the hospital. 
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Some staff were concerned about the time it may take them to realise that their card 
has been stolen, during which time the thief would have their access privileges. 
Staff were in favour of having access control mechanisms on the drug dispensing 
units. Staff felt that the use of the system would stop any thefts that might otherwise 
occur. 
Staff felt that they initially would have to be reminded about wearing their I D badges, 
since it acts as the access card. 
8.2.5) Managers view of VTX (Video TeXT system) 
Overview 
VTX is a system that is used to display various types of HCE information, e.g. hazard 
notices, clinical information, ward procedures or urgent information. The aim is to 
ensure that users are given the information that is relevant to them. 
The notices wi l l be sent out via a distribution list. Once a notice has been read a 
message wi l l be automatically returned to the system to signify this event. 
Another aim of VTX is to use the system within clinical departments to circulate 
details relating to practice guidelines, surgeon protocols, and the like. 
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Pilot Stage 
This stage wi l l be used for the transmission of safety and hazard notices to business 
managers, clinicians and departmental heads. The pilot stage v ^ l l then be extended to 
cover clinical procedures for haematology. 
Training 
Users wi l l be given a simple instruction guide and there wi l l also be open days 
explaining how to use the system. The system itself is designed to be simple to use. 
Training within clinical departments should be top down to ensure that common 
procedures are used in each department. This is important in clinical teams where 
non-lT staff (e.g. nurse) would be the main users. 
Problems 
Accuracy of the information entered on the system is very important, e.g. is the 
intended drug dosage data relevant for children. It is important to control which 
people have the right to put information onto the system. 
I f the system becomes very successful it could 'snowball', with the systems original 
aims being forgotten and non-relevant information being entered on the system. 
Comments 
The system is what the users want rather then something that is being forced upon 
them. The system is likely to grow as a result of the users demanding more from it.. 
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8.2.6) SIM-ETHICS evaluation of VTX 
Ease of Implementation 
Implemented with an extensive amount of effort. Implementation wi l l be based upon 
user types and areas, e.g. system managers, business managers, clinical areas. 
Training 
Training needs to be given to a few people (e.g. system managers) who can then train 
others. Because the system is designed to be user friendly, it is assumed that staff 
would not have difficulty using it. i f users have problems they should be able to 
contact their system managers. 
User Impact 
VTX should help to improve user satisfaction through the use of the computer system. 
VTX should also improve users job efficiency and effectiveness. 
Organisational Impact 
The use of VTX wil l dramatically change the way notices and guidelines are 
distributed within the organisation. 
The culture of the organisation may change in the following ways: 
- the organisation moves towards a greater acceptance of IT; 
- the organisation accepts IT in ways that were not planned for, e.g. V T X 
expands to cover new areas such as Community Health; 
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- the system 'snowballs' and similar systems are developed, e.g. notice boards; 
- the development continues until it is out o f control and problems 
occur, e.g. inaccurate information being entered on the system. 
Hum^n Issues 
Certain jobs may be restructured, e.g. the person who currently photocopies staff 
notices may have this duty taken away. 
8.2.7) Users v i e w o f V T X 
Overall 
It was felt that the VTX system would help to overcome the problem of large 
numbers of memos being sent within the organisation. 
Training 
User made it clear that any training information sent with monthly paycheques would 
be ignored. 
The users expect a comprehensive VTX training manual to be produced. 
Users expect key staff to be ftilly trained so that they could train the remainder of the 
staff. 
Any training conducted during dinner break would not be acceptable to staff. 
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Issugs Rgisgd by Users 
Practical problems 
The following points were raised by users. 
- What would happen i f the system fails? 
- There is a problem due to lack of terminals in wards, existing terminals are 
heavily used for clinical systems. 
- Which members of staff would get the task of entering the information on 
the system? 
Tgchnig^l Problems 
The users enquired about the following: 
- is it possible to determine who sent the memo? 
- is there an option to print the memos? 
- would there be a facility to save and retrieve memos? 
- how would the system prove that staff have read memos sent? 
Other Points 
Some staff (e.g. nurses) would not fully trust all the information displayed on the 
terminal, this is because they are not confident in the use of IT. 
There was some concern about the type of information that could be entered on the 
system, e.g. confidential information. 
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Some staff had worries relating to the fact that information displayed on screen is not 
legally treated the same as written information. 
Some staff suggested that the VTX system may cut down human interaction, which 
they see as being very important. 
8.2.8) Users View of Passwords 
Overall 
Users see the overall need for passwords on computer systems. 
Issues Raised 
Users wonder i f the frequency of password changes should be related to their 
individual usage of a system. 
Users would prefer to define their own passwords rather then be given computer 
generated passwords. 
Problems 
Users were unhappy about having one password for each system, especially when 
they use three or four systems. They would prefer one password that would give them 
access to all systems. 
Page 191 
Chapter 8: Validation of Research 
Some users have never changed their passwords (in some case for as long as four 
years). 
Users are unhappy about certain systems because they have to change passwords 
every three months. 
Some users have a written record of their passwords, e.g. written on the back of their 
ID card. 
8.3) Findings of SIM-ETHICS review 
The appropriate managers were given a series of problems that the users raised, the 
now had to overcome these before the actual implementation of the countermeasures 
and computer systems. The review raised many points which management had not 
considered. 
The findings of the review were given to : 
- the appropriate system managers concerned with implementation; 
- the Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority security forum. 
The SIM-ETHICS review provided impetus in the production of an authority wide 
security policy. The results of the SIM-ETHICS review were cited to show a need for 
a security policy. 
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8.4) Validation of the ODESSA method 
The ODESSA method was validated by experts during its development from paper 
based methodology to computer prototype. The validation took the form of 
correspondence, direct meetings and questionnaires. The findings of the validation 
process are presented in the pages that follow, citing feedback from specific 
individuals who were consulted. 
Name: 
Country: 
Expertise: 
Medium: 
Comments: 
Professor Enid Mumford (Manchester Business School) 
UK 
Developer of the ETHICS methodology 
Correspondence 
She was sent a copy of a paper (Warren, Sanders and Gaunt, 1994) 
relating to ODESSA. She thought that the system seemed an excellent 
way of securing user co-operation and identification with a new 
computer system. She thought one of its major objectives would be to 
give future users a sense of ownership. She was sure there must be a 
large market for the kind of system that was being developed. 
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Name: 
Country: 
Expertise: 
Medium: 
Comments: 
Name: 
Country: 
Expertise: 
Medium: 
Comments: 
Mr Avraham Hayam 
Israel 
Security Consultant 
Co-chairman of MIE 93 Security session 
Correspondence 
Mr Hayam considers himself to be a pioneer of IT security in Israel, he 
is trying to introduce the use of expert systems in risk analysis and 
audit evaluation. Mr Hayam was sent the initial model of ODESSA. 
He thought that the model could be improved by adding data 
sensitivity (which it was). He liked the model of classification relating 
to disclosure, denial, modification and destruction. 
Mr John Davey 
UK 
Security consultant 
Project manager of SEISMED project 
Help developed CRAMM 
Direct Meetings 
Mr Davey assisted with various problems that occurred relating to 
the use of CRAMM. Mr Davey also assisted by validating the early 
conceptual design of the ODESSA method. The original ideas were 
based upon the production of an expert system, as shown in fig 8.1. 
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User 
R e q u l r e m e 
B a s e l i n e 
S e c u r i t y 
B a s e l i n e 
S e c u r i t y 
A d v i c e 
S y s t e m Risk 
I d e n t l f l c a t i c r E v a l u a t i o n 
C o u n t e r m e a s u r e 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
C o u n t e r m e a s u r 
List 
• ! 
O D E S S A 
S y s t e m 
C o u n t e r m e a s u r e 
List 
I n f e r e n c e 
E n g i n e 
K n o w l e d g e 
B a s e 
I m p a c t 
A d v i c e 
•( U s e r 
S I M - E T H I C S 
E x p e r t S y s t e m 
Fig 8,1. Early Conceptual view of ODESSA 
Figure 8.1 is explained as follows. 
The ODESSA system is broken down into the following: 
1) Baseline Security - the user is given basic security advice for their 
organisation; 
2) System Identification - system assets are evaluated; 
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3) Risk Evaluation 
4) Countermeasure 
Identification 
risks and vulnerabilities are determined; 
appropriate countermeasures are produced. 
SIM-ETHICS Expert System 
The expert system takes the countermeasure lists produced by the ODESSA system 
and determine the impact that their implementation could have. 
Name: 
Country: 
Expertise: 
Medium: 
Comments: 
Mr John Fowler 
UK 
Head of IT at Royal Hospitals Trust, London. 
Member of SEISMED project 
Direct Meetings and questionnaires. 
Mr Fowler was sent a copy of the ODESSA prototype to evaluate. He 
thought" I was on to a potential winner". He liked the idea 
of an overview impact analysis (Stage 3 of ODESSA), something that 
is missing from CRAMM. He would like to see OLE (object linked 
embedding) added to allow the use of word processing packages. The 
printing was considered slow, although he felt that this was a fault of 
Windows rather than ODESSA. The data produced by the system was 
useful and he found the system beneficial as a source of security 
advice. 
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Name: 
Country: 
Expertise: 
Medium: 
Comments: 
Mr Erik Flikkenschild 
Netheriands 
IT manager at Leiden University Hospital 
Member of SEISMED Project 
Direct Meetings and questionnaires. 
Mr Flikkenschild was sent a copy of the ODESSA prototype to 
evaluate. He found the system simple to install and set up, he also 
found the user guide very helpful. He found the system easy to use 
and found the data produced by the system useful. Mr Flikkenschild 
particularly liked the graphics, but would have liked to seen healthcare 
related icons (this will be added at a later stage). 
8.5) Conclusion 
This chapter has proven the worth of the methodologies that were developed. SIM-
ETHICS has been proven by actually using it in real life situations to determine the 
problems of implementing security and IT systems. ODESSA has been validated 
though its developmental life cycle by experts and, as such, has proven itself in terms 
of its applicability and quality. In addition, the fact that people were so enthusiastic 
about the methods proves that there is a genuine need for them. 
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9.1) Achievements of the Research Program 
The research programme has met all of the objectives originally specified in chapter 1. 
New conceptual and practical work has been developed in a number of areas, as listed 
below. 
1. The project helped to determine the need for information security for 
HCEs. This took the form of working extensively within HCEs, meeting users 
and seeing their requirements for security at first hand. 
2. The work within the AIM SEISMED project allowed the production of 
new security guidelines. These guidelines were validated by meeting 
users within HCEs and discussing the issues. 
3. A new management method was developed that could be used to assist with 
the implementation of security within healthcare. This method was proven by 
using it within a HCE during the implementation of 'real world' security 
features and computer systems. 
4. The current use of risk analysis security packages was assessed. The 
resulting list of methods represents one of the most comprehensive lists of its 
kind. 
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5. A new risk analysis methodology was developed specifically for use 
within healthcare. This will allow HCE staff to carry out security reviews of 
their own systems (i.e. without requiring external consultants). 
6. A security prototype was developed that fully encapsulated the new risk 
analysis management method. 
7. By combining the use of SIM-ETHICS and ODESSA a new method of 
handling the life cycle of security has been developed, as shown below: 
- identification of organisational security needs; 
- assessment of an organisation to determine needed security 
features; 
- implementation of security features; 
- determination of organisational impacts. 
Several papers relating to the research have been presented at referred conferences, 
with favourable comments being received fi-om other delegates. Several papers have 
also been published in refereed journals. As such, it is believed that the research has 
made valid contributions to the IT security field in terms of the healthcare field, as 
well as at a more general level. 
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9.2) Limitations of the Research 
Despite having met the overall objectives of the research, it is possible to identify a 
number of limitations associated v^th the work. These points are presented below. 
1. The ODESSA methodology, whilst complete in terms of the overall 
framework and associated prototype, cannot be considered viable until 
it is developed into a full working system. However, due to 
time constraints it was not possible to do this. 
2. The review of risk analysis method was limited by the fact that 
organisations are reluctant to give any significant information about 
their products. This is because it could indicate the type of security 
countermeasures that they have installed. 
9.3) Suggestions and scope for future work 
It is possible to identify a number of areas in which further work could be conducted 
to build upon the research already undertaken. There are a number of areas where 
direct continuation of research could take place as follows. 
1. Development of the ODESSA prototype into a full working system, 
which would potentially produce a marketable commercial product. 
As part of the development, extensive studies within HCEs should be 
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undertaken to look at the applicability of countermeasures. These 
reviews would further enhance the applicability of the system. 
2. Further research into the use of ODESSA and SIM-ETHICS within 
other commercial sectors (although they originally developed for 
healthcare). This would help determine i f the methods can be used in a 
more generic manner. 
3. More extensive research into the known risk analysis methods. This 
information is very scare so any further research v^ll enlighten the risk 
analysis practitioners. 
4. More research is needed into the human aspect of security . This 
research is required because security is a human issue (Warren and 
Gaunt, 1993) and the most advanced security mechanism will fail i f 
users do not wish to use it. 
5. The area of security management has not been extensively 
researched and new work in this area is therefore desirable. 
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9.4) Conclusion 
The development of the ODESSA method is at the forefront of research in its area. 
Further work will be needed in developing this "logical transformation" style of risk 
analysis method. 
The work described is the product of real world experiences. This was carried out by 
working within a HCE and looking at the real life requirements for security, which 
help to validate its applicability. 
There is always going to be a need for security within healthcare. A main reason for 
this is that technology changes and therefore the way that technology is implemented 
will change. The improved technology would have even greater impact to staff and 
their job functions. 
The future use of the 'Internet' for business and leisure will truly allow the 
globalisation of IT systems. These new network technologies will have a major 
impact on all aspects of society including healthcare. It is for this reason that the role 
of healthcare will change in the next millennium. The future ISHTAR project will 
help to develop the use of these new technologies by healthcare. 
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S I M - E T H I C S Criteria 
Ease of Implementation 
1) Easily implemented. 
2) Implemented with minor modifications to existing systems or with 
the minimal amount of effort. 
3) Implemented with major modifications to existing systems or with 
an extensive amount of effort. 
4) Implemented with the development of a new system or 
redevelopment of an existing system. 
Training Issues 
1) No training requirements. 
2) Some training needed, i.e. a few people. 
3) Some training/retraining needed, i.e. a department. 
4) Extensive training needed, i.e. the whole organisation. 
User Impact (Related to users Job function) 
1) No user impact. 
2) Countermeasure affects user satisfaction. 
a) Causes a minor impact. 
b) Causes a major impact. 
3) Countermeasure affects users efficiency, effectiveness. 
a) Causes a minor impact. 
b) Causes a major impact. 
Organisational Impact 
1) No organisational impact. 
2) Effect the way tasks are carries out. 
a) Causes a minor impact. 
b) Causes a major impact. 
3) Effect Organisational Culture. 
a) Culture changed through planned change. 
b) Culture changed through unplanned change. 
c) Culture changed through technical seduction. 
HMman Isswcs 
1) No individual impact. 
2) Results in restructuring a persons job or changing a persons 
individual power. 
3) Results in restructuring of management techniques or creation 
of new management techniques. 
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Access Control Cards 
1. How do you feel about having to use access cards. 
2. Do you mind having to use a dual ID card and access control card. 
3. Can you think of any practical problems of using access control cards. 
4. To what extent do you think access cards should be used within the hospital. 
5. What training v^U you feel that you need in order to use the access control cards. 
6. Do you think access control cards will help promote a "security" culture and 
security awareness. 
7. Would you feel that 'Big Brother' is watching you since the access control system 
can be used to monitor where you are in the hospital. 
V T X 
1. Can you see any problems with using VTX. 
2. What would you use the information provided by VTX for and how important is 
the accuracy of that information. 
3. Can you think of any practical problems of using VTX. 
4. What do you think will be the best method of training. 
5 How do you feel VTX will improve our job. 
6 Do you think VTX will change the culture of the organisation. 
7. How do you feel that VTX may affect your job. 
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PASSWORDS 
1) How many password do you use and how do you feel about it. 
2) How often do you change your passwords, how often would you actually like ((i.e. 
30 - 90 days). 
3) How do you feel having passwords structured, i.e. so many characters. 
4) Do you think there should be restrictions on names used as passwords, i.e. secret, a 
persons name. 
5) How do you feel about being forced to change your password. 
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Name : 
Directorate : 
Computer System : 
(Rease t ick the app rop r i a te boxes) 
Question 1 
Do your fee l con f i den t In your know ledge of c o m p u t e r security? 
o ) Yes 
b) No • 
Question 2 
Would y o u like speci f ic training relat ing t o security? 
a ) Yes • 
b ) No • 
Question 3 
Are you a w a r e of any specif ic security features o n your system? 
a) Yes • 
b) No r— 
Page 225 
Question 4 
Rease enter the appropr ia te value: 
1) Cost is very important 2) Cost is impor tan t 
3) Cost Is relevent 4) Cost is irrelavent 
Please identify v/h\ch cost componen ts o re cons idered w h e n imp lemen t i ng security. 
• 
• 
a ) Direct Costs, i.e. cost of security 
b ) Associated Costs, I.e. training 
c ) Indirect Costs, i.e. extra e q u i p m e n t 
d ) Consul tancy, i.e. externally hired staff d] 
e) Upgrade costs, i.e. extra e q u i p m e n t costs EH 
(Rease t ick the approp r ia te boxes a n d e x p a n d any anwers in t he s p a c e p rov ided) 
Question 5 
Which of t he fo l lowing factors hove y o u cons idered w h e n d e c i d i n g h o w to 
secure your system. 
a ) Ease of Implementa t ion | ^ 
b ) Whether t he existing system needs t o b e mod i f ied r~ 
c ) The a m o u n t of training n e e d e d |—j 
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Question 6 
Which of t h e f o l l ow ing fac to rs o r e t a k e n in to a c c o u n t r e g a r d i n g t ra in ing ; 
a ) The leve l o f t ra in ing t h a t is r e q u i r e d b y users Q 
b ) The n u m b e r o f p e o p l e t o b e t r a i n e d i— 
c ) The cos t o f t ra in ing , i.e. t i m e lost t h r o u g h t ra in ing j — | 
Question 7 
W h e n i m p l e m e n t i n g secur i ty a r e a n y o f t h e f o l l ow ing c o n s i d e r e d : 
a ) User Sa t i s fac t ion , i.e. w o u l d secur i ty f ea tu res e f f e c t thei r sys tem use EZ 
b ) User E f f i c iency , i.e. w o u l d secur i ty f ea tu res e f f e c t thei r e f f i e n c y CI 
c ) G r o u p Ef fec t iveness, i.e. h o w secur i ty in f luences c l in i ca l c o r e 
Page 227 
Question 8 
Are a n y o f t h e f o l l ow ing user issues c o n s i d e r e d w h e n i n t r o d u c i n g secur i ty : 
a ) H o w secur i ty fea tu res c h a n g e t h e users Jobs 1^ 
b ) W h e t h e r t h e secur i ty requires n e w j o b s or responsibi l i t ies {H 
c ) W o u l d t h e secur i ty measures a f f e c t t h e w a y users use t h e sys tem 
( R e a s e t i c k t h e a p p r o p r c i t e b o x e s ) 
Question 9 
Does you r d e p a r t m e n t h a v e a pe rson respons ib le for secur i ty ma t te rs . 
a ) Yes 
b ) N o 
Question 10 
Does you r d e p a r t m e n t h o v e a g e n e r a i c o m p u t e r secur i ty p o l i c y . 
a ) Yes • 
b ) N o • 
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Question 11 
Does your d e p a r t m e n t h a v e a specia l security po l icy for t h e use o f po r tab le PC's. 
a ) Yes • 
b ) No • 
Question 12 
Are your users g iven c o m p u t e r security t raining. 
a ) Yes • 
b ) No 
If so by w h o m : 
Question 13 
Are your users g iven regular security awareness programs. 
a ) Yes • 
b ) No [—j 
If so by w h o m : 
lhank you for completing this questionnaire 
(All answers given will be held In strictest confidentiality) 
Dr Nick Gaunt 
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Appendix D - Results of System Managers Security 
Questionnaire 
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Questionnaire Results 
Questionnaire Overall Rate of Retum70% 
Questions 
Ql) Do you feel confident in your knowledge of computer security? 
a) Yes 64 
b) No 36 
(% Replies - 100%) 
Q2) Would you like specific training relating to security? 
a) Yes 71 
b) No 29 
(% Replies - 100%) 
Q3) Are you aware of any specific security features on your system 
a) Yes 93 
b) No 7 
(% Replies - 100%) 
Q4) Please identify which cost components are considered when implementing 
security 
(Very Important) (Irrelevant) 
J 2 3 4 
a) Direct Cost 27 55 18 
(Cost of security) 
(% Replies - 78.5%) 
b) Associated cost 10 20 40 30 
(Training) 
(%Replies-71.5%) 
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(Very Important) (Irrelevant) 
J 2 2 4 
c) Indirect Costs 22.2 33.3 44.4 
(extra equipment) 
(% Replies - 64%) 
d) Consultancy 50 25 25 
(% Replies - 57%) 
e) Upgrade Costs 20 30 40 10 
(% Replies-71.5%) 
Q5) Which of the following factors have you considered when deciding how to secure 
your system? 
a) Ease of Implementation 85 
b) Whether the existing system needs to be modified 69 
c) The amount of training needed 77 
(% Replies - 93%) 
Q6) Which of the following factors are taken into account regarding training 
a) The level of training that is required by users 75 
b) Tlie number of people to be trained 50 
c) The cost of training, i.e. time lost though training 75 
(% Replies - 86%) 
Q7) When implementing security are any of the following considered: 
a) User Satisfaction 66 
b) User Efficiency 66 
c) Group Effectiveness 66 
Page 232 
Appendix D 
(% Replies - 86%) 
Q8) Are any of the following user issues considered when introducing security 
a) How security features change the users jobs 61.5 
b) Whether the security requires new jobs or responsibilities 30 
c) Would the security measures affect the way users 92 
use the system 
(% Replies - 93%) 
Q9) Does your department have a person responsible for security matters 
a) Yes 77 
b) No 23 
(% Replies - 93%) 
QIO) Does your department have a general computer security policy 
a) Yes 46 
b) No 54 
(% Replies - 93%) 
Q l l ) Does your department have a special security policy for the use of portable 
PC's 
a) Yes 20 
b) No 80 
(% Replies - 86%) 
Q12) Are your users given computer security training 
a) Yes 71 
b) No 29 
(% Replies - 100%) 
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Q13) Are your users given regular security awareness programs 
a) Yes 23 
b) No 77 
(% Replies - 93%) 
Overview 
Two thirds of system managers are confident in their knowledge of computer security 
but just over 70% would like specific training relating to security. 
Managers consider ease of implementation and the training required by users very 
important when implementing security. When it comes to training, managers are 
concerned about the level of training required by users and the time that staff lose 
through training. 
Managers are also concerned about how security features would affect the users use of 
individual systems. 
Nearly all departments have a person responsible for IT security, but less than half of 
these departments have IT security polices. About 70% of system mangers said that 
users are given security training, but less than 25% go on security awareness programs 
after their initial training. 
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Appendix E - Security Culture in Saudi Arabia 
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Taking Saudi Arabia as an example of the following national characteristic are found: 
National Culture 
Saudi Arabia is defined as being a Power Distance culture. Society accepts the 
fact that power in organisations is distributed unequally. Employees show 
respect for those in authority, titles, rank and status being important. 
General use of IT 
Saudi Arabia has developed a five year plan with the aim of using labour-
saving technology as a result of a severe shortage of indigenous manpower. 
Research has shown (Yavis and Yasin, 1993) that IT is implemented mainly 
for business expansion and replacing manual operations. This research also 
shows that employees are considered as the main security risk. 
Mgdic9l use of IT 
Surveys undertook at a Saudi Arabian hospital on the use of IT systems found: 
Males (39%) used the IT systems more than females (30%); 
Non Saudi Consultants (31%) made the most use of IT systems; 
The Saudis which used IT the most were consultants (29%); 
67% of staff had poor computer skills or none at all; 
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46% of Consultants has computers, 
44% of Physicians thought computers were useful but not 
necessary. 
(Al-Hahhah and Bamgboye, 1992) 
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Appendix F: Comprehensive list of Risk Analysis 
Methods 
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Appendix F 
Method Name: 
Country of Origin: 
Description: 
References: 
ASIS 
Germany 
During 1991 a major German IT manufacturer designed an 
overall framework for risk management. The scope of the 
project comprised the development of a conceptual model for 
an object oriented risk analysis tool. 
(S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: BULLRAM 
Country Of Origin: France 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
BULLRAM was developed by BULL for its internal use and 
for use by its customers. The model is broken down into the 
following stages. 
Incident Scenario Model 
Phase 1 - Aggression 
An aggression threatens to trigger a attack against a 
resource ("the Primary Target"). The aggression will use a set 
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path or series of paths of attack, the attributes of these give a 
measure of the targets vulnerability to attack. 
Phase 2 - Degradation 
This stage determines the level of damage caused by the attack. 
The estimated damage to physical and logical resources is 
carried out and especially loss in confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. 
Phase 3 - Recovery 
The aim of this stage is to recovery from any damage that has 
occurred to the organisations business flinctions. 
Safeguards Scenario Model 
BULLRAM uses classes of safeguards, each class coping with 
various adverse actions occurring in the incident scenario. 
These safeguards are suggested as certain incidents occur. 
Risk Assessment Metrics 
Risk is measure by a combination of two major parameters, 
"potentiality" of threat and incident and "gravity" (seriousness) 
of business impact. This is the estimated residual losses related 
to the businesses ftinctions. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
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Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
Citicorp Operations Risk Assessment 
USA 
Computer based 
This method is an impact analysis method used to determine 
which operations and services are of critical, high or medium 
risk. The method is concerned with ensuring availability and 
continuation of services. The method consists of the following 
steps: 
- designate business functions, products and services; 
- determine impact of product/service loss; 
- asses loss of dependent resources; 
- apply the results of review in a contingency plan that 
would incorporate 'containment measures'. 
This method is not commercially available. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: Data Center Evaluation Checklist 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: None 
System: Paper based 
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Appendix F 
This checklist is used by Digital to determine i f their computing 
resources meet their minimum suggested security levels. 
References: (Digital. 1991) 
Method Name: IBM Methodology (Spain) 
Country Of Origin: Spain 
Description: 
This method is designed for use in producing contingency plans 
for organisation computing centers and it can be used within 
other organisational environments. The evaluation of risk is 
carried out via the use of scenarios that considers the 
disruption that could occur as a result of security breaches. The 
risks relate to destruction of assets, corruption of data, 
disclosure of information and interruption of IT service. This 
method is not commercially available. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: Insurance Technical Bureau IFAL 
Country Of Origin: USA 
System: Computer based 
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Description: 
This was developed to provide risk assessment for oil, gas and 
petrochemical plants. IFAL assumes that the risk is influenced 
by three elements: the process risk, the quality of design and 
construction and the quality of management and operation. 
IFAL only considers protecting IT assets, staff etc. from 
explosions. This package is highly specialised and is 
concerned only with the oil, gas and petrochemical industries. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
PSICHE 
France 
Computer based 
PSICHE is a vulnerability and risk management method 
developed for EDF/GDF (National Electricity and Gas 
companies of France) for their internal use as aid to the 
development and implementation of IT security plans. The 
method is broken into three major steps. 
Intrinsic Vulngrability Analysis 
Vital and sensitive systems are identified, then quantified and 
measured in terms of relative value. 
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Effective vulnerabilitv and management 
The organisational functions are analysed and expressed in 
terms of information systems and applications, each of which is 
represented by a vulnerability chain (the vulnerability of 
hardware, software, organisational and human elements). The 
system rates the average and maximum vulnerability of a chain 
link. 
The overall effective vulnerability level of the information 
systems is obtained by combining the risk values of the chains. 
I f this level is considered too high then security 
countermeasures are suggested. 
Spe<;ification Qf the Security ?\m 
A detailed analysis of the safeguards suggested in stage 2 is 
carried out in order to take into account the financial, technical, 
organisational and time constraints. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: REASSURE 
Country Of Origin: Canada 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
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This system was the result of a Canadian academic research 
project. The system includes an expert system and is concerned 
about the security issues of implementing networks and 
standards, e.g. US Yellow Book. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
References: 
Sofine 
The Netheriands 
Computer based 
This system is highly specialised and it used by financial 
instructions to undertake security risk analysis reviews. 
(S2014, 1993) 
ConsMltants 
Method Name: Analyse des Risqu^s Programmes 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: IT security experience and specific method training required 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: 
Impact Analysis: 
Extensive 
Extensive 
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ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative approach. The system can also given 
justification for the security suggested. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: AnalyZ 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: Specific method training required. 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks by using a quantitative approach. 
AnalyZ has been designed to take risk analysis to the user, e.g. 
a project manager or business manager. AnalyZ is data driven 
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and therefore it can changed to suit any organisation by simply 
changing the contents of the database. AnedyZ database 
contains a set of baseline security measures, which are changed 
to reflect the organisation requirements. AnalyZ is menu driven 
and allows the user to: 
- build a risk model of the system through a question and 
answer session; 
- establish the target level of acceptable risk based on the type 
of business for which the system is being used; 
- review the risk profile of the systems against the target level 
for the business; 
- perform 'what-if scenarios on the initial model. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: AROME+ 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: IT security experience and experience of the MARION method 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: 
Impact Analysis: 
ThreatA^ulnerability 
Extensive 
Extensive 
Extensive 
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Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. The system can 
also give justification for the security countermeasures 
suggested. The method allows the use of scenarios as a way of 
allow the user carry out risk analysis reviews. The system 
produces its own questionnaires for the user to answer as a way 
of measuring vulnerability levels. The system in only available 
in French. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: BIS Risk Assessor 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: Limited 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Moderate 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: None 
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BIS Risk Assessor does not produce countermeasures but the 
data produced from it can be imported into CRAMM for future 
use. The method expresses threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative approach. The method expresses risk 
levels by a qualitative method. 
The BIS risk assessor is conceived as being a high-level risk 
evaluation product. The system evaluates risk according to 
approximately 30 threat categories. The BIS risk assessor 
calculates a conceptual level of risk, that is risk levels 
without taking into account any existing or potential 
countermeasures that the organisation is considering. The 
objective of the BIS risk assessor is limited to obtaining global 
indications of risk for consideration by the organisations 
management. Any further risk analysis should be carried out 
using another method, which is the reason for the link to the 
CRAMM method. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: Buddy System 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Required Experience: None for general use 
IT security knowledge needed for the maintenance utility 
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System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Moderate 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative approach. The Buddy system can justify 
any security recommendations that its make. 
The Buddy System derives its name from the concept of two 
separate individuals being involved in the security process; the 
end user and the security analyst. The end users completes the 
security survey and the security analysis loads the survey 
information into a central database and performs the risk 
analysis. The end user survey can be completed by users with 
little knowledge of computer security. It collects baseline 
information about the system and identifies countemieasures 
that are already in place. The security analysis loads the results 
into a risk management system. This software determines the 
vulnerability level, and uses "what-if' scenarios to model the 
vulnerabilities and provide additional countermeasures. 
Page 250 
Appendix F 
References: (S2014. 1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: COBRA (Consultative, Objective and Bi-functional Risk 
Analysis) 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: None 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
References: 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a qualitative approach. The method can justify its security 
recommendations. The system can be used with two different 
approaches. The first is to target a specific area, e.g. 
contingency planning for a specific area. The second approach 
is for a business manager to complete a business impact survey 
that will quantify security breaches. The system makes use of 
computer generated questions in order to elicit user 
information. 
(S2014, 1993), (Lee, 1992), (Addison, 1991) 
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Method Name: Control Matrix Methodology for Microcomputers 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Computer based System: 
Description: 
This method use a matrix approach for designing controls into 
microcomputer environments. It identifies which controls are 
needed to ensure adequate security in business or scientific 
systems. The main package is a control matrix development 
package that contains a database of controls plus separate 
database of threats and computer system components. There is 
also a graphical package which draws the final matrix 
representing threats, components and controls. The package 
also comes with two training programs. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
Control - IT 
USA 
Computer based 
This system identifies potential threats related to a computer 
system as well as identifying the controls that are necessary to 
protect the system. The main sofhvare package contains a 
spreadsheet development package that contains three databases 
Page 252 
of potential threats, components and controls. The package 
draws a matrix showing risk regions and their rankings. This 
system comes with automated teaching packages. 
References: (S2014,1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: COSSAC (Computer Systems Security Analyser and 
Configxu^tor) 
Country Of Origin: Canada 
Required Experience: None 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
COSSAC is an automated checklist system that consists of 400 
questions. All the questions can be modified and more 
questions can be added by the user. The questions are 
structured into the following groups, which are: 
- general (parameter security, fire protection, hardware and 
software security features etc.); 
- financial (accounting, auditing, fund transfer etc.); 
- virus (deals with threats from computer viruses); 
- classified and sensitive (deals with classified and sensitive 
material as defined by US law and regulations, e.g. US 
Orange Book). 
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At the end of each section COSSAC suggest simple hints and 
countermeasures to improve security. 
References: (S2014,1993), (Wahlgren, 1990), (Carroll and Mac Iver, 1985) 
Method Name: CRITI-CALC 
Country Of Origin: USA 
System: 
Description: 
Computer based 
The system uses the concept of ALE (Annual Loss Expectancy) 
to quantify the criticality of risk exposure for applications. The 
criticedity of each system is determined by the potential for loss 
caused by a processing interruption. This system is menu 
driven with a buih in "major threats" database and a "f i l l - in-
the-blank" application database. The system uses the user input 
to determine the optimum off-site recovery time for 
applications. CRITI-CALC allows the user to carry out "what if 
analysis" on their input data and this is used as a way of 
verifying the effectiveness of certain countermeasures. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (NIST. 1991) 
Method Name: DAFI 
Country Of Origin: France 
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Required Experience: IT security, Method relating training, auditor skills. 
System: 
Description: 
Computer based 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. DAFT can also 
justify its security recommendations. This method provides 
either a high level view of the security requirements or a 
detailed report. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: DDIS (Datenschutz-imd-datensicherheits (Data Protection and 
Data Security) Information System) 
Country Of Origin: Germany 
Required Experience: None 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: 
Impact Analysis: 
Extensive 
Extensive 
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ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countemieasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat levels by using a 
quantitative and qualitative approach. Users can tailor the 
system to their own requirements by defining new questions for 
the system. The system uses a questionnaire to detemune user 
requirements and these results can be aggregated and shown as 
graphs. The system can justify the countermeasures its 
suggests. The system produces a high level report of the 
organisational security requirements. The system is only 
available in German. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
EDV-Sicherheits-Check 
Germany 
Computer based 
The system is used to analysis the consequence resulting from 
the unavailability of IT systems or system components. The 
method is comprised of two stages. 
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Analysis of dependencies upon systems, data, effectiveness 
of existing countemieasures. At the end of stage 1 the critical 
dependence of the business should be determined - that is 
which business functions would be hindered i f the I T system 
were not available. 
Stage 2 
A quantitative simulation of business functions is carried out. 
The simulation represents the use of different threats and 
countermeasures. This stage also produces other simulations 
relating to production and costs. At the end of this stage a 
security profile for the organisation is produced. 
This method is used as a consultancy tool and is not 
commercially available. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: 
Country of Origin: 
Description: 
Expert Auditor 
USA 
This system is an automated checklist used for auditing. 
The main function of the system is to ensure that the system 
under review meets certain criteria. This criteria relates to 
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environmental issues, e.g. type of building, where the data 
centre is placed. 
References: (Wahlgren, 1990) 
Method Name: Feros 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: None 
System: Paper based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ ulnerability Moderate 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a qualitative approach. This method is used to identify 
the requirements, security objectives and the system then 
produces a high level report. This method should be used 
before a detailed risk analysis review is carried out. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Page 258 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
GRA/SYS 
USA 
Computer based 
This system performs a qualitative risk assessment o f multi-
organisational units. The method is designed to assist auditors 
and security personnel in developing a work priority plan for 
reviewing organisational risks. 
References: (S2014,1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
IST/RAMP 
USA 
Computer based 
This system supports an automated model o f a computer 
security environment. This is used to estimate loss to determine 
the benefits of introducing security measures. The model 
evaluates against five loss categories, which are unavailability, 
physical damage, fraud, disclosure of data and physical theft. 
References: (S2014,1993), (NIST, 1991). (Wahlgren, 1990) 
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Method Name: IS Case 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: Software design 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. IS Case can also 
justify the reason for suggesting security countermeasures. 
IS Case suggests ways in which security can be designed into 
new systems. The system produces reports relating to: 
- maximum risk analysis results; 
- audit results; 
- economic issues reports, e.g. cost benefit reports; 
- simulation reports; 
- suggested countermeasures. 
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The system uses a simulation to determine the major risks and 
then the simulation reduces the risks by use of appropriate 
countermeasures. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: JANBER 
Country Of Origin: USA 
System: 
Description: 
Computer based 
This is a qualitative risk analysis package that is customised to 
fit an organisations requirement. JANBER uses a yes/no 
questionnaire and checklist for collecting information about 
existing security controls. The system records information 
relating to current systems, countermeasures and data 
classification of systems. 
The review determines the level of vulnerability for the 
organisation by using a vulnerability level of between 2 - 28 
(28 being worse case scenario). The system contains a database 
of all the information collected, which is then used to 
suggest future countermeasures. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
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Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
MACS 
France 
Computer based 
This method allows a project manager to include security 
concepts from the initiation of any programming project in 
order to implement efficient security at a minimal cost. 
The method is concerned mainly with logical systems security, 
but takes into account all cause of unavailability, e.g. hardware 
failure. The software comes complete with a database 
containing risk scenarios and countermeasures. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: MARION 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: IT security experience 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
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The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. N4ARION can 
also justify the reason for suggesting security countermeasures. 
MARION uses data complied from the French Insurance 
Companies as a method of determining risks. 
The MARION method consist of six stages. 
Slagal 
At this stage the level of risk is determined for the organisation. 
This is determined by using staff from the different departments 
to complete a questionnaire. 
In these stages the maximum risk (losses that the organisation 
can accept) are determined. The calculation is carried out for 
each of the different risk types. During the tliird stage a security 
audit is undertaken to determine the quality of the suggested 
counlermeasures. 
Stages 5 and 6 
In stage 5 the new countermeasures are selected relating to 
different aspects of security, e.g. prevention, recovery. In stage 
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6 an implementational plan is produced which suggests how the 
countermeasures can be implemented over a three year plan. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (Wahlgren, 1990), (Baratte. 1989), (Coopers 
and Lybrand, 1989) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
MicroSecure Self Assessment 
USA 
Computer based 
This is a menu driven qualitative risk analysis package that 
allows PC users to conduct their own security self assessments. 
The system contains an expert system which analyses a 
companies computing environment and gives advice about 
security weakness and how to improve it. 
References: (S20I4, 1993), (NIST. 1991) 
Method Name: MINIRISK 
Country Of Origm: USA 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
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MINIRISK is a tool to assess security vulnerabilities i n a 
microcomputer environment. A vulnerability assessment allows 
the organisation to evaluate the adequacy of their 
countermeasures. The absence of certain safeguards determines 
the level of vulnerability between 0 (best case) and 9 (worse). 
References: (S2014,1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: Predict! 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Required Experience: Understanding of Risk Analysis 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
References: 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. The system 
makes extensive use of user models of computer systems. This 
package contains a number of models that can be used. 
(S2014, 1993) 
Page 265 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
QuikRisk 
USA 
Computer based 
QuikRisk is a system that can be used to determine the impact 
of security breaches. This system requires the user to enter 
information about their system on a computerised scenario 
form. This form relates to potential threats, current 
countermeasures and assets. Once all the information has been 
entered the annual loss exposure is determined. 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
RA/SYS 
USA 
Computer based 
The system works by getting the user to answer questions on 
four subsets of risk, these are: 
- corporate risk; 
- PC risk; 
- mini-computer risk; 
- generic risks (e.g. physical). 
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The system then determines the threat, vulnerability ratings, 
asset valuations, annual loss expectancy. From this the system 
produces a list of countermeasures and cost benefit analysis. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
RANK-IT 
USA 
Computer based 
This is an automated risk analysis tool that uses Delphi 
techniques. Delphi is an expert system approach to risk ranking. 
The system automates Delphi by adding comparison risk 
ranking to obtain a list of ranked events. These events relates 
to threat scenarios, disaster recovery, etc. Each ranked item has 
a number that can be used as a weighting factor to determine its 
importance. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (NIST, 1991), (Wahlgren, 1990), (Fitzgerald, 
1993) 
Method Name: RISAN 
Country Of Origin: The Netheriands 
Required Experience: Method related training course 
Page 267 
System: 
Description: 
Computer Based 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative approach. RISAN can also justify the 
reason for suggesting security countermeasures. 
The system determines the vulnerability of design options and 
it presents the risk to the user and assists in selecting 
countermeasures for the user. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: Risiko 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: Method specific training 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
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Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. Risiko can also 
justify the reason for suggesting security countermeasures. This 
method is very similar to the Marion method (Wahlgren, 1990) 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
RiskCALC 
USA 
Computer based 
RiskCALC has two separate parts; one for the system manager 
and one for the user. The system manager section is used to 
develop different security models and determine the risk 
factors. The user section is used to elicit information 
about the users system. RiskCALC uses the annual loss 
expectancy (ALE) to determine the impact of security breaches. 
The system then determines the organisations most significant 
risks and determines the ALE. The system comes complete 
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with a risk minimizer section and this is used to find areas of 
high risk and reduce that risk level. In essence, RiskCALC is a 
tool for building risk analysis models. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (NIST, 1991), (Wahlgren, 1990) 
Method Name: RiskPAC 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Required Experience: No experience required 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a qualitative approach. RiskPAC can also justify the 
reason for suggesting security countermeasures. 
RiskPAC is a knowledge based system that uses questionnaires 
to obtain user information, there are questionnaires for 
determining risks, business impact analysis and evaluating 
disaster recovery plans. RiskPAC evaluates user answers and 
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then determines the level of risks from this data, 
countermeasures are then suggested. RiskPAC includes a ALE 
calculator, this is used to identify the level of loss for loss of 
systems. 
References: (S2014.1993), (NIST, 1991), (Wahlgren, 1990) 
Method Name: RiskWatch 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Required Experience: No experience required 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Moderate 
ThreatA^ ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. RiskWatch can 
also justify the reason for suggesting security countermeasures. 
RiskWatch makes use of questionnaire to elicit information 
from users and these questionnaires can be altered for any 
organisation. This method contains a re-usable security 
Page 271 
database so that information from the risk analysis can be used 
to generate security and contingency plans automatically. 
Risk Watch contains a module that evaluates the "Orange Book 
Level". This eveduates the highest classification of data used 
against the levels of staff who use the data. 
References: (S2014.1993), (NIST. 1991) 
Method Name: SISSI 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: Method specific training 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. The system uses 
questionnaires to obtain information from users. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
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Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
SOS (Security On-line System) 
USA 
Computer based 
This system was designed for use by security management. 
The user defines their security requirements and the system 
then carries out a risk assessment, looking at factors 
such as data loss, modification. The user then has to 
complete computer generated questionnaires, fi-om this data the 
system produces lists of threats, vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures. This data can be used in developing a 
contingency plan. 
References: (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name : 
Country of Origin: 
Description: 
SPAN 
USA 
References: 
This decision support system (DSS) provides suggestions to 
assist Security Plan Analysis (SPAN). The DSS includes a 
relational database that details the interaction of resources, 
threats, risks and countermeasures. Resources and 
countermeasures are associated with particular locations. 
(Baskerville, 1993) 
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Method Name: X.R.M (eXpert Risk Management) 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: Method specific training 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. This system can 
also justify the reason for suggesting security countermeasures. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
Xsec 
Sweden 
Computer based 
Xsec is a system that is used for auditing countermeasures for 
an organisation. There are two versions of Xsec, there are: 
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Xsec-Base - covers areas such as physicEil security, data 
security. 
Xsec-Di - covers areas such as data confidentiality. 
Xsec is an expert system, the system consists of 18 knowledge 
bases, these relate to a specific area of security, e.g. physical 
security, disaster and recovery planning. Each area consists of 
control points, e.g. water and fire damage control. For each area 
there are between 10 and 20 different control points covering 
different aspects of computer security. The current level of 
security for a control points depends on what countermeasure 
are implemented. There are 6 different levels of security on a 
scale fi-om low to very high. The method has the following 
steps: 
- determine the security levels of specific computer centres. 
This is done by determines the systems that are operated in 
these centres, this information is obtained through the use of 
questionnaires. Xsec uses this information to produce a security 
profile for the organisation. 
- evaluation of countermeasures. This stage is concerned with 
determining the current level of security for all control points. 
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This information is determined by the use of questionnaires, 
these are completed by the users. 
- security comparison. In this stage a comparison of the 
security demand profile and security level profile for all control 
points is undertaken. I f the security demand is higher than the 
security level then a security weakness occurs. 
References: (Wahlgren, 1990) 
General 
Method Name: @Risk 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Required Experience: Specialist knowledge required 
System: 
Description: 
Computer based 
@Risk is an add-in for either Lotus 1-2-3 or Microsoft Excel 
software package. This package is a general purpose risk 
analysis and simulation modelling package. The package has 
been designed as a general risk analysis tool but it is possible to 
determine and simulate the risk of implementing computer 
systems. 
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Assets Protection: Limited 
Impact Analysis: None 
ThreatA^ulnerability None 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: None 
References: (S2014,1993) 
Method Name: BDSS (Bayesain Decision Support System) 
Country Of Origin: USA 
Required Experience: None 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Counterraeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risks, threat zind vulnerability levels by 
using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. BDSS 
qualitatively identifies assets and supports valuation as 
bounded ranges within an associated confidence factor to 
accommodate uncertainty. 
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References: (S2014.1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
References: 
PRISM 
USA 
Computer based 
PRISM supports development of risk modelling, simulation, 
sensitivity analysis and graphical presentation of results. This 
method allows the use of BASIC-like statements to model more 
complex applications. 
(S2014, 1993), (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
Risk 
USA 
Computer based 
RISK is a LOTUS 123/ Microsoft Excel add-in for general risk 
analysis. The software uses Monte Carlo simulation to 
determine uncertainly. The system includes output routine for 
displaying the information graphically and also providing 
detailed statistics. 
References: (S2014, 1993) 
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GpYgnmimcnt 
Method Name: Baseline Security 
Country of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: None 
System: 
Description: 
References: 
Computer based and paper based 
This system is a cut down version of CRAMM and it was 
developed in 1991. The aim of its development was to suggest 
basic security measure ("Baseline") that should be installed on 
IT systems. It is used by UK governmental departments in 
order to carry out security reviews on small systems 
(CCTA, 1993) 
Method Name: CRAMM (CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method) 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: IT security and method related training 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^uInerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
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The method expresses risks, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. The system can 
justify its security recommendations. The method was 
developed for use by UK government agencies. CRAMM is 
developed as a tool to assist staff or consultants undertaking a 
security review. 
CRAMM is broken into 3 main stages, which are as follows. 
Slage-L 
This stage is concerned with: 
- agreeing the boundaries of the review; 
- identifying and valuing the assets, e.g.: 
physical assets; 
software assets; 
data. 
St^gc 2 
This stage is concerned with: 
- evaluating the dependence of a system or group of assets. 
Each group is made up of assets which are considered for 
the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities. 
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- assessing threats and vulnerabilities. The CRAMM system 
generates questionnaires in order to determine the level 
of threats and vulnerabilities for each asset group. 
- calculating risk levels. The system automatically generates 
the risk for each asset group. 
Stagg3 
This stage is concemed with: 
- countermeasure selection. The system selects appropriate 
countermeasures from a library containing 1100 
countermeasures. 
- unjustified countermeasures. I f an existing system is being 
reviewed there may be some countermeasures which are 
not required. 
A new version of CRAMM is being released in 1996. The 
stages of this new method are slightly different fi-om the stages 
described. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (NIST, 1991), (Wahlgren, 1990), (CCTA, 1992) 
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Method Name: FIPS PUB 65 
Country Of Origin: USA 
System: Paper based 
Description: 
The system was developed for the US Department of 
Standards. One of the main objectives of its development was 
to inform governmental staff how to undertake a risk 
assessment. 
The method is broken down into three main stages. 
Preliminarv Examination 
This is concerned with initially examining the system that has 
to be reviewed, e.g. the type of system, the type of data is 
processes, special considerations, etc. 
Risk Analysis 
The risk analysis process requires the estimation of two 
quantities: 
- frequency of occurrence of a threat; 
- the impact of when a threat materialises and how it 
aftects an asset. 
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Multiplication of these factors results in the annual loss which 
can be expected fi'om the threat. 
Selection of Countermeasures 
This stage is concerned with selecting countermeasures for the 
organisation, an important aspect of the selection is the cost 
benefit of the countermeasures. 
The advantages of the FIPS method is that it produces 
financial figures, e.g. armual loss expectancies which is 
easier for management to understand. The main disadvantage of 
the system is that because it is paper based its very staff 
intensive. 
References: (FIPS 65, 1979), (Neugent, 1985) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
LAVA (Los Alamos Vulnerability Analysis) 
USA 
Computer based 
The structure of LAVA is broken into three stages. 
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Vulngrability Assessment 
Information is gathered about the organisations. This 
information takes the form of asset and threat determination. 
These threats and assets are combined into threat - asset pairs, 
the result of these pairing are then determined, e.g. modification 
of data. Countermeasure are then suggested on relating to the 
threat - asset pairing. The vulnerability assessment measures 
the relative weakness of the countermeasures and uses the 
assumption that all attacks are equally likely to occur and that 
the consequences of these attacks will be extreme. 
Threat Analysis 
The threat analysis takes into account possible threat agents, 
e.g. terrorists, employees and their potential attack goals, e.g. 
sabotage, theft, fraud. The threat analysis uses the following. 
- asset attractiveness, e.g. how attractive the asset is to a threat 
agent; 
- motivation, e.g. how much effort would a threat agent be 
willing to expand to attack an asset; 
- capability, e.g. this is the measure of the resources that the 
threat agent has at their disposal; 
- opportunity is a measure of how easy it is for the threat agent 
to carry out an attack. 
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The threat analysis provides a score for each possible threat, 
these scores are combined to produce an overall score. 
Consequence Analvsis 
The object of this analysis is to determine the effect that an 
outcome of a successful attack would have upon an 
organisation. The consequence measures the potential costs in 
both monetary and non-monetary terms. The types of 
consequences are obtained fi-om using interactive 
questionnaires. The potential loss is determined by calculating 
and combining the results fi-om the previous analysis. Then the 
system suggests possible countermeasures. This system was 
developed for the US government. 
References: (S2014,1993), (Wahlgren, 1990), (Smith and Jalbert, 1990) 
Method Name: PARIS (Pragmatic Assessment RISk methodology) 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: None 
System: Paper based 
Description: 
This system is a cut down version of CRAMM. Its used by the 
UK government department. The Home Office to carry out 
Page 285 
security reviews on existing or new computer systems. PARIS 
uses a tabulated questionnaire. The method identifies the 
following: 
- assets to be protected; 
- threats to those assets; 
- likelihood of the threat occurring and the 
impact it causes. 
Having determine these facts, it then poses questions regarding 
possible methods of countering the threat or reducing its 
likelihood. 
References: (Coverson, 1991) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
References: 
RiskPAC (Federal) 
USA 
Computer based 
This system meets the USA regulation requirement for risk 
analysis that is used on classified and unclassified critical 
government computer systems. The system is particularly 
focused by US government documents, e.g. Orange Book, 
National Computer Security Act (1987), etc. 
(S2014, 1993) 
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Healthcare 
Method Name: ZIP 
Country Of Origin: UK 
Required Experience: None 
System: Paper based 
Description: 
This system is a cut down version of CRAMM. It is used by the 
UK National Health Services (NHS). The NHS use it to carry 
out security reviews of small systems. 
References: (SCOLL, 1992) 
Military 
Product Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
ANSSR (Analysis of Networked Systems Security Risks) 
USA 
Computer based 
The method is aimed at carrying out risk analysis reviews for 
networked systems. The work was sponsored by the US Navy. 
The system works by the reviewer entering descriptive 
information via a set of menus. This information helps to 
produce a system model. Other factors can also be modelled, 
such as existing countermeasures. ANSSR performs a 
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simulation of human attacks against systems with the goal of 
gaining access. These attacks are modelled as threat scenarios 
and the likelihood o f success depends upon the attackers 
capabilities and the systems countermeasures. I f a system is 
compromised by a threat scenario, then the system can be 
remodelled with new countemieasures and the simulation run 
again. 
References: (Bodeau, 1992) 
Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
ARES (Automated Risk Evaluation System) 
USA 
Computer based 
This method is a quantitative system. ARES uses a rule based 
interference engine and a menu driven checklist system to 
perform a risk analysis. The system collects information from 
user and from this information the risk analysis process is 
carried out. This process shows where the potentials risks are 
and the system then suggests countermeasures. The system was 
developed for the US Air Force. 
References: (NIST, 1991) 
Method Name: LRAM (Livermore Risk Analysis Methodology) 
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Country Of Origin: USA 
System: 
Description: 
Computer based 
The method was developed for the US Air Force Logistics 
Command by Lawrence National Laboratory in 1985. 
The system is structured to allow screening of asset/threat event 
combinations so only high impact risks are reviewed. The 
system looks at proposed and present security features. L R A M 
is structured in three stages. 
Scoping of Analysis 
This phase defines the scope of the analysis and identifies 
needed resources and personnel. 
Risk Idcntifigation 
Risk elements are identified by establishing corresponding 
threats, countermeasure and assets. 
Decision Support 
This process is concerned with selecting and listing in priority 
each recommended countemieasure on the basis of cost benefits 
estimates. 
References: (S2014, 1993), (Wahlgren, 1990), (Guarro, 1987) 
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Method Name; Melisa 
Country Of Origin: France 
Required Experience: None 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Extensive 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
Melisa was developed for the French Navy in 1985. The 
method expresses threat and vulnerability levels by using a 
quantitative and qualitative approach. Risk is expressed by 
using a quantitative approach. The threat levels are measured is 
terms of its seriousness and vulnerability levels are presented 
by grades. Risk levels are presented by a score of between 0 
(no risk) and 100 (absolute risk). 
References: (S2014, 1993),(Wahlgren, 1990) 
Method Name: SDC US Navy Risk Assessment Methodology 
Country Of Origin: USA 
System: Paper based 
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Description: 
The system was developed in 1979 for the US Navy. The 
method consist of six phases. The first three are concerned with 
identifying the system to be evaluated, identifying the threats 
and then the vulnerabilities. The identification of threats and 
vulnerabilities using a qualitative approach, e.g. low, medium. 
The fourth stage is concerned with matching threats and 
vulnerabilities to determine areas of possible attacks and 
impacts. The f i f th stage is concerned with expanding the 
impacts and this is determined by multiplying the impact 
against the frequency of attack (using supplied mathematical 
tables) to determine the annual loss expectancy (ALE). The 
sixth stage is concerned with selecting the countermeasures. 
References: (Neugent, 1985) 
Method Name: Security by Analysis (SBA) 
Country Of Origin: Sweden 
Required Experience: Method specific training and IT security knowledge 
System: Computer based 
Description: 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: 
ThreatA^ulnerability 
Extensive 
Extensive 
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Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: None 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. The method was 
originally developed in Sweden for their Ministry of Defence, 
but is now used by all commercial sectors. The method 
describes the principles an analyst should adopt to examine 
threats in a business area. The SBA method is based on 
the analysis of three factors which affect the vulnerability of 
computer systems, these are: 
- interruptions in information processing systems; 
- unauthorised use of information; 
- poor information quality. 
The SBA method consists o f various modules that can be used 
independently of each other, these modules are: 
SBA Start - this module relates to managers 
judgements of their present security 
situation, e.g. how serious would the 
consequence, be i f something 
happened; 
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SBA Dependence - reveals the ftinctions that the 
organisation is more dependant upon and 
the information systems supporting these 
functions; 
SBA System 
SBA Scenario 
SBA Report 
- analyses how the systems behave 
under the influence of various 
vulnerability factors; 
- assesses the data risks by means of 
imagined future events, e.g. worse case 
scenarios; 
- an assessment of the current state of 
information security within the 
organisation; 
SBA Project estimates the risk of a project; 
SBA Development - eliminates risk factors of system 
developments; 
SBA Key Personnel - analyses the organisations dependence 
of key staff. 
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References: (S2014,1993), (Wrede, 1984), (Voutilainen, 1989) 
Research 
Method Name: SARA (Simple to Apply Risk Analysis) 
Country Of Origin: Europe 
System: 
Description: 
Method Name: 
Country of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
Paper based 
The method was developed by the European Security Forum. 
Due to the fact that I have signed a non-disclosure agreement 
relating to this method, I cannot expand upon it any further. 
SEISMED Risk Analysis Method 
Europe 
Paper Based 
The method was developed as part of the SEISMED project, 
it is a development of the ZIP methodology. The method has 
not been used within healthcare and it has not been adopted 
by any official organisations. 
References: (Davey and King, 1995) 
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Method Name: 
Country Of Origin: 
System: 
Description: 
SESAME HYPERVIEW 
France 
Still in development 
Assets Protection: Extensive 
Impact Analysis: Extensive 
ThreatA^ulnerability Moderate 
Analysis: 
Level Countermeasures: Extensive 
The method expresses risk, threat and vulnerability levels by 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach. Risk is expressed 
by using a qualitative approach. The system is still been 
developed and it is one of the few methods developed for use 
by UNIX systems. 
References: (52014,1993) 
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Other methods 
The following are a list of knowTi risk analysis method that exists but no information 
was found relating to them: 
BP Methodology (not commercially available); 
Chase Manhattan Bank; 
CSAEP (Computer Security Assessment and Evaluation 
Package); 
CVRP; 
DHSS Methodology (not commercially available); 
DIAPASON; 
EBP; 
GRAM; 
ICI Methodology (not commercially available); 
M2Risk; 
Risk Manager; 
PARI/AEROSPATIALE; 
Predictor. 
References: (S2014. 1993) 
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Appendix G Published Papers 
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Published Papers 
Conferences 
Particaptional Management and the Implementation of Multimedia Systems, 
by MJ.Warren, P.W.Sanders and P.N.Gaunt, 
MEDIACOMM 95 - International Conference on Multimedia 
Communications. 
Southampton, England, April, 1995. 
Secure Multimedia Systems in Healthcare and Medicine 
by S.M.Fumell, N.J.Salmons, P.W.Sanders, C.T.Stockel and M.J.Warren, 
MEDIACOMM 95 - Intemational Conference on Multimedia 
Communications. 
Southampton, England, April, 1995. 
Security Criteria Expert System - the medical application, 
by M.J.Warren, P.W.Sanders and P.N.Gaunt 
International Conference on Neural Networks and Expert Systems i n Medicine 
and Healthcare Conference,(NNESMED 94). 
Plymouth, England, August, 1994. 
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Impact of Security on a healthcare environment and how to overcome i t , 
by M.J.Warren and P.N.Gaunt, 
I M L \ (International Medical Informatics Association) WG4, 
Caring for Health Information Conference, 
Heemskerk, The Netheriands, November, 1993. 
J w m a l s 
Development of Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems 
by S.M.Fumell. P.W.Sanders and M.J.Warren, 
Published 'Medical Informatics', Vol 20, no 2, 1995. 
A Generic Methodology for Health Care Data Security, 
by S.M.Fumell, P.N.Gaunt, G.Pangalos, P.W.Sanders and M.J.Warren, 
Published 'Medical Informatics', Vol 19, no 3,1994. 
Awaiting Publication 
Conferences 
ODESSA - Baseline Security Risk Analysis, 
by M.J.Warren, P.W.Sanders and P.N.Gaunt, 
To be published. 
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Provision of healthcare security information using the World-Wide-Web, 
by S.M.Fumell, P.W.Sanders and M.J.Warren, 
MIE 96, Denmark, August, 1996. 
Journals 
Assessing stafT attitudes to information security in a European healthcare 
establishment, 
by S.M.Fumell, P.N.Gaunt, R.F.Holben, P.W.Sanders, C.T.Stockel and M.J 
Warren, 
Medical Informatics, UK. 
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MEDIACOMM '95 
PARTICIPATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
MULTIMEDIA SYSTEMS 
M^.Warren' & P.W.Sanders* & Dr RN,Gaunt^ 
'Network Research Group, S E C E E , 
Uaiversity of Plymouth, 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: Matw@socplym.acuk 
^Division of Health Care Informatics, 
Faculty of Medicine, University of Plymouth, United Kingdom 
ABSTRACT 
Multimedia is the latest development in user information 
presentation systems. In certain sectors there will be an 
increasing dependency upon the quality ofdatathatis 
delivered by multimedia systems. Acceptance of the 
computer systems by users is of utmost importance, 
and without this acceptance a whole series of problems 
can occur relating to the user and the organisation. 
The paper describes a methodology that can be used for 
the process of implementing multimedia systems and 
determining the problems that could occur during the 
implementation stage This is the first step in the UK 
towards developing a complete approach that can be 
used for change control management in respect 
to muhimedia systems. 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of this new type of presentation will have a major 
impact across many different sectors, that range from 
business to healthcare. The use of multimedia systems 
will be major component of the information age. but there 
ire problems; technological innovations by themselves 
ire not enough for the development of systems that users 
•equire and need[l]. Other considerations relate to 
ivailability and reliability of the systems once they have 
been introduced. 
The introduction of new technology into an organisation 
is not only a technical but also a himian issue the following 
should be considered: 
Human Issues 
The main impact areas are: 
- User requirements 
New technology directly affects users. There is little 
evidence that managers have recognised the need of using 
IT (including multimedia) to change the way they do 
business [2]. 
Users requirements should be incorporated fully into the 
system design from the start so that the system that is designed 
actually complies with user requirements. 
- User job satisfaction 
The way in which the multimedia system operates usually 
has a direct affect upon the user and the way they use the 
system. I f the user is unsatisfied with the system they will 
become less motivated and users will lake longer to carry 
out tasks; or might not even use the system at all. It is 
important to determine how users will react to the visual style 
of data that will be contained within the multimedia system 
Organisational Issues 
The introduction of new technology is a method by which 
organisations can gain a competitive edge by increasing 
their efficiency. The main organisational issues are: 
-Technical Impact 
Tlie introduction of new technology often has a technical 
impact within the organisation. Computer system should 
be phased in gradually in order to smooth out compatibility 
problems that could arise. 
- Training 
The introduction of new computer systems will require 
the training o f users in order to use it effectively. 
Training considerations would relate to the level of 
training required, the number of staff requiring training 
and the amount of time lost by staff because of training. 
A particular consideration will be making users aware of 
the limitations and advantages of using multimedia 
information. 
-Costs 
An important organisational issue is that of cost. Any 
new technology being introduced will be more expensive 
then existing available technology. User costs also have 
to be considered, such as the cost of training. 
- Culture 
The introduction of new types of technology could have 
a direct or indirect impact upon the culture of the 
organisation, i.e. new technology being seen as status 
symbols, jobs being redesigned around the new 
echnology. 
JVHAT IS SIM-ETHICS? 
;iM stands for Security Implementation Methodology and 
iTHICS stands for Effective Technical and Human 
mplementation of Computer based Systems. ETHICS was 
iriginally developed by Professor Enid Mumford of the 
Manchester Business School. 
SIM-ETHICS is a methodology that manages the 
nplementation of IT technology, i.e. from multimedia to 
rganisational IT policies. It allows for the assessment of 
iciors relating to: 
-determining the impact of technology in terms of 
user job satisfaction and system efHciency and 
effectiveness. 
-determining problems that could occur when 
implementing new technical systems within an 
organisation. 
-determining the training required to use the 
implemented technology. 
SIM-ETHICS is based upon the concept of participational 
management, and uses a selection o f committees as a basis to 
discuss organisational issues [3]. 
Part of SIM-ETHICS is used to evaluate multimedia 
applications against a pre-defined set of criteria. These 
criteria relates to: 
- Ease of Implementation 
- Training Issues 
- User Impact of multimedia 
- Organisational Impact 
- Human Issues regarding the use of multimedia 
The criteria means that major problems could be foreseen 
and overcome before the actual implementation of the system 
occurs. 
THE USE OF SEM-ETfflCS 
SIM-ETHICS has been successfully used in Plymouth 
NHS Hospital Trust, UK to determine: 
- the impact of a security physical swipe card system. 
- the impact of a computer system that will be used 
for sending memos and office notices 
; internally via e-mail. 
- users perceptions of passwords. 
- security training needs for users and system 
managers. 
SIM-ETHICS is intended to be used in the future to 
determine: 
• the organisational impact o f a new IT security 
policy. 
- the impact of various new computer systems, 
. including multimedia systems. 
CASESTUDY 
Problems with implementation 
The case study relates to a new multimedia system that is 
being considered within the Plymouth NHS Hospital The main problems with implementation will be: 
Trust. The aim is to develop electronic healthcare ai  is to 
records for all patients that are treated within the Tmst for 
certain cancers. The medical record is the most 
important repository for information covering patient's 
healthcare. The traditional paper-based system suffers from 
serious drawbacks [4]. The drawbacks relate to factors such 
as duplication of information, illegible handwriting. 
The electronic health record system would contain a 
mixture of text and multimedia and will help to overcome 
some of the problems of paper-based medical records. 
The system will be PC based to allow for integration with 
existing medical computer systems. 
The perceived advantages of such a system are: 
- simple to use, so any member of staff should 
be able to use it; 
- allows for more accurate and complete storage 
of patient details during their treatment in 
different areas of the hospital; 
- allows for greater access to patient details by 
staff involved in the treatment, e.g. by general 
practitioners, community nurses; 
- improves the quality of patient data records, i.e. 
by reducing duplication and improving illegibly; 
- improve the working relationship that exists 
between the clinical teams providing cancer 
services; 
- designing a system that meets user requirements 
and can be used by many different types of staff: 
- doctors 
- nurses 
- laboratory staff 
- radiographers 
- community nursing staff 
- general practitioners 
- Designing a multimedia record that incorporates 
data from the following information sources: 
- general practitioners 
- hospital clinics and wards 
- pathology and radiology departments 
- oncology department 
- community nurses 
- Determining the training requirements of users. 
- Initiating awareness programs to educate staff about 
multimedia and it*s implications. 
- Problems of integrating with various existing comput 
systems. 
Case study Diagram 
The diagram on the next page shows an overview of the 
system. It shows the main function areas of the system and 
shows the different types of data that exists within the 
system. This data will be conuined within the new multimedia 
health record. 
- allows long term follow up of patients; 
- allows for instant access to medical records, 
24 hours a day. 
The diagram shows that, though the system is being designed 
for the treaUnent of certain cancers, it will have a direct effect 
on general practitioners, neighbouring trusts and several 
departments within Plymouth Hospital Trust. The users 
could number several hundred staff with different requireme 
and needs from the system. 
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Intended nse o f SIM-ETHICS 
The following indicates the framework that is intended to be 
used for the introduction of the new multimedia medical 
record system. 
1) Initial CQmmittee Consultation 
The committee wi l l be made up of a cross section of staff 
directly involved or affected by the implementation of the 
new computer system, i.e.: 
- representatives o f clinical staff from the different 
departments affected by the change 
- representatives o f the IT department 
- representatives of the CP's who wi l l be working 
with the system 
The committee wi l l decide initially on what should be 
considered the major impacts: 
- the impacts of introducing multimedia 
- training of users 
- cost o f new equipment 
- compatibility with existing clinical and 
administrative computer systems 
I) Managerial consultation 
The intended computer system is evaluated against the 
SIM-ETHICS criteria to determine the level of impact it's 
implementation wil l have. 
\ representative of the committee would meet the following 
- system managers of existing clinical systems 
- specialist IT managers, i.e. network managers 
- managers and staff involved in implementing the 
new multimedia system. 
\ t these meetings issues relating to the introduction of the 
system are discussed (as determined in Stage I ) as well as 
iny other possible problems that managers could see. 
0 Committee Stage 
rhe views of the managers are discussed within the 
:ommittee. It is now that initial problems are discussed, i.e. 
jroblems of changing existing paper based medical records 
nto the new required format. 
fhe committee decides on: 
- What questions to ask, 
i.e. How do you feel about having to use 
a new type o f medical record. 
- The type o f user to ask, 
i.e. Ward clerk 
- The number o f users to ask 
i.e. Every ward clerk 
4^ Users consultation 
A representative of the committee then meets the users to 
explain the proposed system and then ask them a series o f 
questions. 
The multimedia system is then re-evaluated against the 
criteria to take into account the newly raised issues. 
g)Comminec Stage 
The views of the users are discussed. I f problems are found 
concerning the system, ways would be discussed on how to 
overcome the problem, i.e. increase the amount o f training. 
6) Post implementational review 
This meeting takes place after the implementation to 
determine i f any unforeseen problems have occurred and 
discuss ways in which to rectify the problems. 
CONCLUSION 
The key to successfully implementation o f new computer 
systems is an participational approach involving the staff 
directly affected ensuring their acceptance of the system 
The work being carried out is a step towards developing a 
generic methodology that could be used for the 
implementation of multimedia systems. 
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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to examine the increasing 
potential for applying multimedia technology within the 
medical community. Muhimedia is considered to be a 
particularly appropriate means for information deliveiy 
within Healthcare Establishments (HCEs). especially for 
that relating to patient care, and the paper considers the 
principal advantages in this area. The discussion then 
proceeds to highlight the fact that adoption of multimedia 
dictates new requirements for information security and, 
by the nature of the technology involved, also allows new 
approaches to be explored. On this premise, the outline of 
a security strategy for future multimedia healthcare 
networks is proposed. The discussion is supported by an 
example scenario and a brief examination of our own 
research groups efforts in this area. 
allowing further improvements to the speed 
information delivery within and between HCEs. 
of 
INTRODUCTION 
MEDICAL CARE 
MULTIMEDIA IN MODERN 
Over the past twenty years computerised information 
systems have gradually been introduced to, and utilised 
within, a large number of heahhcare establishments 
(HCEs). Information Technology (IT) now enables 
modem HCEs to provide more comprehensive medical 
care, comprising more numerous and more complex 
procedures. As such, HCE systems now process and 
handle information beyond simple text and graphics and 
more advanced medical applications may also generate 
digital images, full motion video and audio. The use of 
this multimedia information can considerably aid patient 
diagnosis and treatment (Ceusters et al. 1993). 
As a result of recent advances in desktop processing 
power, the large scale use of multimedia-based healthcare 
systems is closer to being an achievable goal, with the 
presentation and delivery of multimedia information 
becoming possible at a viable price. This is largely due to 
the fact that PC-based systems can now represent a 
realistic platform for multimedia and can be found in 
numbers in most HCEs. In addition, telecommunications 
networks are now capable of handling the high speeds 
necessary to transfer large amounts of multimedia data. 
In terms of advantages, the presentation of medical data in 
a multimedia format is considered to be ideally suited to 
the healthcare field as it inherently provides more 
information (Orozco-Barbosa et al. 1992), and in a form 
that is more easily comprehended than traditional text-
based reports. This should indirectly help to improve the 
quality of care, as clinical decisions are made on the basis 
that the clinician has direct access to the most 
comprehensive information possible. In addition, it will 
allow the seamless integration of existing operational 
systems, with the ability to maintain a standardised 
viewing structure. As such, the potential applications of 
multimedia in healthcare are wide-ranging. For example, 
an area of significant potential will be the establishment 
of composite electronic health records, bringing together 
various types of multimedia patient data into a single 
entity (Arnold and Peter 1993). Such electronic 
muhimedia record systems have the potential to 
significantly improve care delivery as they will allow 
immediate access to full patient data at any time, with 
flexible options for retrieval (whereas the same data may 
currently be held in several different places, making it 
difficult for clinicians to obtain all o f the information that 
may be available). 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY 
It is important to recognise that a major consequence of 
the progression to multimedia will be an extension of the 
already significant reliance upon IT in healthcare 
establishments. This reliance stems from the increasing 
number of healthcare IT applications, particularly those 
relating to clinical care, that are now fundamental to 
routine clinical practice (Barber 1991). A number of 
fumre trends are predicted (European Commission 1994), 
with European project sponsorship (in the 4th 
Framework) under way, that will further increase this 
dependency. These include: 
• increased intra and inter-HCE networking; 
• increased exchange of data between HCEs; 
• increased potential for sharing of facilities 
between HCEs; 
• establishment and adoption of the composite 
electronic health record. 
Due to the comprehensive nature of the information 
presented, it is envisaged that there is likely to be a even 
greater level of implicit trust in the correctness of the 
system. As such reliance upon IT increases, so too does 
the potential impact of any system unavailability or 
erroneous data. This, therefore, heightens the requirement 
to ensure that the availability and mtegrity of medical 
systems can be maintained. 
In addition, further considerations arising from the 
increasing variety and complexity of data dictate a greater 
need for confidentiality controls. Firstly, the 
amalgamation of different forms of data into the 
composite record may potentially increase the sensitivity 
of the information beyond that of any of the component 
parts. Secondly, information that would previously have 
been held (and potentially secured) by separate 
applications would now be placed together, and thus the 
impact of a security breach would be significantly higher. 
The use of multimedia can, therefore, be seen to affect all 
three main principles of information security (i.e. 
confidentiality, integrity and availability). 
As a result of these considerations, the authors believe 
that a different approach may be necessary to integrate 
security into multimedia systems and that the 
environment may also allow new opportunities to be 
explored. 
A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR MULTIMEDIA 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
Whilst many areas of security (e.g. physical, 
environmental and personnel considerations) will not be 
directly affected by the multimedia context, there will be 
noticeable effects in others; some significant, some less so 
(e.g. the quantity of data involved will affect the backup 
process in temis of increased storage requirements and, 
potentially, the time required to perform the task). The 
paper concentrates upon two aspects in particular which 
should be re-examined in light of the trends predicted 
above; namely user authentication and data 
communications. In both of these cases, an important 
issue will be the transparency of protection mechanisms 
employed. One of the main advantages of multimedia 
systems is that data can be presented in a more natural and 
"user-friendly" context. As such, there is a dilemma that 
whilst the systems must be easy to use and effective, they 
must at the same time be made secure. This does not 
necessarily mean that users should be totally unaware of 
security (indeed, it will probably increase trust in the 
system i f some security is seen to be present), but it must 
not interfere with their work and should be compatible 
with the general "feel" of the system. 
User Authentication 
User authentication mechanisms will still be required to 
prevent impostors masquerading at local terminals and 
workstations. However, two factors suggest that 
traditional password-based methods alone will no longer 
be sufficient protection: 
• multimedia systems will significantly reduce the 
role of keyboard input in some contexts (e.g. 
information retrieval), such that it may not be 
required at all HCE terminals. As having to retain 
a keyboard simply for user authentication 
purposes would hardly constitute transparent 
security, an authentication mechanism not 
requiring this aspect would be desirable; 
• the increased data sensitivity that could potentially 
result from the composite record context adds 
weight to the argument that passwords (which 
often provide a weak / unreliable basis for 
authentication anyway (Jobusch and Oldehoeft 
1989)) should be supplemented by other 
mechanisms. 
The use of smart card systems may have a place in 
overcoming these problems, but may not be practical as a 
compulsory measure as this would introduce an 
immediate financial burden across the whole system 
(which most HCEs would not be able to tolerate at the 
present time). 
A appropriate alternative would be to utilise advanced 
user supervision systems which could operate 
transparently and in real-time throughout each session 
(Lunt 1993). A number of factors could potentially be 
encompassed by the supervision, including : 
• tunes and locations of system usage; 
• typical applications used; 
• types of data accessed and how it is used; 
• analysis of the users typing style (if a keyboard is 
still used). 
The use of neural network techniques could allow 
appropriate information on these (and other factors) to be 
gathered automatically, with subtle behaviour patterns 
being learnt in order to develop profiles for legitimate 
system users. Current user activity could then be 
continuously compared against the profile for the users 
claimed identity (with significant departures causing an 
alert to be generated). 
In addition to the above, multimedia systems may allow 
many new options to be introduced for improving 
authentication. For example, appropriate hardware for 
implementing several biometric identification methods 
may already be present "as standard" in a multimedia 
configuration (e.g. cameras which may be used for image 
/ "faceprint" recognition, microphones and audio 
processing facilities for voice recognition). These 
techniques have been successfully implemented 
elsewhere, delivering adequate authentication 
performance and gaining a high degree of user acceptance 
(Sherman 1992). As such they should btegrate well with 
multimedia systems. However, the presence of such 
hardware enhancements should not be a prerequisite of 
the authentication strategy for the same reasons as smart 
cards. Nevertheless, some mechanism should be 
incorporated to allow extra facilities to be utilised if they 
are present 
Future multimedia systems may, therefore, demand that a 
variety of authentication technologies are actually 
employed, based around an approach that is primarily 
software-oriented. These may then be linked / managed 
by an intelligent supervision system which can select the 
most appropriate mechanism to be invoked at any given 
point according to the current user activity and the type of 
system being used (e.g. keystroke analysis could be used 
in any text-intensive activity; facial recognition could be 
used i f the host system is equipped with a camera). Note 
that once authentication has been conducted, any 
underlying data / application access and auditing controls 
could still be implemented in a traditional manner to 
restrict and monitor the activities of different classes of 
user. 
Data Communications 
One of the trends likely to result from the availability of 
more and better information is the increased sharing and 
exchange of data between HCEs. In the UK, the National 
Health Service (NHS) already plans to bring all aspects of 
voice and data communications together into a common 
framework, with all major HCEs having the facility to 
communicate electronically by 1996 (NHS Management 
Executive 1992). However, the transmission of 
composite records again raises the concerns of 
confidentiality and integrity (i.e. the need to protect 
messages against unauthorised interception, modification 
and falsification). Hence the requirement to have secure 
data communications will also be correspondingly greater. 
A strategy is proposed that would introduce layered 
security at local, national and international levels with 
encryption of data between different security domains 
(based upon a Trusted Third Party (TTP) approach as 
shown in figure I) . 
International 
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(imemel) 
•FT 
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Fig. 1 : Secure Data Communications using a TTP 
hierarchy 
The TTP would be capable of providing three main types 
of security service in relation to data transmission : 
• integrity (e.g. checksums); 
• non-repudiation (e.g. digital signatures); 
• confidentiality (e.g. encryption). 
These services would be applied, as appropriate, to 
communications at all levels of the TTP hierarchy. In 
addition, encryption could be used to protect stored data 
where workstations in the local domains cannot be 
physically secured. However, it should be noted that 
whilst the facility for encryption would exist, its use in 
healthcare is currently restricted in some EC countries. 
The operation of all data communications services could 
theoretically be made completely transparent to the end 
user (although in some cases, such as the use of digital 
signatures, users should be given some indication that a 
security service is being provided). 
As can be seen from the figure, the Security Management 
Centre (SMC) introduced to handle the authentication 
system will also assume responsibility for securing 
communications in each local domain. The SMC 
facilities could be incorporated as part of an overall 
Network Management Centre. 
This strategy would increase the importance of 
maintaining availability, with a reliance upon the 
availability of interconnected systems as opposed to 
earlier isolated ones. The hierarchy would, therefore, be 
designed to be fault tolerant to enable secure operations to 
continue even in the event of individual TTP failure. 
However, this strategy obviously depends upon the 
overall TTP infrastnicture being in place before it can be 
realised. Therefore, in the short to medium term, 
individual HCEs and co-operating establishments will 
require alternative means by which their communications 
can be secured (AIM SEISMED 1994). In addition, due 
to the enormous volume of data involved in multimedia 
data communications, there are also questions that must 
be addressed regarding the need for compression and how 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) may then be 
used. In the longer temi, the fact that uses of the TTP 
would not be restricted to the healthcare domain could aid 
its introduction and acceptance at the national and 
international levels. The use of TTPs in the healthcare 
context is described in more detail in (Fumell and Sanders 
1995). 
EXAMPLE SCENARIO 
This section presents an example scenario to illustrate 
how future multimedia data exchange would be likely to 
function within and between HCEs. This is, in turn, used 
to highlight the need for security at the various stages 
involved. To this end, the information flows involved in a 
potential multimedia healthcare system are illustrated in 
figure 2 and explained in the description below. 
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Fig. 2 : Multimedia Healthcare Application 
The neurology department in one establishment (HCE A) 
performs a series of tests which produce a set of "raw" 
results data. However, HCE A lacks the equipment 
required to process and visualise the data, making it 
necessary to involve another site (HCE B). Once 
visualisation has been performed the results are 
transmitted back and stored in a database, from where 
they are subsequently accessed by a consultant at HCE A. 
However, further expert opinion is required and advice is. 
therefore, sought from another neurological consultant 
located at HCE C. Hence, the data is exchanged 
further, with the additional interpretation fmally coming 
back to the originating consultant (allowing a more 
informed care decision to be made at HCE A). The 
consultants at HCEs A and C have access to a video 
conferencing link from their camera-equipped 
workstations, whilst the other parties in the scenario use 
standard workstations without such a facility. 
From this basic outline, a general security specification 
can be given based upon the strategy described earlier. 
The different HCEs would communicate via local and 
national level TTPs. with all parties being authenticated 
by their local SMCs, Given that their workstations are 
equipped with cameras, the two consultants could 
potentially be authenticated by an image recognition 
system. However, the data production and data 
processing centres, utilising standard workstations, would 
have no facility for multimedia-enhanced authentication 
methods. Authentication of these parties would, 
therefore, be reliant upon the SMC facilities for activity 
supervision (possibly alongside traditional methods). The 
example is heavily communications oriented and the 
SMCs would communicate via the TTP hierarchy to 
authenticate and validate the various data exchanges and 
messages. The principal services required between HCEs 
A and B would be data integrity and confidentiality, 
whereas the HCE A / HCE C link would also require that 
the consultants were unable to repudiate information 
messages added to the system. 
The example primarily illustrates the types of information 
exchange and consultations that the use of multimedia in 
healthcare will make possible. It also serves to underline 
the need for secure data communications between the 
various parties involved. The use of the TTP / SMC 
hierarchy would ensure that security was consistent across 
the three sites involved; a factor that considerably reduces 
the potential problems of sharing data and facilities as 
discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
The need for security is not unique to multimedia-based 
systems - indeed, similar demands already exist in many 
operational healthcare applications. However, the 
important point is that introduction of multimedia will 
serve to increase the demands significantly. Neither is the 
proposed security strategy restricted to applications within 
healthcare establishments. However, the primary reliance 
upon software methods makes it particularly suited to 
HCEs, which are often more significantly financially 
constrained in relation to security than other types of 
organisation. 
Our group is currently involved in the development, 
implementation and evaluation of a prototype multimedia 
patient records system in co-operation with a local HCE. 
Security is being considered as a key issue the project, 
with elements of the proposed strategy being addressed. 
It is hoped that the research will also help to identify other 
considerations that arise from the practical 
implementation of multimedia in healthcare. 
The adoption and utilisation of multimedia technologies 
in healthcare is accelerating and it is likely that there will 
be a period of transition as research projects and pilot 
programmes (such as the EC 4th Framework) proceed in 
this area and produce their recommendations. From 
these, the principal uses and benefits of multimedia within 
healthcare will be established. We believe that it will be 
important for security issues to be considered during the 
planning and development of future systems, as the nature 
of the environment could well make it more difficult to 
securely integrate suitable protection later (or at least 
without it appearing to be an obvious afterthought). 
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ABSTRACT 
In many Health Care Establishments (HCEs) there is an increasing dependency upon 
computer systems and the data contained within these systems. The importance of this 
data dictates that computer systems have to be properly protected. Within the NHS there 
is generally a \ov/ understanding of computer security and the problems of 
implementing security. 
This paper describes a methodology that can be used for the process o f implementing 
security and determining the problems that could occur during the implementation 
stage. This is the first step within the UK towards developing a complete approach that 
can be used for change control management regarding security. 
The paper describes how the methodology wil l be developed as an expert system and 
used in conjunction v^th a newly developed risk analysis methodology. 
The work contained in the paper was developed as part of the European Union 
SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) research 
project, the aim of which is to provide recommendations and guidelines for European 
HCEs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Security is a human issue and should be considered in the context of the health care 
staff. A problem with introducing security into HCE's is that it is not only a technical 
^LuuLcuL uut m:ku oil uigmuaiiuuiiat i^^uc. i i icic i2k ii rcquirciiicni lur a meuioa lo concroi 
the introduction of security and determining the different impacts that this introduction 
could have upon the HCE or a wider range o f organisations, SIM-ETHICS was 
developed because of this. 
WHAT IS SIM-ETHICS? 
SIM stands for Security Implementation Methodology and ETHICS stands for Effective 
lechnical and Human Implementation of Computer based Systems. ETHICS was 
originally developed by Professor Enid Mumford of the Manchester Business School. 
This is a methodology that managers the implementation of security countermeasures. I t 
allows for the assessment of factors related to: 
-determining the impact of security in terms of 
user job satisfaction and system efficiency and effectiveness 
-determining technical problems that could occur when implementing 
security within an organisation. 
-determining the training required to use the implemented security 
countermeasures. 
A more detailed breakdown of these factors are foimd in [1]. 
SIM-ETHICS is based upon the concept of participational management, and uses a 
selection of committees as a basis to discuss organisational issues [2]. 
SIM-ETHICS is used to evaluate security countermeasures against a pre-defined set of 
criteria. 
- Ease of Implementation 
- Training Issues 
- User Impact 
- Organisational Impact 
- Human Issues 
A more detailed explanation of the criteria can be found in [3 ] . 
The use of the SIM-ETHICS security criteria allows countermeasures to be evaluated 
and suggest impacts that their introduction could cause, the use of this criteria wi l l form 
a major component of the knowledge base of the expert system. 
The steps of SIM-ETHICS 
The following framework is used to implement SIM-ETHICS. The stages of the process 
are: 
n Initial Committee Consultation 
The committee decides which countermeasures to look at, taking into account 
issues such as training of users and the number of users affected by the 
proposed countermeasure. 
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A representative of the committee meets the managers concerned with 
implementing the countermeasures. Issues relating to the introduction o f the 
countemieasures are discussed as well as any other possible problems that could 
occur. The countermeasures are evaluated against the SIM-ETHICS criteria. 
Vi Committee Stage 
The views of the managers are discussed. It is then decided which users to 
interview, i.e. staff nurses and how many of them. 
4) Users consultation 
A representative of the committee then meets the users to explain the proposed 
countermeasures and the problems that they may cause. The representative 
wi l l ask the users for their views about the countermeasures and possible 
problems that their implementation could cause The coimtermeasures are then 
re-evaluated against the SIM-ETHICS criteria 
5) Committee Stage 
The views of the users are discussed. I f problems are found concerning the 
countermeasures, ways would be discussed on how to modify them, i.e. increase 
the amount of training, reduce the scope of implementation. 
6) Post implementational review 
Once the countemieasures have been implemented, a meeting wi l l take place 
with the users to detemiine i f any unforeseen problems have occurred and try to 
discuss ways to try and overcome them, i.e. arranging more training for certain 
staff. 
The use of SIM-ETHICS 
It is being used at Derriford Hospital, Plymouth, UK to determine the impact of new 
security countermeasures and a new computer infomiation systems. The security areas 
being looked at are: 
a new physical access control system for the whole hospital 
a new method of assigning levels of access for all computer users 
a new Infomiation Computer Systems 
THE EXPERT SYSTEM 
The lack of security awareness within the NHS generates a requirement for a low cost 
source of appropriate expertise. The answer maybe an expert system. The SIM-ETHICS 
methodology vAW be combined with a new risk analysis methodology, ODESSA 
(Organisational Dfiscriptive Security Analysis) to produce such a system. This expert 
system should allow staff instructed on risk analysis techniques to review a system and 
then determine the impact that recommended security countermeasures could have upon 
their department or organisation. 
ODESSA is a newly developed risk analysis methodology, which operates by 
detemiining baseline security countermeasures, these countermeasures are then 
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ODESSA is an extension of a theoretical risk analysis modal developed for HCE's [4], 
many new features have been added to this theoretical modal to produce a ful ly working 
method. 
The expert system wil l be designed using a formal methodology such as KADS [5], to 
promote the benefits of: 
- easier planning 
- a structured approach for the design of expert systems 
- an improved requirement analysis 
KADS itself is a design methodology that can be adjusted to fit the scale of the problem. 
It is not envisaged that the ful l KADS methodology wi l l be used in the design of the 
expert system but rather a cut down version, the reason for this is that KADS was 
originally developed for developing large expert systems, this explains why there are 
seven steps just in the feasibility stage [5]. 
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ODESSA System 
The ODESSA system is broken down into four main stages: 
1) Baseline Security - The user is given basic security advice for their 
organisation. 
2) System Identification - System assets are evaluated 
3) Risk Evaluation - Risks and vulnerabilities are determined 
4) Countermeasure Identification - Appropriate countermeasures are produced 
S I M - E T H I C S Expert System 
The expert system takes the countermeasure lists produced by the ODESSA 
system and determine the impact that their implementation could have. 
Environment in which the expert system will operate 
The SIM-ETHICS expert system wil l work as part of the ODESSA program suite. The 
ODESSA prototype wi l l be written in Visual Basic. The interface facilities o f Visual 
Basic means that a language such as C++ could be used as the host language of the 
expert system. The advantage of using C-H- is its portability, the speed at which it 
operates and the fact that it allows the use of object orientation. 
Knowledge Analysis for the expert system 
Knowledge analysis is an important stage in the development of any expert system. This 
analysis determines the rules which would populate the knowledge domeiin and 
therefore structure the behaviour of the expert system. 
As part of the knowledge analysis process the following areas wi l l be looked at: 
Environmgntal Analysis 
This analysis is concerned with determining the need for and value o f 
knowledge within the health care environments. Particular importance is placed 
upon analysing the cultural environment of HCE's, i.e. staff interaction, staff 
patient interaction. 
Usgr Analysis 
This analysis is concerned with analysing the way in which staff carry out their 
job fiinctions and determining their attitudes toward security issues. Other areas 
that wi l l be examined are; which key records staff used to aid their job function 
i.e. how patient records were used for the treatment of a patients. Consideration 
wil l be made of how important records are developing, i.e. Electronic Health 
Care Record (EHCR) [6] and the impact that this development would have on 
security. 
The security knowledge for the expert system w i l l be acquired from a 
number of sources, these wi l l be: 
Formal risk analysis security reviews o f major systems within Plymouth 
Health Authority and Plymouth Community Trust 
Personal experience of implementing security and interviewing staff 
within the Plymouth Health Authority and Plymouth Community 
Trust 
Knowledge gained from research undertaken within the EU (European 
Union) SESIMED Medical Security Research Program 
Discussions with commercial organisations about security issues 
Discussions with security consultants about security issues 
Knowledge obtained from literature review of security guidelines 
Results obtained from security questionnaires 
SIM-ETHICS criteria evaluation of security coimtermeasures lists 
produced by various security risk analysis methodologies, i.e. 
COBRA, CRAMM 
Expert System Design 
The input for the expert system wi l l take the form of a list of security countermeasures 
produced by the ODESSA system, the expert system wil l be designed to *bolt' onto an 
as a separate software package. 
An aim of the expert system is to evaluate suggested security countermeasures produced 
by the ODESSA system and inform the user about the impact of implementing these 
suggested measures. The inference engine wi l l draw conclusions using the knowledge 
contained in the knowledge domain. 
The expert system rule set will be based around production rules. The advzintage of 
using production rules is that they follow natural thinking, they are simple to develop, 
they allow for intensive knowledge to be stored and they also allow the expert system to 
be easily developed in modules. But, there are disadvantages with using production 
rules; it can be hard to keep track of them all, they are sometimes inefficient and they do 
not allow the expert system to learn and give the users the answers they require. 
The following is an example production rule that could be contained with the expert 
system: 
IF security countermeasure = E123 (Introduction of identification passes) 
AND large organisation (Environmental Issue) 
based in inner city ( " " ) 
THEN Ease o f Implementation Impact 3 
(Implemented with Extensive amount of effort) 
Training Impact 4 
(Extensive training needed) 
User Impact 2b 
(Countermeasures cause minor impact to user satisfaction) 
(Effect culture through planned changed) 
Human Issues I 
(No Human Impact) 
The user would be given the following advice about countermeasure E123: 
E123 Introduction of identiflcation passes 
OrganisatiPini^l Kmpact 
The countermeasure can be implemented with an extensive eunount of effort. 
The intended countermeasure may have a minor impact on user satisfaction within the 
organisation. 
Traiining Impact 
The whole organisation wi l l have to be taught about the use of identification cards and 
procedures relating to them. 
CwltMrg Impact 
The countermeasure wi l l cause a planned culture change to the organisation. 
Special Advice 
Large Organisation 
It may not feasible to implement identification cards at the same time, it may be more 
feasible to stagger the implementation of identification cards within the organisation.. 
Inner City Location 
Ensure that staff wear identification cards at all time, even out of office hours. Anyone 
without a identification card should be challenged immediately. 
CONCLUSION 
The work being carried out on the expert system is the first step towards combining a 
risk analysis system and security management expert system in the same package. The 
resulting system wil l fu l f i l a requirement that exists for a universal security consultation 
system that can be used to assess the security requirements for different types of HCEs . 
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Impact of security on a healthcare environment 
and how to overcome it. 
by M-J-Warren and Dr P.N.Gaunt 
Security Research Group, School of Electrical, Electronic and Communication 
Engineering, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, UK 
DSepurity Heglthparg 
Any new technology that is being implemented, i.e. security would cause an 
organisational impact. The impact would be top down, it would affect the 
healthcare organisation as a whole. Security is a human issue and should 
therefore be considered in the context of the staff and the organisation. 
Therefore the implementation of security within a healthcare environment 
would affect the hospital managers down to the doctors and nurses on the 
individual wards. 
2) Major components of security 
Within the NHS there is a growing dependency on computer systems and the 
data contained within the systems. Therefore the computer system and data 
contained within the system have to be protected. 
Computer security is concerned with: 
Confidentiality 
The aim is to ensure that unauthorised people (including staff) do not 
have access to healthcare data unless they are authorised. 
Integrity 
To ensure that data produced by a healthcare system can be 
trusted as being accurate and complete. 
Availability 
To ensure that computer systems should be able to provide data 
when and where it is needed. 
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3) Issues of Medical security 
From a medical clinician point of view [6] some of the major medical security 
problems are: 
Phyglcal sgcMfity 
The open nature of hospitals and clinics make them vulnerable to 
theft, damage and unauthorised access. 
Rjgk tP the patient 
The failure of a healthcare computer system could affect the health 
care treatment given to a patient, this could ultimately result in the 
death of the patient. 
Confidentiality 
Medical data contains information that may be extremely sensitive 
to an individual, i.e. the person may be mentally ill or have HIV. 
Disclosure of infomnation could be embarrassing for an individual 
and could result in that person being ostracised by society. 
Any disclosure would also destroy the trust between the clinician 
and the patient. Any disclosure could result in legal action being 
taken against a clinician or health care organisation. 
Data retention 
Within some countries there is a legal requirement to retain health 
care data for a minimum period. This raises problem concerning the 
long term storage of data especially when data is converted between 
old and new machines, this could affect the integrity of the data. 
4) The effect of Implementing security 
It is important to ensure that the introduction of the new security systems and 
procedures does not hinder the staffs work, it is also important to ensure that 
systems still stay 'user friendly* after they have been modified to cater for the 
new security features. 
An important issue for healthcare IT users is job satisfaction. If a member of 
staff uses a badly designed system they will quickly become demotivated and 
become less efficient. If a badly designed security system is implemented 
across all the systems it would affect users efficiency and operational costs 
will go up as tasks take longer to carry out. 
Another issue is the implementation of the security policy. This should be 
done in a structured manner using a project plan or by using a structured 
methodology, e.g. CS-Methodology[1] or Corporate Security Model[2]. Any 
plan should take into account the life cycle of the security system, a s defined 
by J.WyldertS]: 
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The Introductory Phase 
This is when the plan is initially introduced. This is an important 
step because it establishes the healthcare organisational emphasis 
on security. This stage affects few users. 
The Early Growth Phase 
This is when security features are added to a limited number of 
systems, affecting some users. 
Thg Rapi(< growth Phasg 
This is when security features are added to all existing systems, 
affecting all the users. 
The Mattirity Phage 
This is when the system is fully developed, then post developnnent 
features will be added affecting a varying number of users. 
S) Organisational problem of implementing security 
In the UK within the national health service there is an organisation called the 
Infomnation Management Group (IMG). The aim of this group is to promote 
security awareness and advise on security issues. They have produced 
documentation[5] detailing the minimum security countermeasures that 
should be in place within a UK healthcare organisation. Some of the 
countermeasures put forward by the booklet could have important 
organisational implications upon the organisation. One of the 
countermeasures recommended was the introduction of an IT security officer. 
This single countermeasure would have a major impact upon the organisation 
and raises a number of organisational questions: 
- What managerial responsibilities would this person have? 
- Within the organisation structure what seniority would this person 
have to carry out the tasks required of them? 
- Would the security officer be solely responsible for the 
introduction of security or would he have the assistance of suitable 
mangers, i.e. network managers? 
- What would happen if the health care organisation couldn't afford to 
appoint an IT security manager, who would carry out the 
countermeasures specified for the security officer from the security 
review? 
The introduction of a security officer could result in other problems. There is a 
problem that the IT security officer may be seen as an 'agent of change*, 
therefore an awareness scheme is needed to ensure staff are aware of his 
responsibilities and his aims and therefore don't perceive him as a threat. 
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The importance in detemiining the impact of security suggests that some type 
of methodology or model should be used, i.e. SIM-ETHICS. 
6) What jg SIM-ETHICS 
SIM stands for Security Implementation Method and ETHICS stands for 
Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer based System. 
The work on SIM is being undertaken by Plymouth University and the 
Plymouth Health Authority as part of the SE ISMED project. The work on 
ETHICS was undertaken by Professor Enid Mumford of the Manchester 
Business School. 
The use of the SIM method allows for the hypothetical implementation of 
security countermeasures. This allows for the assessment of certain factors: 
-Detenmination of the organisational impact of security. 
-Determination of any technical problems of implementing security 
within the organisation. 
-Determination of the training issues related to security. 
g.DHowSIIVI-ETHICS worK$ 
The philosophy behind SIM-ETHICS is that the development of new 
technology, i.e. a computer system is not only a technical problem but also an 
organisational issue. This organisational issue is concerned with the effect 
that the process of change could have upon the organisation as a whole. 
SIM-ETHICS will work through the use of committees to discuss group issues. 
Some committee members will then interview key staff in order to determine 
their views about the introduction of security. 
6.2) Why ygg SIM-ETHICS withm h?althcarg environmgnt? 
The principle aim of SIM-ETHICS is to determine the impact of any 
technology, i.e. security could have upon the organisation as a whole. The 
impact is looked at from the point of view of: 
User job satisfaction. 
Existing system efficiency and ways to improve it. 
Determining ways to improve effectiveness. 
Allowing for the management of future change. 
6.3) The use of SIM-ETHICS within an healthcare environment. 
The following are the steps used in the SIM-ETHICS method: 
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stQp 1) Initial Rgquiremgnte 
Theory: 
The list of the prioritised countermeasures is used for discussion and is 
produced by the implementation group. The implementation group is the body 
actually concerned with the implementation of the security countemieasures. 
They are therefore interested in all aspects of the implementation including 
the technical issues, training issues and the human issues. 
Process: 
To obtain appropriate documents, these will act as a source of discussion 
within the various stages of the method. 
Example: 
The implementional group will be sent a list of prioritised CRAMM 
countermeasures. This will act as a source of discussion for the committee. 
Step 2) Convening the committee 
Theory: 
The SIM-ETHICS method uses the participational approach in order to allow 
user input into the process of change. There are various levels of participation 
[1], these are: 
Consultative 
This is when an existing body. i.e. the Security Group is used to 
Implement the change process. They will then consult users on the 
effect that change will have upon them. 
Representative 
This is when a cross selection of users effected by change are 
brought together into a design group. This ensures that 
representatives effected by change have the same powers in the 
group as those bringing about change. 
Consensus 
This is when all the staff effected by changed are involved in the 
design process. Representatives of the staff effected are elected to 
form the design group. 
Part of this stage is concerned with informing the committee members about 
security and it's possible impact. This helps to ensure that all members have 
an understanding about security. 
Process: 
To set up a committee to carry out the participational process. This committee 
should reflect a cross section of managers and users, this committee should 
not be that large that it becomes unworkable. This process should be carried 
out by key staff of the committee, i.e. IT experts. The first meeting should 
contain a presentation about security explaining the issues related to it. The 
P a g e s 
aim of this is to educate the members of the committee who are unfamiliar 
with security. 
Example: 
Based upon the participational concept the following seems appropriate for 
the Plymouth Health Authority to act as the committee: 
System Managers or Users (two - six) 
IT experts (two) 
Internal expert (one) 
Within this committee the role of the internal expert is to act as the security 
expert for the group and also to head the committee. 
Step 3) Committee design questionnaire and interview script 
Theory: 
The aim of these stages is to determine users reaction to the implementation 
of the security countermeasures. This also covers thinking of questions to ask 
on the questionnaire or to ask at the interviews. 
The ETHICS related questions of SIM-ETHICS are concerned with: 
Job Satisfaction 
Effectiveness 
Efficiency 
Mumford [2] has defined these as being : 
Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is defined as the attainment of a good "fit" between what 
employees are seeking from their work(their job needs, expectations and 
aspirations) and what they are required to do in their work - their 
organisational job requirement. 
Effectiygnggg 
This is defined as ensuring that tasks already being carried could be carried 
out in a more effective manner. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency is a set of support services which help individuals to work in a well 
organised way with all the necessary back-up facilities which they require. 
These will include information, materials, technical aids, specialist knowledge 
and supervisory help. Employees who do not receive the support services 
which they regard as essential to the efficient performance of their jobs are 
likely to become frustrated and dissatisfied. 
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Process: 
The committee will determine questions for the questionnaire and the user 
interviews. Questions will be related to the organisational impact of security, 
training requirements and the SIM-ETHICS approach. These questions would 
related to user job satisfaction, efficiency requirements and effectiveness 
requirements. 
Example: 
The committee reviews the security countenneasures produced from the 
review and: 
Determine the importance of particular security areas in relation to the 
users. 
Determine which questions will be asked on the questionnaire. 
These questions will help to find out about the organisational 
impact of security, training requirements and problems shown 
through the use of SIM-ETHICS. 
Determine which people, i.e. users, system managers will receive 
questionnaires. 
Determine questions to ask at the interviews. These interview 
questions will be based on the need to find out about the 
organisational impact of security, training requirements and the 
SIM-ETHICS approach. 
Determine key users to interview. 
Step 4) Questionnaire phase 
Theory: 
The aim of the survey is to detenmine user job satisfaction. Questions will 
also be asked about other topics, i.e. organisational impact, organisational 
culture, efficiency and effectiveness matters. 
P rocess : 
Sending out questionnaires to determine user satisfaction and collating the 
results. 
Example: 
External advisor and other committee members will: 
Produce the questionnaires as agreed by the committee. 
Send out the questionnaires. 
Collate results for the other committee members. 
P a g e ? 
step 5) Interview Phase 
Theory: 
The interviews determine the organisational impact of implementing 
countermeasures. Questions will also be asked about other topics, i.e. 
efficiency and effectiveness matters. 
Process: 
Interview key staff in order to detemiine their response to the implementation 
of security. 
Example: 
Members carrying out the interview will: 
Decide on any extra questions that may be needed. 
Interview key personnel about the impact of security. 
Write up interview notes for the other committee members. 
Step 6) Committee d iscuss results 
Theory: 
This is part of the participational process. The aim is to discuss results from 
the interviews and questionnaires and determine problems connected with 
the security countermeasures. 
Process: 
The aim is to discuss results from the questionnaires and interviews and then 
draw appropriate conclusions. These discussions will be based upon the 
results of the interviews and questionnaires. 
Example: 
The committee will: 
Discuss the results from the questionnaires and interviews, drawing 
conclusions. 
Determine potential problems of implementing security (in temns of 
organisational impact, threat/risk levels, technical problems, cost 
benefit problems) 
Step 7) Committee advises on impact of implementation 
Theory: 
This is part of the participational process. The aim Is to finalise a plan 
containing details about the selected countermeasures and their priority. The 
plan would also contain details about which countermeasures could be 
implemented immediately and which countermeasures could be implemented 
after training took place. 
Page 8 
Process: 
Committee decides on appropriate countermeasures taking into consideration 
the comments made. The decision is based upon the organisational impact of 
the countermeasure (based on views of the committee and conclusions 
drawn from the interviews and questionnaires). 
Example: 
The committee will: 
Pick appropriate countermeasures. 
Prioritise countermeasures and training. 
Consider appropriate countenneasures in the following terms: 
If countemrieasures cause no organisational impact and there 
are no training problems then the countermeasures should 
be implemented. 
If countermeasure causes an organisational impact then 
training should be carried out and following this the 
countermeasures should be implemented. 
Step 8) Post impjgmentional gtage (Optional) 
Theory: 
The aim of this stage is to consider post implementional changes by using a 
participational approach. This stage is optional and should be used if 
problems occur. 
Process: 
The committee would review the implementation of the security 
countermeasures. The committee should discuss any problems that have 
arisen and suggest ways to overcome these problems. 
Example: 
A newly implemented security countermeasure may have caused an 
unforeseen impact to the organisation. Therefore the committee will decide 
either to modify the countermeasure or find a way to overcome the 
organisational impact, i.e. training. 
7) FMtMfg Work 
The \Nork carried out with SIM-ETHICS is part of the E E C S E I S M E D project 
(part of the AIM project). Once the SIM-ETHICS methodology has been 
developed for the healthcare security environment it will be implemented by 
other partners within the project. This would mean that SIM-ETHICS would be 
used within the healthcare organisations of Holland. Switzerland and the UK 
to determine the impact of security. The use of SIM-ETHICS would help to 
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ensure that healthcare woricers fully understand the impact of implementing 
security. 
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Abstract 
As modem healthcare establishments become increasingly dependent upon 
information systems it is vital to ensure that adequate security is present to safeguard 
the confidentiality and integrity of data and the availability of systems. Whilst this is 
now generally recognised in the design of new systems, many existing operational 
systems have been implemented without security in mind. This paper describes the 
need for a standardised approach in the protection of existing healthcare systems 
within Europe and presents an overview of a new set of information security 
guidelines that have been developed specifically for the medical community. 
The guidelines discussed have been produced as a deliverable of the Commission of 
European Communities (CEC) SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information 
Systems in Medicine) project, under the Advanced Informatics in Medicine (AIM) 
programme. 
1 Introduction 
The increasing accessibility of information technology QT) systems during recent 
years has had a significant effect upon the healthcare field. Many healthcare 
establishments (HCEs) now operate heterogeneous IT environments with equipment 
ranging fi-om standalone PCs to minicomputer and mainfi-ame installations. 
The influence of information systems can now be seen in most areas of healthcare 
operation, v^th an ever increasing number and variety of medical applications. In 
addition, IT also facilitates the exchange of medical data between different HCEs at 
both national and international levels. A significant result of these advances is that 
healthcare professionals have become increasingly dependant upon the availability of 
systems and reliant upon the correctness of the data that they hold. 
As the adoption of information technology has increased so too has the requirement to 
protect the systems and the infomiation they store. Healthcare systems may be 
vulnerable to a variety of accidental or deliberate threats and, as such, it is now 
recognised that security issues must be considered during the development and 
implementation of new health information systems to maintain the confidentiality. 
integrity and availability of the data held. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of 
operational healthcare systems were originally designed and implemented with 
inadequate security and, as a result, security must also be added or enhanced in many 
existing systems. 
2 The ADM SEISMED Project 
The issue of information security in healthcare has been addressed by the GEO 
SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in Medicine) project, part of 
the Advanced Infomiatics in Medicine (AIM) programme [1], 
The objective of SEISMED is to provide practical security advice and guidance to all 
members of the healthcare community who are involved in the management, 
development, operation or maintenance of infomiation systems. The eventual aim is 
to establish a consistent framework for the protection of medical data across the 
European Union. 
The project commenced at the beginning of 1992 with an original duration of 3 years, 
but this was subsequently extended for a further 6 months (until mid-1995). A total of 
14 workpackages were established, each addressing a separate aspect of healthcare 
security. Five European HCEs (located in the UK, the Netherlands, Sv^tzerland and 
the Czech Republic) were selected to act as Reference Centres for the project, 
commenting upon and ensuring the viability of the recommendations made. 
The problem of securing existing systems was addressed by workpackage SP07, the 
scope of which was to produce a comprehensive set of recommendations for the 
addition (or enhancement) of security in operational healthcare systems and 
environments. The principal objectives of this workpackage were : 
• to produce guidelines on the level of protection that should be attached to 
existing operational healthcare systems; 
• to provide guidance as to how this level of security may be achieved; 
• to revise the approach based upon Reference Centre feedback. 
Whilst various guidelines and standards for IT security have previously been 
developed, none have specifically targeted the needs of the medical community at a 
European level. The new guidelines are intended to provide a common source of 
reference for European healthcare establishments and are relevant to (and udll affect) 
all categories of personnel. 
3 Baseline Security Recommendations for Healthcare Establishments 
In order to assess current security practice and attitudes within European 
establishments a survey was distributed to HCEs in 11 community countries [2]. 
Amongst other things, this allowed a broad assessment of existing systems to be made 
and revealed a significant variety in both the types of system in use (i.e. hardware, 
operating systems and applications) and the levels of security provided. For example, 
whilst virtually all systems included some form of user authentication mechanism 
(even if only a simple password in some cases), the attention given to other aspects of 
security (e.g. disaster recovery, physical protection and auditing) was, in general, 
significantly less. Furthermore, the variety of techniques used to address a single 
aspect of protection indicated anything but a standardised approach (e.g. the types of 
authentication mechanisms variously utilised include individual passwords, shared 
passwords, challenge-response mechanisms and other methods - with likely 
inconsistency between similar systems). 
It was considered that, in many cases, the disparity indicated by the survey had 
resulted from the lack of appropriate standards and guidance, with HCEs being 
unclear over both general security issues and the level they should aim for. The most 
appropriate strategy for improving the situation was, therefore, considered to be the 
definition of baseline recommendations for security, to provide a common foundation 
for all HCEs. 
This inmiediately raises the question of what level of security should be specified. 
The nature of the healthcare environment, with the inherent requirements to maintain 
patient safety and confidentiality, demands that protection should generally be higher 
than in many other domains. As a result, the security requirements extend beyond the 
levels proposed by many existing standards. 
The new baseline recommendations have been developed to satisfy the following aims 
to represent a minimum acceptable standard for the security of operational 
healthcare systems and their associated envirormients; 
to be usable by all HCEs and staff within Europe; 
to allow a straightforward means of validating existing systems security to 
ensure compliance. 
The development of the resulting guidelines was based upon an interactive approach, 
in close co-operation with the SEISMED Reference Centres and in consultation with 
other independent healthcare professionals. 
From the outset it was established that the reconunendations should address more than 
the just the host system in isolation. Indeed, to provide comprehensive protection, 
several aspects of security must be considered : 
• logical / system-based controls; 
• physical and environmental protection; 
• personnel procedures; 
• policy and administration issues. 
On the basis of these high level requirements, existing IT security guidelines and 
standards [3,4,5] were used in conjunction with suggestions from within the project to 
formulate initial recommendations. These were progressively refined and enhanced 
over time on the basis of Reference Centre feedback and comments from independent 
healthcare personnel. This procedure provided the principal criteria for retention, 
addition or removal of guideline recommendations. 
4 An Overview of Existing Systems Guidelines 
The final Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems [6] are grouped under 
10 key principles of protection, representing the main elements governing the security 
of existing healthcare information systems (having been agreed in detail with the 
Reference Centres). The principles are denoted by ESP followed by a unique 
reference code, as listed in table 1 below. 
Code Title 
ESPOlOO Security Policy & Administration 
ESP0200 Physical & Environmental Security 
ESP0300 Disaster Planning & Recovery 
ESP0400 Personnel Security 
ESP0500 Training and Awareness 
ESP0600 Information Technology Facilities 
Management 
ESP0700 Authentication & Access Control 
ESP0800 Database Security 
ESP0900 System Maintenance 
ESP1000 Legislation Compliance 
Table 1 : Existing Systems Security Principles 
Each of the principles has a number of associated guidelines. These represent the 
specific security concepts or countermeasures that should be considered by the HCE 
to meet the requirements of a given principle. As established earlier, the 
consideration of existing systems encompasses a very broad range of issues and the 
overall coverage consequently extends from general concepts to specific technical 
measures. 
The 10 protection principles are described in more detail below. In each case the 
general purpose of the principle is stated, along with a list of the main issues that are 
covered by the underlying guidelines (the overall number of guidelines pertaining to 
each principle is given alongside its title). 
Security Policy & Administration ( i guidelines) 
General Principle 
A formal policy will provide clear direction and support for security within the 
HCE. Policy is formulated fi-om the senior managerial level, with subsequent 
guidance provided to all levels of staff. Correct administration of and adherence 
to the policy should ensure the effectiveness of H C E security controls. 
Main issues: 
• the need for a security policy; 
• policy awareness issues; 
• co-ordination and administration of security; 
• use of specialist security personnel. 
2. Physical & Environmental Security (22 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The generally open nature of HCEs and their high degree of public access dictates 
that physical security measures are a vital first stage of protection to prevent 
unauthorised access to computing equipment and facilities. Systems must also be 
safeguarded against a variety of environmental hazards that may adversely affect 
operation. 
Main issues: 
• physical access conu-ol; 
• security of HCE equipment; 
• protection against natural disasters; 
• environmental controls; 
• various procedural measures. 
3. Disaster Planning & Recovery (7 guidelines) 
General Principle 
The continuous availability of Information Systems is essential to the operation of 
a modem HCE. It is essential that adequate plans are made to ensure the level of 
availability needed by the HCE can be maintained in the event of any catastrophe. 
Recovery of IT systems should be a component of an overall H C E disaster / 
recovery plan. 
Main issues: 
• continuity planning (development, testing and update); 
• fallback arrangements; 
• post-disaster procedures and controls. 
4. Personnel Security (8 guidelines) 
General
The major security weakness of many systems is not the technology but the 
people involved. Many organisations are extremely vulnerable to threats from 
their own staff and, as a result, even the most comprehensive technical controls 
will not guarantee absolute security. There are, however, a number of personnel-
related measures that can be introduced to help reduce the risks. 
Main issues: 
• staff recruitment; 
• contractual agreements promoting security; 
• security during normal working practices; 
• staff appraisal and monitoring; 
• termination of employment. 
5. Training & Awareness (6 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Information systems security can only be maintained if all personnel involved in 
their use know, understand and accept the necessary precautions. Many breaches 
are the result of incorrect behaviour by general staff who are unaware of security 
basics. The provision of security training and awareness will make it possible for 
staff to consider the security implications of their actions and avoid creating 
unnecessary risks. 
Main issues: 
• the need for general security awareness; 
• specific areas that must be addressed (job training, use of information 
systems); 
• recommendations for internal / HCE training and awareness initiatives; 
• use of specialist training courses; 
• assigrunent of responsibilities for training. 
6. Information Technology Facilities Management (3 J guidelines) 
General Principle 
A variety of activities can be identified that are related to the normal day-to-day 
use and administration of information systems. All categories of H C E persormel 
(management, technical and general users) have responsibilities that must be 
addressed in order to maintain security in this area. 
Main issues: 
• system plaiming and control; 
• the importance of maintaining back-ups; 
• media controls; 
• auditing and system monitoring; 
• virus controls; 
• documentation issues. 
7. Authentication & Access Control {28 guidelines) 
General Principle 
It is essential that IT systems are protected by comprehensive logical access 
controls. Access should be guaranteed for legitimate users and denied to all 
others. All classes of user must be identified and authenticated before any access 
is granted and ftirther mechanisms must control subsequent reading, writing, 
modification and deletion of applications and data. There should be no method 
for bypassing any authentication or access controls. HCE users are unlikely to be 
satisfied with controls that intrude upon working practices and chosen schemes 
should be transparent and convenient in order to gain acceptance. 
Main issues: 
• requirements for user identification and authentication; 
• password issues; 
• system and object access restrictions; 
• methods of control; 
• access in special cases (e.g. system management, third parties, temporary 
staff)-
8. Database Security (21 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Database security is concerned with the enforcement of the security policy 
concerning the disclosure, modification or destruction of a database system's 
data. Databases are fast becoming very important for HCEs. Over 90% of today's 
IT systems contain some kind of database and the value of information stored is 
now widely recognised as a major asset, far more important than any other 
software. However, databases also introduce additional security concerns (e.g. 
granularity, inference, aggregation, filtering, joumaling etc.) and therefore 
warrant specific consideration. 
Main issues : 
• control of medical database software; 
• organisation and administration of H C E database systems; 
• database operation issues. 
9, System Maintenance (5 guidelines) 
General Principle 
System maintenance activities merit special consideration given the opportunities 
that exist to affect the operation of the system. Unauthorised or uncontrolled 
changes to any aspect of an operational system could potentially compromise 
security and, in some cases, endanger life. Maintenance must therefore be carried 
out in accordance with well-defined procedures. 
Main issues: 
• controls to prevent unauthorised changes to and upgrades of H C E software, 
vendor software and operating systems; 
• requirements for testing and acceptance. 
10, Legislation Compliance (5 guidelines) 
General Principle 
Specific levels of protection may be demanded in order to comply with national 
and European legislative requirements, as well to satisfy internal H C E policy. 
Whilst the guidelines highlight the most basic requirements, this principle 
represents an ongoing process which must take account of any new legislation 
that may be relevant, as well as ensuring compliance with existing standards. 
Main issues : 
• data protection; 
• abuse of information systems; 
• prohibition of "pirated" software; 
• compliance with internal security standards; 
• retention and protection of business records. 
5 H C E Target Audiences 
It should be evident that many of the issues covered are not relevant to all H C E staff. 
As such, the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems are targeted at three 
main staff groups (as shown in figure 1), with separate guideline sets having been 
developed for each audience. 
General H C E 
Staff 
(50 Guidelines) 
Security 
Guidelines 
H C E 
Management 
(6^ Guidelines) 
IT & Security 
Personnel 
{122 Guidelines) 
Fig. 1 : HCE target audiences 
Whilst all three sets draw upon the same core principles, they nevertheless differ 
dramatically in terms of the type and quantity of information presented. The 
anticipated readership and general content of each set is as follows : 
• The General guideline set is aimed at the majority of HCE staff, including 
clinicians, administrators and general system users. Guidelines are 
presented for user reference during day-to-day use of H C E information 
systems, highlighting what they can do to safeguard security. 
• The Management set primarily targets the senior decision makers within 
the HCE, who will be responsible for defining security policy (although a 
significant number of points will also be relevant at department / line 
management level). This set is intended to highlight areas in which 
management should be directly involved and also improve management 
security awareness by explaining / justifying the importance of other more 
technical guidelines (for which management approval will be required). 
• The IT & Security Personnel set is aimed at IT staff, system 
administrators, security officers and other support staff who will be most 
likely to have the lower level responsibilities for implementing security. 
This is the most detailed of the subsets and should be a key source of 
reference for implementation and validation of security. 
The Management and IT & Security audiences would also be expected to read and 
observe the General guideline set. 
6 Implementing the recommendations 
The Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems should be applied in any 
European Healthcare Establishment with existing operational information systems 
(where the term Healthcare Establishment refers to any establishment providing 
medical services, research, training or health education). They will be relevant even 
where systems are thought to include security provision, so that the level of protection 
can be validated against the recommendations. 
However, given the diverse nature of European healthcare environments and systems, 
it is impossible to specify precise guidelines for implementation. Establishments will 
differ in terms of both the information systems used, as well as financial, operational 
and other constraints that may apply. These issues will all have bearing on the 
applicability of the recommendations and the guidelines therefore concentrate more 
on describing what aspects of security should be considered rather than how they may 
be best implemented (with broad recommendations that should be compatible, to at 
least some degree, with the majority of systems and environments) 
Despite these attempts to ensure applicability, it is still conceivable that some 
guidelines may not be suitable for all systems. As such, implementors must use their 
discretion in cases where guidelines are genuinely inappropriate to the environment. 
However, recommendations should be followed as closely as possible and in some 
cases the implementation of a guideline will depend upon others already being in 
place (which is made clear from the guideline context and / or cross-references to 
other points). 
As for the implementation strategy itself, it would obviously be impractical to attempt 
to address all of the suggestions at once due to constraints of cost and likely disruption 
to services. A phased approach is, therefore, advised in which each principle is 
considered in turn to identify the areas in which the H C E / department is currently 
deficient. The individual guidelines may then be assessed to determine 
implementation priorities based upon local requirements. 
Further work within the SEISMED project has resulted in the development of the 
methodology SIM-ETHICS (Security Implementation Methodology - Effective 
Technical and Human Implementation of Computer based Systems) which may be 
used to assist with the implementation of these and other SEISMED guidelines [7]. 
The methodology is based upon the concept of participational management, using 
groups of users and managers to carry out a hypotheticed implementation of chosen 
security countermeasures. This provides a means of highlighting any problems which 
may occur, which may then be overcome in advance of the actual implementation. 
Finally, the Security Guidelines for Existing Healthcare Systems should not be 
considered in isolation and a number of the other SEISMED guideline deliverables are 
also relevant in the context of existing systems. These include specific guidelines 
relating to high-level security policy, system development and implementation, 
network security and data encryption. 
7 Potential Problems 
Whilst the new recommendations are intended to provide a simple and straightforward 
means of addressing healthcare security issues, it is recognised that problems may 
exist. 
Firstly, many establishments may currently be operating with security significantly 
below the recommended level and progression to the required level may be a non-
trivial task. As mentioned in the discussion of implementation, HCEs may face a 
number of constraints that affect their ability to address security requirements. For 
example, cost (in terms of finance, performance and practicality) will be a significant 
factor in determining acceptability. Financial cost will be particularly relevant, given 
that expenditure for direct care activities is likely to receive higher priority than 
security. In addition, organisational constraints will play a role in so far as 
recommendations will need to integrate with existing practice (or at least not conflict 
too greatly) in order to gain acceptance. I f such constraints are present, 
establishments should bear in mind that every guideline implemented will improve the 
security of their systems. 
Conversely, some environments and / or applications may demand a level of security 
significantly higher than the proposed baseline. In these cases a risk analysis review 
is recommended in order to determine the level of additional protection that is 
necessary. A specifically designed healthcare protection methodology, that has also 
been developed by this group, could be utilised for this purpose [8]. 
8 Conclusions 
In conclusion, it is believed that the guidelines have fulfilled the objectives of this 
phase of the SEISMED project and will provide a solid foundation for the 
improvement of security within existing HCE systems. 
Whilst the principles will remain relatively static, it is expected that the underiying 
guidelines will require periodic updates to account for changes within the healthcare 
field or in the types of information system technology available (e.g. the increasing 
use of multimedia systems may introduce new considerations). Changes within the 
local HCE (e.g. organisational structure, medical applications and practices) may also 
necessitate re-evaluation of some recommendations. 
The guidelines will now form the basis of a further SEISMED workpackage dedicated 
to the validation of the projects recommendations. This will include full trials of the 
guidelines at the Reference Centres and will provide an extensive test of their 
applicability in practice. It is anticipated that the Reference Centres themselves will 
then be able to document their findings in due course. 
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Abstract. The aim is to outline the framework of a generic methodology for specifying 
couniermeasures in health care environments. The method is specifically aimed at the I 
enhancement of security in existing health care systems, and a key element is the use of j 
predetermined 'profiles* by which these may be classified. Example scenarios are presented 
to illustrate how the concept could be applied in practice. The paper is based upon work 
that was initially carried out as pan of the Commission of European Communities 
SEI5.MED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) project, the aim 
of which is to provide security recommendations for European health care establishments i 
(HCEs). 
Keywords: Risk analysis; System profiling. | 
1. Introduction 
During the past few decades the use of information technology ( I T ) has become 
more widespread in all areas of society, and the types of activities that it performs 
or supports have become increasingly more important. As a result, information 
systems are now heavily utilized by all levels of staff, and relied upon to the extent 
that it would be difficult to manage without them. 
The health care field has been no exception to the trend, as witnessed by the wide 
variety of applications that now handle many types of health data (1 ] . These systems 
contain vast amounts of information, much of it relating to individuals and of a 
sensitive nature. In addition to direct care applications, some parts of the European 
Community are now making the transition to a purchaser-provider funding system, j 
meaning that an increasing volume of traditional business type data must also be 
maintained. 
The combination of these points serves to make the protection of health 
information systems a vital concern, and necessitates that security is now considered 
as an essential aspect of the information technology field. 
At a high level, information security is defined as being the combination of the 
following key factors [2]: 
(1) Confidentiality. This refers to the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of 
information. All access to data must be restricted to authorized users who 
have a legitimate 'need to know'. Confidentiality is fundamental in health 
care since certain categories of data may be of a particularly sensitive nature, 
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and disclosure could result in significant embarrassment or prejudice to the 
individual concerned. 
(2) Integrity. The prevention of unauthorized modification of information. 
There is a requirement to be able to trust the system and be confident that 
the same information can be retrieved as was originally entered. For example, 
the accidental or deliberate alteration of patient-related data could have 
serious implications for care delivery. 
(3) Availability. Data and systems should be accessible and usable (by 
authorized users) when and where they are required. This requirement 
necessitates both prevention of the unauthorized withholding of information 
or resources, and adequate safeguards against system failure. In some 
medical environments, for example, critical systems may be required to be 
in operation 24h a day, 7 days a week. 
Security breaches may result from a variety of accidental or deliberate acts, with 
potential threats being posed by outsiders and from staff within the organization. 
Deliberate acts may include activities such as fraud, theft, hacking and virus 
infection. The health care field has certainly not been immune to these threats, with 
the most recent UK survey [3] showing that 10% of rfpor/e</security incidents were 
related to health care systems (with roughly an even split between the above 
categories). 
The introduction of information security seeks to eliminate or, more realistically, 
reduce the vulnerability to any risks that may be present. Protection must encompass 
the computer system and everything associated with it (e.g. from the computer unit 
itself to the building in which it is housed). Most important, however, is the 
protection of the information stored in the systems. These goals may be realized via 
a variety of measures [4], of both a technical and non-technical nature (e.g. physical, 
personnel and administrative controls). 
In a health care establishment (HCE), any part of the computing system could 
provide the basis for a security breach, and this multiplicity of targets makes medical 
security a difficult issue. Large-scale introduction is complicated by the myriad of 
different system configurations (in terms of hardware, networking and actual 
applications) that may be identified within a single country, let alone within the full 
European scenario [5]. The issue is further complicated by the variety of information 
that may be held, and the fact that several different levels of data sensitivity may exist. 
The desired protection will depend upon several factors including the computer 
configuration, the operational environment and the information itself. As such it is 
impossible to assert a single level of security that will be appropriate for all cases 
without it being excessive in some applications. 
Introducing security is a balancing process between providing the desirable level 
of protection against the maintenance of an adequate level of availability and 
performance (so that legitimate users have easy access to the data). Specifying the 
level of security that should be included involves some judgement about the dangers 
associated with the system, the required level of availability and the resource 
implications of various means of avoiding or minimizing those dangers. 
Guidelines are therefore required on the selection of appropriate security 
measures, as well as on where and how to put them into HCE systems in general. 
The commonly accepted means of achieving this is to conduct a risk analysis 
investigation. However, this can be a time-consuming and costly proposition, and 
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may consequently be prohibitive in many cases. It would obviously be undesirable 
for security to be overlooked when this occurs. Given that many of the threats and 
vulnerabilities of individual HCEs are not unique, a full risk analysis in each case 
may also be largely unnecessary. 
This paper proposes the framework of a methodology that is able to simplify the 
identification of security requirements for individual systems. This provides a 
straightforward means by which system administrators/security officers can select 
solutions appropriate for their own particular arrangements. 
2. A conceptual overview of the generic methodology 
Security should be examined from the perspective of the whole system, with all 
factors that influence protection requirements being considered. In general terms the 
security-relevant elements of existing systems are characterized as follows: 
Information system = Computer configuration + Operational environment 
+ Data sensitivity 
These elements have been incorporated into the framework of a system protection 
methodology as shown in figure 1. This illustrates (at a high level) the steps involved 
in profiling existing systems to determine their requirements and select appropriate 
countermeasures. 
The rationale of the methodology is that similar organizations/systems wil l have 
similar security requirements and a key factor in the approach was to devise a number 
of predetermined security 'profiles' for each element of existing systems. What the 
methodology proposes is a 'mix-and-maich' approach to countermeasure selection, , 
based upon a comparison of existing systems against general profiles. Using • 
appropriate combinations it is possible, at a high level, to generate existing system 
profiles/categorizations that could then account for the majority of health care I T 
scenarios. From these it should be feasible to specify appropriate protection 
, measures to meet the security requirements in each case. ] 
The main elements of the methodology are now considered in more detail. ! 
2.1. Computer configuration 
This refers to the I T assets (both hardware and software) of the organization. 
At a high level it is possible to identify a relatively small number of elements which 
may be included in any given computer configuration, as shown in figure 2. 
Individual systems would be considered to determine which elements are applicable, ^ 
and countermeasures selected accordingly. Examples of associated baseline 
countermeasures have been identified for each configuration, and are grouped as 
shown in table 1. 
2.2. Operotioual environment 
This considers the nature of the environment in which the I T assets are actually 1 
located and used, which may also affect the type and level of protection that is 
required. Table 2 indicates the main environmental considerations that may have 
security bearing. Appropriate combinations of these factors can be used to describe 
the majority of health care establishments (i.e. from CPs to general hospitals). 
Again, appropriate baseline countermeasures can be specified for each type of 
environment, and the key issues are indicated in table 3. 
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Figure I. Existing system protection methodology overview. 
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Figure 2. Computer configuration groups. 
Table Computer configuration countermeasure categories. 
Cat ego rj- Example issues 
Physical 
Disaster planning 
System 
Procedural 
Personnel 
Physical access, theft prevention 
Maintenance contracts, alternative systems, backup arrangements 
Auiheniicaiion. logical access controls 
Backup/recovery policy, software usage, hardcopy control 
Operational training, computer-related awareness 
2.3. Data sensitivity 
The sensitivity of data is determined by two major factors, as shown in 
figure 3. These factors, and the means of rating sensitivity, will now be considered 
in more detail. 
2.3.1. Data type. In consultation with a number of HCEs within Europe, the 
general care activities carried out by hospitals, general practitioners, community 
health care centres, and various other support services were examined. This enabled 
a generic model of medical data to be developed as the basis for further investigation 
[6]. The model is composed of 12 main data groups, as described in table 4. 
The purpose is to allow a simple means of specifying what data are available within 
Buildings 
Peopit 
Methoaolo,yJor health care data security 
categories. 
. 2 ^ : i ! : i _ _ _ C o m m c n t s 
Fixed/mobile 
Variable environment (e.g. portable 
computer system) limits cnvironmenial 
measures 
Local environment is an indicator of local 
population density, crime potential and 
likelihood of natural disasters 
Number of buildings will determine access 
control, site security requirements 
Age of building may indicate risk of fire, 
natural damage, etc. 
Number Number and mixture of people infiuences 
(low, medium, high) access controls and personnel-related 
measures 
Staff/coniract/publtc 
Rural/urban/city 
Single/multiple 
Old/modem 
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a system and help in the allocation of appropriate sensitivities, thus simplifying the 
process of identifying how and where data are located in different computer systems 
and networks. The information used by the HCE may be of varying levels of 
sensitivity, and this will again be highly dependent upon the cases involved. 
The models groups are of a (necessarily) broad nature, but they may be broken 
down into further levels of detail as required. For example: 
Patient care: Episode information, Dates of admissions/discharges. Staff 
involved. Diagnosis including clinical codings(s), Care plan, Specific needs. 
Health care delivered, Drug therapy, Outcome of the treatment, Consultants' 
and anaesthetists' reports. 
The model provides a generic framework that should encompass all data required 
by a HCE. Specific medical applications may store and communicate information 
from all of the data groups, or a particular subset of them. I t is consequently possible 
to map such applications on to the model, indicating the data groups that are 
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Table 4. Generic data group descriptions 
Description 
Data group 
Patient identification 
Patient administration 
Patient care 
Clinical serv ices 
Finance 
Hotel services 
Staff 
Resource management and planning 
. I i^brary and information services 
Expert systems 
Communication services 
External systems 
General information held regarding individual patients 
referred to the health care sen'ice. Often utilized by a 
number of different systems/applications 
Information used in the day-to-day scheduling of various 
non-clinical care activities related to patients (i.e. 
concerned with the delivery of resources that in turn 
facilitate clinical care) 
Contains medical history-, diagnosis, care decisions nnd 
treatment information relating to individual patients 
Information related to the functioning of service 
depanments of the H C E . Data are for the department's 
internal use (not patient-related) 
Information covering all aspects of finance that are 
involved in the operation of HCEs 
Information stored on all the basic 'housekeeping' 
functions of health care systems 
Personnel information relating to all grades of H C E staff 
Information used in the management, monitoring and 
planning of health care organizations 
Encompasses the existing medical knowledge that is 
referenced by clinical staff, and national/local 
protocols for clinical management 
Information utilized by decision support tools and/or 
neural networks within the H C E 
Identifies the process of communication within the HCE. 
Could contain a variety of additional data generated 
during organizational communication (e.g. activity 
requests, transaction information 
Recognizes potential data relationships (interfaces) that 
may exist with other H C E epplicaiions/sysiems 
Table 5. General categories of medical data usage 
Description 
Dnta use 
Planning, deliver '^ and monitoring of health care 
Operational clinical 
Emergency care 
Critical clinical 
Expert systems 
Operational non-clinical 
Provision of care in a clinical emergency, where optimal 
conditions/information cannot be guaranteed 
Control of instrumentation/systems in direct feedback loops 
Use in decision support tools or neural networks 
Supporting H C E infrastructure, but not directly influencing 
care of individuals 
Financial 
Contract management, purchasing and billing 
' Z Z u and resource n^ anogn^ en, Aggrega.ion of d.,a for planning and review purposes 
Quniirv n^anngemen, Clinical audi., assessn^en, of care efficiency and ou,con,e 
r r c=l research Identifiable or anonymized dara used for research purposes: 
Cl.n.cal research ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ aggregared da,a 
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involved, and from this derive the basic sensitivity of the information. Examples of 
such mappings are given later in the text. 
2.3.2, Data use. Incorporating this factor of data sensitivity into the methodology 
demands that an appropriate range of general uses can be identified. Related work 
within the SEISMED project [7] has determined a high-level set of data uses that 
are appropriate for our purposes. A total of nine categories is considered, as described 
in table 5. 
2.3.3. Sensitivity ratings. Sensitivity is quantified in terms of several different 
types of impact that may relate to the data in the system. Four main types of impact 
can be identified, with appropriate countermeasures being given in each case. 
(1) Disclosure. Unauthorized disclosure of information to HCE staff or 
outsiders. 
(2) Denial. Denial of access to the information for varying periods. 
(3) Modification. Accidental or deliberate alteration of the information. 
(4) Destruction. Destruction of the system or information. An extreme form of 
unavailability. 
The type and use of the data will have different influences over the protection 
requirements in each of these cases. 
Disclosure. Data type is the most significant factor in determining the 
confidentiality requirement, as data will generally portray the same 
information in ail contexts. The protection afforded should therefore remain 
constant regardless of which application uses it. However, data usage may still 
have some effect as it can influence problems arising through data aggregation. 
It is conceivable that, if certain data elements are combined, then the impact 
of disclosure may be greater than that of any one element in isolation. 
Denial, modification and destruction. The requirements for these are primarily 
determined by the data usage, as the context will determine the seriousness of 
the impact. 
Impacts are rated low, medium or high (where low indicates that the baseline 
countermeasure level is satisfactory, and high is the maximum protection that 
can be provided). The level is determined by considering a number of 
potential influencing factors: (a) confidentality (both personal and commercial), 
(6) disruption, (c) embarrassment, (d) financial loss, (e) legal, ( / ) personal safety. 
For example, the disclosure of sensitive patient care information to HCE outsiders 
could be seen as a serious risk in terms of legal action, patient personal privacy and 
embarrassment to both the patient and the HCE. The level of impact will in turn 
determine the level of countermeasure. 
Medical opinion from within various European HCEs was sought in obtaining 
the impact valuations (using a small survey distributed to appropriate personnel). 
Nevertheless, it is recognized that, because of the inherent subjectivity in any 
judgements (based largely on individual roles and/or perceptions of the problems), 
the resulting figures represent 'reasonable* rather than 'correct' values (i.e. values 
which the majority of health care professionals would be prepared to accept as an 
adequate representation of the situation). 
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2.4. Other factors 
This element of the methodology highlights the fact that whilst the "appropriate 
countermeasures' suggested may be suitable when considering the existing system 
in isolation, a number of real-world factors are also likely to influence the final 
selection process. Such factors are principally considered to include the following: 
(1) Cost constraints. The cost of adopting particular countermeasures may be 
considered from several angles (e.g. financial, performance, practicality, 
etc.). The acceptable levels will obviously be highly dependent upon 
individual environments and their priorities. Financial cost is perceived as 
being a particularly key factor in security-related decision-making for the 
majority of health care establishments. 
(2) Operational constraints. The selection of countermeasures wil l also be 
influenced by the nature of the organization itself. Any proposals must fit in 
with what is likely to be tolerated/accepted within the particular health care 
environment, and should not conflict too greatly with established practice. 
This relates to the 'business culture* of the organization. 
(3) Existing countermeasures. Any security countermeasures that are already in 
place in relation to the existing system will obviously influence whether some 
of the suggested couniermeasures need to be considered/adopted. 
These would obviously be very subjective elements in the application of the 
methodology, and it is not possible to formalize them further. 
2.5. Countermeasures 
Actual security countermeasures are identified and refined at various stages 
within the methodology, and it can be seen from figure 1 that they are categorized 
under three headings. These are distinguished as shown below: 
(1) Baseline countermeasures. Represents the minimal security considerations 
for a given computer configuration in a particular environment, and should 
be considered irrespective of the data held or the purpose(s) the system is 
used for. 
(2) Appropriate countermeasures. Represents the overall set of countermeasures 
that may be appropriate for a given system, considering what data are used 
and how, but not taking into account any practical constraints that may apply 
in respect to implementation. 
(3) Selected countermeasures. Represents the final output of the methodology, 
namely a set of countermeasures that may be added to the existing system 
to address the security requirements (having considered any imitations of the 
individual HCE). 
The countermeasures used with the methodology are derived from a representative 
set that are being developed for use within the SEISMED project [8]. 
3. Methodology implementation 
This section describes the specific steps by which the methodology would be 
implemented when considering individual existing systems. 
In order to apply the method the following factors would need to be identified 
for the specific system/application being considered: {a) computer configuration 
involved, (6) type of operational environment(s), (c) data groups involved. 
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Environmeni Couniermeasures 
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Figure 4. Methodology implementation steps. 
{d) purpose of application (data use(s)). Couniermeasures would then be derived as 
shown in figure 4. At each stage appropriate countermeasures would be selected from 
corresponding categories (NB: I t is likely that some duplication may occur in terms 
of the countermeasures suggested within different categories). 
The stages of the methodology may be more formally described as follows; 
Stage 1: Determine basic system profile 
Input: none. 
Output: baseline countermeasures. 
Description: categorize computer configuration and operational environment of the 
existing system according to predetermined profile categories. For computer 
configuration choose appropriate elements from: (a) laptop/portable, (6) desktop 
PC, {c) mini/mainframe, {d) network. For operational environment categorize 
elements of: (a) location, (6) buildings, {c) people. 
Stage 2: Determine data sensitivity 
Input: none. 
Output: data-related couniermeasures. 
Description: establish data types and uses. Select countermeasures based upon 
sensitivities encompassed. Choose appropriate levels from each of: {a) disclosure 
couniermeasures, (A) denial countermeasures, {c) modification countermeasures, 
(d) destruction countermeasures. This stage is described in more detail below. 
Stage 3: Determine appropriate system countermeasures 
Input: baseline countermeasures, data-related countermeasures. 
Output: appropriate system couniermeasures. 
Description: generate countermeasure set thai would satisfy the requirements of the 
existing system. 
Stage 4; Select system countermeasures 
Input: appropriate countermeasures. 
Output: selected (final) system countermeasures. 
Description: refine couniermeasure set by considering any HCE specific 
factors/constraints that may apply. 
(siogo a) 
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Counlenneasures 
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Figure 5. Determining data sensitivity. 
3.1. Determining data sensitivity 
Determining the data sensitivity countermeasures for an existing system is the 
most complex stage of the methodology, as they will be based upon a variety of 
impact values derived from the data involved. All data groups in the system must 
be considered to establish: (a) impact valuations for disclosure (based on data type 
only); (b) impact valuations for denial, modification, destruction (based on data 
type and use). The specific procedure involved is illustrated in figure 5. These stages 
and descriptions are listed below: 
2.1. Identify the data groups involved using generic data model. 
2.2. Determine disclosure impacts from model group valuations. 
Identify general data usage category(s) that applies to the system. 
Determine denial, modification and destruction impacts from usage 
valuations for each data group involved. 
Derive overall sensitivity values for application by selecting *worst-case* 
values from component groups (four values in total). 
Determine appropriate data sensitivity countermeasures using values from 
2.5. 
2.3. 
2.4. 
2.5. 
2.6, 
4. Illustrative examples 
The following section presents two basic examples to illustrate how the 
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methodology may be applied in practice. These are based on typical information 
system scenarios that may be found within the U K health service. 
Note that the countermeasures and impact levels given in the examples are 
selected from predetermined lists. However, listing a full set of countermeasures is 
outside the scope of this paper, and the examples therefore provide only a small 
representative selection. I t should also be noted that the examples only proceed to 
stage 3 of the methodology. The reason for this is that stage 4 is very much related 
to the subjective factors of real-world environments, and imposing artificial 
constraints would add little to the examples. 
4.1. Example I 
4.1.1. Scenario. A patient records system maintained by a small CP practice. 
The system is primarily based upon a standalone PC, although selected data may 
be transferred to and from this using a portable computer that the GP takes on 
general visits and emergency call-outs. The practice is based in a single, modern 
building located in an inner city. 
4.1.2. Methodology implementation 
Stage I: Determine basic system profile 
Computer configuration: Laptop/portable—standalone; Desktop PC—standalone. 
PollenJ C<B« PaOort 
CGnical .Scnrico* Finonco 
Holet Soivfcot 1 
^ S i r ^ 1 
Roiourca Mgnit 
ond planning 
1/ijOifiMjlnn Syrfeim 
stall 
Communlcalten* 
Sotvicat 
Eitwnol 
Syitorro 
Figure 6. CP records system mapping. 
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Operational environment: Location—fixed and mobile, city; building—single, 
modern; People—staff, public, low. 
Stage 2: Determine data sensitivity 
Stage 2.1: Identify data groups. Three data groups are encompassed, and can be 
identified from the existing model as shown in figure 6. 
Stage 2.2: Determine disclosure impacts 
^^^^ group 
'mpacr lex el 
High 
Stage 2 3- rj ' 
^ "'-'S^ncy care '^^ ^ 'der 
^^^Se 2.4- n^,^ !Ows: 
Dai a group 
Patient idemiBcation 
Patient administration 
Patient care 
Operational clinical 
Emergency care 
Operational clinical 
Emergency care 
Operational clinical 
Emergency care 
Denial 
• '^cdium 
Low 
Lou- Low 
Low 
"'gh 
Lou* 
Lou-
Low 
Low 
High 
'•^ e^dium 
High 
—" High Medium 
Stage 2,5: Derive overall sensitivity ratings. The *worst-case' impacts from the 
previous tables are extracted to determine the overall sensitivity: disclosure, high; 
denial, medium; modification, high; destruction, high. 
Stage 3: Determine appropriate system cm**-* — 
Computer canfi"'—"' 
Co^ntermeasure category ^ 
Physical 
'^'•^"-p/^nning 
System 
Laptop/portable 
(standalone) 
Casing locks 
Property markings (visible and UV) 
Protective carr>- case 
Service warranty 
Maintain/store data backups 
Carr>' spare batteries, etc. 
Use of any standard features 
Password protection 
Virus checking 
Desktop PC 
(standalone) 
Locks and/or alarms 
Property markings (visible and UV) 
Site to deny casual access 
On-site scr^ 'ice contract 
Maintain/store data backups 
Documented/tested recovery strategy 
Use of any standard security features 
Password protection 
Virus checking 
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Procedural 
Personnel 
Hard dish encr>'ption 
Store sensitive daia on separate media 
Care of floppy disks 
Lock away when not in use 
Regular backup to desktop machine 
Menu-only access (no DOS) 
Integrity checksums 
Ban unauthorized software 
Control software updates 
Regular (automatic?) backups 
Care of floppy disks 
Stress individual accountability for Provide software training machine/data when off-site Disciplinar>- procedures for misuse 
Operational environment 
Example countermeasures 
Countermeasure 
category Singlc-building/modcm/ciiy Mobile 
L'se of staff ID badges 
The nature of this environment is. by Receptionist/guard at main entrance 
dehniiion, variable, making it difficult Room access control (locks) 
to cite environment-specific Alarm systems 
countermeasures 
Disaster planning 
Procedural 
Personnel 
Smoke and moisture detectors 
Fire alarm (linked to fire station) 
Visitors escorted (non-public areas) 
Strangers challenged 
(non-public areas) 
Prohibit smoking 
Controlled access hours 
Defined responsibilities 
Monitor maintenance work 
Additional attention should therefore be 
devoted to the physical countermeasures 
relatmg to the computer configuration. 
With the level of protection being 
appropriate to account for the 
'worst-case' scenario. 
Data sensitivity 
Example countermeasures 
Countermeasurc 
level 
High 
Disclosure Denial/destruction Modification 
Medium File-level passwords 
SMART cards 
Hard-copy controls 
Encrypted transmission 
Encry pted storage 
Removable storage media 
Secure disposal of 
media/paper 
T E M P E S T protection 
Regular recovery checks 
Alternative processing 
arrangements 
Disk shadowing 
Resource control 
Backup generators 
Separation of key assets 
File-level passwords 
Integrity checksums 
Auditing 
Digital signature 
Data encryption 
4.2. Example 2 
«i'.LS„T;;!,. J :^z'z s n r ' w i . . . . 
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Figure 7. Drug administration system mapping. 
4.1.2. Methodology implementatioii 
Stage I: Determine basic system profile 
Computer configuration: mini/mainframe; Network—LAN. 
Operational environment: location—fixed, urban; building—multiple, modern; 
people—staff, public, contract, high. 
Stage 2: Determine data sensitivity 
Stage 2.1. Identify data groups. Three data groups are encompassed, and can be 
identified from the existing model as shown in figure 7. 
Stage 2.2: Determine disclosure impacts 
Data group Impact level 
Clinical services Low 
Finance Medium 
Library and information services High 
5/05^ 2.3: Identify data uses. Potential data uses are identified as follows: 
(fl) operational non-clinical, {b) financial, (c) planning and resource 
management. 
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Impact levels 
Data group Use Denial Modification Destruction 
Clinical Ser\'ices Operational non-clinical Low Medium Medium 
Financial Low Medium Medium 
Planning and resource 
management Low Low- Low 
Finance Operational non-clinical Low Medium Medium 
Financial Medium Medium Medium 
Planning and resource 
management Low Medium Low-
Librar>' and 
information 5er\'ice$ Operational non-clinical Medium Medium Medium 
Financial Low Low Low 
Planning and resource 
management Low Medium Low 
Stage 2.5: Derive overall sensitivity ratings. The 'worst case' impacts from the 
previous , tables are extracted to determine the overall sensitivity: disclosure, 
medium; denial, medium; modification, medium; destruction, medium. 
Stage 3: Determine appropriate system countermeasures 
Computer configuration 
Mini/mainframe Network (LAN) 
Countermeasure 
category Example countermeasures 
Count ermeasure 
category Example countermeasures 
Physical 
Disaster planning 
Svstem 
Procedural 
Per 
Control access to computer Physical 
suite 
Identifiable marking on 
terminals 
Site to deny casual 
access/vie wing 
24-hour maintenance System 
contract 
Duplicate/alternative system 
Maintain/store data backups 
Prioritize recovery options 
Documented/tested recovery 
plans 
Use OS security features Procedural 
Access time/location controls 
Enforced password criteria 
Automatic terminal logout 
Auditing of activity 
Log/investigate reported 
variances 
Control software 
development/updates 
Formal testing of new programs 
Provide software training 
Disciplinary procedures for 
misuse 
Avoid reliance on individuals 
Protect cabling from 
interference/tampering 
(data and power) 
Provide alternate routeing 
Monitor for 
overuse/failure 
Automatic re-routeing 
Integrity checking on 
transmission 
Secure WAN gateways 
Maintain list of network 
assets/access points 
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Multi-building/modern/urban 
Countermeasure 
category Example countermeasures 
Site Security patrols 
Closed-circuit T V monitoring 
Use of staff ID badges 
Receptionists/guards for sensitive areas 
Room access control (locks) 
Alarm systems 
Disaster planning Smoke and moisture detectors 
Fire alarm (linked to fire station) 
Backup generator 
Procedural Visitors escorted (non-public areas) 
Strangers challenged (non-public areas) 
Prohibit smoking 
Personnel DeRned responsibilities 
Controlled access hours 
Monitor maintenance work 
Data sensitivity 
Example countermeasures 
Countermeasure 
level Disclosure Denial/destruction Modification 
Medium File-level passwords 
SMART cards 
Hardcopy controls 
Regular recovery checks 
Alternative processing 
arrangements 
Resource control 
Disk shadowing 
File-level passwords 
Integrity checksums 
Auditing 
5. Future enhancement 
The most significant extension that is planned is to develop an expert system to 
be used in conjunction with the methodology. This would contain the expert 
knowledge necessary to apply the methodology, as well as a knowledge base of 
appropriate countermeasures. 
An expert system would contribute further to the user-friendliness and general 
accessibility of the method, as it would allow the techniques to be used by health 
care staff who were not necessarily security-trained (e.g. a hospital general manager). 
A major advantage of this would be cost, as expensive consultancy would not be 
required to carry out security reviews. If the system was developed for P C 
environments it could be made available in nearly all H C E environments. 
6. Conclusions 
The paper should have served to illustrate how high-level categorizations of 
health care systems may be used to simplify considerably the process of security 
selection. Such an approach would be valuable in cases where a full security review 
has been denied on the grounds of budget or inconvenience. 
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It is envisaged that the overall methodology should be compatible with the 
majority of systems, caieririg for a range of general existing system categorizations. 
Despite this, however, it is still conceivable that systems will be encountered that 
do not fit comfortably within the profiles suggested. I n these cases it will be necessary 
to perform a more detailed risk analysis to determine the specific requirements of 
the system/environment. Additionally, in systems where extremely high levels 
of risk are identified, more detailed study is also advisable. 
The methodology itself is at an early stage of development, and requires further 
refinement before it can be considered practically viable. T h e next stage of 
development will be to encompass it within an expert system so that it can be used 
within various H C E environments. T h i s will serve to test the methodology and allow 
adjustments to be made accordingly. 
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Abstract 
The paper describes the development of a new security risk analysis methodology that 
can be used to determine the security requirements of organisations. The methodology 
has been developedfor use within healthcare, but by the generic nature of ODESSA it 
can be used to determine the security requirement of many types of organisation. 
The paper describes the problems with existing automated risk analysis systems and 
how the ODESSA system can overcome most of these problems. The paper also 
presents example security scenarios. It is based upon work carried out as part of the 
European Union AIM (Advanced Informatics in Medicine) SEISMED (Secure 
Environment for Information Systems in MEDicine) project, the aim of which was to 
provide security recommendations for European health care establishments. 
Keywords: Security Risk Analysis, Baseline Security 
1. Introduction 
The use of information technology (\T) has become more widespread in areas of 
business and society, and computers have now diversified into many types of 
applications. As a result, IT systems are used by all levels of staff within 
organisations, and relied upon greatly to such an extent that it would be difficult to 
operate without them. 
The aim of risk analysis is to eliminate or reduce risks and vulnerabilities that affect 
the overall operation of these computer systems. Risk analysis not only looks at 
hardware and software, but also covers other areas such as physical security, human 
security, business and disaster protection. 
Risk analysis is used to: 
- Identify the risks associated with computer systems; 
- Assess the seriousness of risks in relation to the objectives of the 
orgeinisation; 
- Identify parts of the system which are lacking in security. 
In practice there are major problems with the use of risk analysis; the time taken to 
cany out a review, the cost of hiring consultants and/or training staff. To overcome 
these negative aspects a new methodology and operational system has been 
developed. This paper proposes a methodology that is able to simplify the 
identification of security requirements for individual systems, and to provide a means 
by which a system administrator or security officer can select the appropriate security 
countermeasures for their own system. The methodology also describes the impact 
that the implementation of security could have upon the organisation. 
2. The need for risk analysis in Healthcare 
Within the UK, National Health Service (NHS) there is a general lack of security 
awareness and security expertise, even though very sensitive and personal data is kept 
on the computers and is communicated between computers. Medical computer 
security is primarily concerned with: 
Ensuring that unauthorised people (including staff) do not have access to the 
sensitive and/or personal healthcare data. 
Integrity 
Ensuring that the data produced by and used within a healthcare system can be 
trusted as being accurate and complete. 
Availability 
Ensuring that the computer systems are able to provide the necessary clinical 
data when and where it is needed. 
From a medical point of view [1] perhaps the most important security problems are 
concerned with: 
Physical security 
The open nature of hospitals and clinics make them vulnerable to thef^, 
damage and unauthorised access. 
Risk to the patient 
The failure of a healthcare computer system could affect the U-eatment given to 
patients with perhaps dire results. 
Confidentiality 
Medical data contains infonnation that may be extremely sensitive to an 
individual, i.e. the person may be mentally il l or have HTV. Disclosure of this 
information could be embarrassing for the individual in the extreme and could 
result in them being ostracised by society. 
Also any disclosure could destroy the trust between the clinician and the 
patient and possibly result in legal action being taken against the clinician or 
the health care organisation. 
Data retention 
Within some countries there is a legal requirement to retain healthcare data 
for a minimum period of many years. This raises problems concerning the 
long term storage of data, especially when it is converted between old and new 
systems, which could affect the integrity of the information. 
As part of the EU SEISMED (Secure Environment for Information Systems in 
MEDicine) project a new medical risk analysis method was developed [2], The 
method is aimed at the enhancement of security in existing healthcare systems, with a 
key concept of the methodology being the use of security profiles; that for example 
using the assumption that a PC network system would require similar security 
countermeasures to be installed in similar environments. The method has been 
extended to develop a more generic methodology that can be used within most 
organisations, the major differences being the types of profile, types of data and 
organisational details. This generic system ODESSA (Organisational DEScriptive 
Security Analysis), is being evaluated initially in the healthcare field to help overcome 
the lack of security awareness and act as a low-cost source of security expertise. 
The ODESSA system working prototype, has been designed : 
- to be 'user friendly', so that general management and technical staff can use 
the system; 
- to be able to produce easy to understand reports; 
- to have extensive on-line help facilities; 
- to be inexpensive to buy; 
- to use a standard PC machine. 
3. The Theory of ODESSA 
The rationale of ODESSA is that at a basic level, organisations will have similar 
security requirements, but beyond this basic level the security countermeasures are 
unique to each organisation. 
Within ODESSA security is examined from the context of the whole organisation, 
with all factors that influence the organisation being considered, which may range 
from the location and age of buildings, to the sensitivity and type of data. 
These elements have been incorporated into a framework as shown in figure 1. This 
illustrates the steps involved (at a theoretical level) in determining the security 
requirements for an organisation. 
Operational Organisational 
Environment Type 
Baseline Organisational 
Countermeasures Requirements 
Appropriate Organisational 
Countemieasures Impact 
Selected 
Countermeasures 
Figure 1. ODESSA methodology overview 
The ODESSA system suggests three sets of security countermeasures. 
1) Baseline Countermeasures. 
These represent the minimally acceptable security countermeasures for any 
organisational type. 
2) Appropriate Countermeasures 
These represent the unique organisational security countermeasures. They are 
based upon a series of questions from which data sensitivity profiles are 
formed. 
3) Selected Countermeasures 
These represent the selected countermeasures from I) and 2) that have been 
applied against the SIM-ETHICS (see 3.5) impact criteria and then accepted 
by the user. 
The main elements of the methodology are now considered in more detail: 
3.1 Organisational Environment 
This considers the environment in which the organisation's assets are located, which 
may affect the level of protection required. Table 1 gives examples of environmental 
considerations that have to be considered for a medical environment. 
Table I . Organisational Environments 
Type Options Comments 
Location Inner City Location may indicate risk of vandalism, theft. 
- may result in a need for increased 
physical security. 
Urban 
Rural 
Location may indicate risk of theft. 
- may result in a need for a C C T V 
system. 
Location may be many miles from emergency 
services, i.e. fire station. 
- may result in increased fire drills, fire 
awareness schemes, automated fire 
fighting system, etc. 
Building Old / Modem Age of building may indicate risk of fire, 
disasters, etc. 
may result in a review of buildings, 
looking at electricity wires, water pipes, 
etc. 
3.2 Organisational Type 
This relates to the different organisational types that exist within a business sector. 
The baseline security countermeasures are tailored to these different organisations. 
Within the SEISMED project a comparison was made of past healthcare security 
reviews, which helped to form the baseline security needs for the different types as 
shown in table 2. 
Table 2. H C E Organisational Types 
Type Description 
GP (Single) 
GP (Practice) 
A single doctor working amongst the community, location of surgery is 
within the community, i.e. in converted house. 
A group of doctors working in the community, location of surgery is 
within the community, i.e. purpose built surgery, large converted house. 
Community Units used for specialist patient health care , i.e. special home nursing, 
speech therapists. Community units are based within the community, 
within a variety of different sites. 
Hospital Units used for the direct treatment of patients, i.e. specialised surgery, 
general surgery, radiotherapy, etc. These organisational types tend to be 
in very large units and based in one location or within a variety of different 
sites. 
3.3 Organisational Baseline Security 
Work on the SEISMED project has shown that within a healthcare environment that 
certain HCE's have the same countermeasure installed at lower levels. The concept of 
baseline within ODESSA relates to the minimal security levels requirements that an 
organisation should have installed [3]. These levels were determined by comparing 
results of different HCE security reviews and examining different HCE security 
guidelines [4], [5]. 
The baseline security countermeasures are broken down into particular groups, as 
shown in table 3. 
Table 3. Security Groups 
Security Type Sub groups Description 
Disaster 7 Relates to disaster prevention, contingency planning. 
Physical 5 Relates to physical protection of sites and assets. 
Hardware 
/Software 
10 Relates to protection of computer systems and the data 
contained on those systems. 
Human 8 Relates to training, procedural issues, etc. 
The countermeasures are defined as being physical, procedural, programmable or 
communicational countermeasures. 
3.4 Organisational Requirements 
At this stage the use of the data is considered. Organisations use a cross selection of 
similar data types, which require similar countermeasures, i.e. encryption of personal 
data. The ODESSA system uses a set of HCE generic data types[6], as described in 
table 4. 
Table 4. HCE's generic data usage types 
Data Use Description 
Patient identification 
Patient administration 
Patient care 
Clinical services 
Finance 
General infomiation relating to patients. 
Information used in patient day-to-day scheduling of 
non-clinical activities. 
Contains medical history, diagnosis care decisions and treatment 
information relating to patients. 
Infomiation used for planning of clinical services (not patient 
related). 
Information relating to all aspects of finance that are involved in 
the operations of HCE. 
Staff 
Resource management 
and planning 
Library and information 
systems 
Expert Systems 
Personal information relating to H C E staff. 
Information used in the management, monitoring and plaiming of 
HCE. 
Details of existing medical knowledge that is used by clinical staff. 
Information used by decision support systems or neural networks 
used within the HCE. 
Once the type of data has been decided, it's sensitivity has to be defined. The 
sensitivity impacts of the data are: 
Denial. Denial of access to the information for different time periods. 
Destruction. Destruction of the information. 
Disclosure. Unauthorised disclosure of information. 
Modification. Accidental or deliberate alteration of data. 
The data impacts are determined as percentages, zmd rated as being low, medium or 
high, (low is equal to baseline security, and high the maximum protection that is 
offered). The sensitivity values and data types are determined from a series of 
questions to the appropriate staff of the organisation, which then are used to produce 
a security profile of the organisation under review. Figure 2, shows the steps involved 
in determining the organisational requirement. 
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Figure 2. Organisational Requirement 
The stages involved are: 
Stage 1 Determine Data Usage 
The user of the system picks the data types that the organisation uses, which are 
associated with certain countemieasures, i.e. levels of access, encryption. 
Stage 2 Data Sensitivity 
The user answers a series of security related questions. The replies determine the 
overall impact of disclosure, denial, modification and destruction. The 
countermeasures are generated from the answers and the overall levels of impact. 
3.5 Organisational Impact 
Any security coimtermeasure that is being implemented will effect the organisation as 
a whole. The impact is determined from a set of impact criteria that has been used as 
part of a change control methodology, SIM-ETHICS [7] (Security Implementation 
Method - Effective Technical and Human Implementation of Computer-based 
Systems). 
The use of this criteria allows management to determine the impact of introducing 
security. It relates to: 
Fase of Implementation 
How easy can new security features be added to a system and/or new security 
procedures added to an organisation? 
Training Isswgs 
What are the training requirements needed by the staff to use new security 
features? 
User Inipact 
What is the impact that security could have upon users, i.e. how does it affect 
user satisfaction, efficiency or effectiveness? 
OrganisatiQnal Impact 
What v^U be the effect that security features could have upon the 
organisation, i.e. changing of the organisational culture? 
Htiman ? $ S H C S 
What is the impact that security has upon a user from the human 
perspective, i.e. changes of peoples jobs, creating new management roles? 
4. Example Scenario 
The scenario is that of a single GP (General Practitioner - primary community care 
provider) - , based in an old building located in an inner city. 
Stage 1: Determine Baseline Countermeasures 
Stage 1.1 Determine Organisational Criteria 
Determine baseline security criteria from the above information. 
Stage 1.2 Determine Baseline Countermeasures 
Summary of some of the baseline countermeasures given are: 
Disaster & Damage Protection 
Physical 
Adequate site fire protection. 
Fitting of smoke detectors. 
Hardwarg/Software 
Programmable Features 
Use of passwords to protect systems. 
Software Training/Use 
Procedural 
Offence to use unauthorised software. 
All users should be trained in the packages they use. 
Spgcial Consideration 
Inner City 
Physical Access Control 
Physical 
To counter an increased risk of theft and vandalism improved 
physical security should be introduced, i.e, window locks, 
secure locks. 
Stage 2: Determine Organisational Requirement 
Stage 2.1 Determine Data usage 
The data types are selected from a list from nine data types (see table 4). In this 
example the GP uses the following data types : 
Patient Identification 
Patient Administration 
Patient Care 
Stage 2.2 Determine Data Sensitivity 
The data sensitivity impacts are determined by answering a series of questions related 
to the sensitivity impacts. 
i.e. If there were problems with your system, would the delay cause any of the 
following: 
a) Patients may be kept waiting for treatment. 
b) Patients may receive inappropriate treatment. 
c) Patients may receive inappropriate treatment resulting in additional time 
spent in hospital. 
d) Patients may suffer immediate harmful problems due to lack of treatment. 
The hypothetical sensitivity impacts for the scenario are: 
- Denial Medium 
- Destruction 
- Disclosure 
- Modification 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Stage 2.3 Determine Appropriate Countermeasures 
Certain countermeasures are specific to the type of data used and it's function, i.e. 
Data Usage Example Countermeasures 
Patient Identification 
Patient Administration 
Patient Care 
Encryption of data 
Use of levels of access to ensure only 
authorised staff have access. 
The next step is to determine the countermeasures for data sensitivity. The type of 
countermeasures for a particular sensitivity would be dependant upon the impact 
level. 
The following are examples of some countermeasures: 
Data Sensitivity Level Example Countermeasures 
Denial Medium Disk shadowing. 
Resource control. 
Destruction Medium Alternative process arrangements. 
Contingency plan development 
Disclosure High Encrypted storage. 
Secure disposal of media/paper. 
Modification Medium Checksums of data. 
Audit of modifications. 
Stage 2.4 Determine Security Profile 
The next stages is to determine countermeasures which are unique to the organisation. 
This is determined by the user answering a series of questions, i.e.: 
Hardware/Software Related Questions 
Are special provisions made for the use of portable PC's. 
Countermeasures 
Hsrdwarg and Sofbv&rg Rglatgd 
PC Protection 
Physical 
Ensure portable PC is secured when in transit. 
Procedgrgl 
Removed important information when portable PC is in transit. 
Programmable 
Encrypt the contents of the hard disc. 
Implement password protection system. 
Stage 3: Determine Organisational Impact 
The countermeasures are reviewed and the appropriate SIM-ETHICS criteria (see 3.5) 
selected. The impacts are dependant upon the type of organisation and each 
countermeasure would have a unique impact description. 
Example use of S I M - E T H I C S criteria: 
Sample Countermeasure: 
Introducing security awareness program. 
Criteria: 
Ease of Implementation 
Once the basic program framework has been determined it can be repeatedly 
used. 
Training Issues 
Awareness program may be included as part of initial computer training for 
new staff. 
Training seminars should be held on a regular basis, i.e. once every two 
months. 
User Impact 
Users will be more aware about security, therefore security problems should 
be reduced, i.e. virus outbreaks, passwords naming conventions. 
Organisational Impact 
The program will help niise security awareness amongst all staff and help 
establish a security culture within the organisation. 
Hum^n Issues 
Expertise for such a training scheme might not exist with the GP's staff, 
therefore outside help would be needed in setting up the awareness program. 
5. Implementation of ODESSA 
The ODESSA system has been initially developed as a prototype using Visual Basic 
and Access and is developed to work on PC machines. Visual Basic was chosen 
because it offered the quickest and easiest way to create the ODESSA prototype. 
Visual Basic allows a system to be developed that incorporates an easy to use 
graphical user interface (GUI) and on-line help facilities. 
The prototype system contains all the features of the methodology. The ODESSA 
system has been evaluated by members of the H C E profession as well as members of 
the SEISMED project. 
The next stage is to develop a complete working system from the prototype, this 
system will be initially developed for use within healthcare. ODESSA will be 
developed so that it can be used by other business sectors, government, etc. for 
security reviews. 
6. Conclusion 
The paper shows how by using ODESSA, the process of security reviews within 
healthcare can be simplified. The use of ODESSA is valuable where a security review 
has been denied on the grounds of budget or inconvenience. 
The paper shows the unique approach taken by the ODESSA method, that of using 
security profiling, data use and baseline security countermeasures. This is a major 
departure from traditional risk analysis methods. 
It is the aim that ODESSA should be compatible with the majority of systems and that 
future versions of the system will be developed for different organisational types. In 
systems where extremely high levels of risk are identified, it is advisable that a more 
detailed security review should be undertaken. 
The computer implementation of the methodology is complete, but by the use of 
independent evaluation of the prototype it will allow for any adjustments to be made. 
7. Acknowledgements 
We would like to acknowledge the various partners v«thin the SEISMED project for 
their contributions to the content of this paper. 
References 
[ I ] P.N. Gaunt, and R.F. France. 
The need for security in health care information systems, 
[A Clinical View], SPl 1.02.A08.02, 
A I M SEISMED Internal Project Report, UK, 1993. 
[2] S.M. Fumell, P.N. Gaunt, G. Pangalos, P.W. Sanders and M.J. Warren, 
A generic methodology for health care data security, 
Medical Informatics, Vol 19. No 3, Pages 229 - 245, UK, 1994. 
[3] Basic Information Systems Security, 
Information Management Group, 
NHS Management Executive, 
UK, 1992. 
[4] P.Sanders and S.M.Fumell, 
Guidelines for Information Systems Security in Existing Systems. 
A I M SEISMED Deliverable 26, U K , 1994. 
[5] S.Katsikas. 
High Level Security Policy for Healthcare Establishments, 
A I M SEISMED Deliverable 23, Greece. 1993. 
[6] P.W. Sanders and S.M. Fumell. 
Data Security in Medical Information Systems using a Generic Model. 
Proceedings of MIE 93 Congress, Jerusalem, Israel, April 1993. 
[7] M.J.Warren, P.W.Sanders and P.N.Gaunt, 
Particaptional Management and the Implementation of Multimedia Systems. 
MEDIACOMM 95 • International Conference on Multimedia Communications. 
Pages 131-135, Southampton. UK. April 1995. 
Provision of healthcare security 
information services using the 
World-Wide Web 
S.M.FurneII, P.W.Sanders and M.J.Warren 
Network Research Group, School of Electronic, Communication and Electrical 
Engineering, University of Plymouth, Plymouth, United Kingdom, 
e-mail: stevef@soc.plym.ac.uk 
Abstract 
The paper considers the continuing need for information security and associated awareness methods within 
modem European Healthcare Establishments (HCEs). It presents details o f a novel security information 
dissemination service that wi l l soon be offered as part of the new European Union ISHTAR (Implementing 
Secure Health Telematics Applications in Europe) project. The objective o f the project is to increase the 
awareness of both the public and healthcare personnel on issues related to health data protection, by way o f 
seminars and world-wide dissemination. The selected means of achieving the latter is to promote healthcare 
security issues over the Internet, utilising a dedicated server on the World-Wide Web. 
The paper examines the way in which the service wi l l be implemented, the features that it wi l l offer and the 
advantages that the approach provides. The principal point here is considered to be the easier availability o f 
consistent security advice to a wide audience. 
Introduction 
Information Technology (IT) is now widely used in all aspects of modem healthcare, from 
administration to direct patient care activities. In all areas, the potential exists to find 
sensitive information and systems which require protection to preserve their 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. As such, the issue of IT security is at least as 
applicable in healthcare as it is in other domains such as business and government. 
Although the need for information security is gaining increasing recognition vdthin the 
medical informatics commimity (with a wealth of relevant material having been produced), 
a problem remains in terms of promoting security issues to the widest possible audience 
and thereby developing a "security culture" within healthcare establishments (Fowler 
1996). However, thanks to advances in IT itself it is now possible to offer appropriate 
information services on demand. At the present time, the most suitable and easily 
accessible means of doing this is considered to be via the Worid-Wide Web (Bemers-Lee 
et al. 1994), the popularity of which has increased dramatically in recent years. 
The WWW is considered to be an appropriate medium for information delivery within 
HCEs for a number of reasons. Firstly, HCEs have a significant existing investment in IT 
facilities and can increasingly be found to have connections into wide area networks 
(WANs). As such, they already have an inherent ability to receive information from 
sources such as the Web. In addition, the Web has the general advantage of being more 
instantly accessible than more traditional documentation or outside expertise. Security 
issues and enquiries could, therefore, be addressed more quickly - even if the establishment 
in question does not possess its own local documentation or experts. 
The need to promote security is recognised as one of the principal aims of the ISHTAR 
(Implementing Secure Health Telematics Applications in Europe) project, part of the 
European Union's Health Telematics initiative. To this end, a dedicated WAVW server is 
being established to help in fulfilling the project's overall objective. 
Service Objectives 
In order to be able to properly observe security requirements, healthcare professionals 
(HCPs) need to have access to appropriate documentation and / or be able to obtain 
answers to ad hoc queries. However, documentation is often expensive (especially if many 
copies are required) and can be difficult to share if many people wish to make use of it. 
With regard to the second point, many establishments will not have trained personnel who 
can answer security questions. In this situation, the normal options would be either the use 
of costly external consultancy or the development of bespoke solutions without the benefit 
of proper advice (which could, therefore, still result in security weaknesses). As such, 
there is scope for a service which can overcome these problems in an effective manner. 
The principal objectives of the planned ISHTAR service are as follows : 
• to provide on-line access to guidelines for healthcare security; 
• to provide and maintain an on-line help-desk and discussion forum for healthcare 
security issues; 
• to provide a centre for the dissemination and retrieval of other information. 
All of these objectives can be realised within a WWW framework. 
Implementation Approach 
Work on ISHTAR commenced in November 1995 and an operational version of the Web 
service is expected to come on-line by mid-1997, having firstly been validated by a quality 
assurance programme and a closed-trial within the project. It is planned that a number of 
useful security information services will be offered to the healthcare community at this 
time. These can be categorised into those that are purely of an information dissemination 
nature and those that can be viewed as being more interactive, as described below. 
Dissemination services 
• Provision of on-line access to healthcare security guidelines and related published 
papers (cross-referenced with hypertext links), with searching facilities and options for 
user feedback. 
• Descriptions of example protection scenarios, highlighting recommended approaches 
to security for different environments and types of system. These would act in support 
of the guidelines as an illustration of "good practice", highlighting ideas on security 
measures, policy and awareness initiatives based upon real-life scenarios. 
• Provision of automated presentations and demonstrations promoting security. 
• Maintenance of an on-line directory of interested parties, including profiles and 
contact information, provision of links to any other related projects also accessible on 
the WWW and to other sites with relevant security content. 
• Provision of a number of other occasional and supporting services as considered 
appropriate. Examples that could be included here are notification of training courses 
and workshops; information gathering exercises (e.g. surveys) and the facility for 
users to download information (e.g. guidelines, papers, other deliverables). 
Interactive services 
It can be seen that all of the above are essentially "one-way" services (i.e. from the server 
to the user). However, in many scenarios the user will need more than just access to pre-
prepared material and may require further explanation or the ability to ask questions. With 
this in mind, the ISHTAR server will also support a number of more interactive services, as 
outlined below. 
• Facilities for an on-line expert panel / help desk to which queries and problems may be 
submitted. This would work by accepting basic details of user's problems from a 
WWW form and then automatically (and securely) forwarding them to an appropriate 
"expert" (from within the ISHTAR consortium) who could then contact the user with 
advice. This idea is illustrated in figure 1 below. 
ISHTAR 
Consultants 
Healthcare 
User www Form www Server 
Problem 
details 
• 
Help Desk 
Problem category: 
O Risk Anarysis 
f) Legal issues 
O Nelwoilc securily 
Problem Description 
Completed 
Fomi 
• • 
Risk Analysis 
E-mail of 
problem 
summary 
Feedback/Advice 
Figure 1 : Potential implementation of security "help-desk" 
The potential will exist for a Frequently Asked Questions page to be spawned fi-om 
this facility over time, if it proves popular. 
Facilities to allow the establishment of an on-line healthcare security discussion forum 
(based on an e-mail type facility). 
With regard to the content of the information offered by the service, a number of avenues 
are being pursued. For example, appropriate guidelines for European healthcare security 
have already been produced as part of the E U SEISMED (Secure Environment for 
Information Systems in MEDicine) project, the forerunner of ISHTAR, covering areas such 
as high level security policy, risk analysis, security in system development and the 
protection of existing healthcare systems and networks. The distillation of these guidelines 
will enable useful summary recommendations to be provided as a first stage. In addition, 
further output from the ISHTAR project itself (covering areas such as enhancement of the 
guidelines, training and legal issues) will also be included as the service develops. 
The quality of the dissemination service will be measured to ensure satisfaction of the 
following criteria: 
• integrity of the information content (e.g. to ensure correct and accurate advice); 
• understandibility and ease of use for healthcare professionals; 
• conformance to general Web "standards" for the presentation of information; 
• visually pleasing displays with adequate hypertext links; 
• adequate response time for operations with human involvement (e.g. help-desk); 
• compliance with other standards internal to ISHTAR (e.g. terminology). 
The "ease of use" issue will be partially ensured by the user-friendly interfaces that are a 
standard feature of most current WWW browsers (e.g. Netscape). However, whilst the 
majority of use may be expected to come from IT professionals, it is recognised that the 
potential will always exist for access by other, less IT literate, audiences. As such, it will 
still be important to ensure that the services offered are as friendly as possible and avoid 
unnecessary levels of complexity. This requirement will be addressed (and assessed) by 
means of a "closed trial" of pilot services, conducted within HCEs acting as ISHTAR 
Validation Centres. A wider quality assurance of the services will then be possible later, 
based upon any feedback received from end-users via the operational on-line system. 
Discussion 
The concept offers a number of important advantages, the core of which being the 
promotion of security awareness to a wider audience. As an indication of the popularity of 
the Web, the advent of graphical browsers in 1993 caused a 300,000% increase in the level 
of Web-related Internet traffic. Thousands of Web sites now exist world-wide, with 
exponential growth predicted over the next few years (Manger 1995). As previously 
mentioned, it is conceivable that any HCE with WAN access could make use of the 
service. 
The service can be provided free of charge and, whilst it will not be appropriate to address 
all situations, it will be able to provide solutions (or at least a good starting point) for basic 
scenarios and common problems. This will consequently enable savings to be made on 
external consultancy charges in many such cases. 
The help-desk concept is particularly useful in that it provides a means of ensuring that 
some level of consistency can be maintained in terms of the advice given to different 
establishments in relation to similar security issues. It can, therefore, indirectly provide 
another means of promoting the baseline security recommendations that have already been 
advocated by SEISMED (AIM SEISMED 1994). 
However, it should be noted that a WWW service will not totally remove the 
responsibilities for promoting security awareness within local H C E domains. Staff will 
still require training in aspects of security as applied in their particular establishment (e.g. 
password procedures) and will need to be made aware of specific issues as they arise (e.g. 
virus outbreaks). 
In addition, whilst the Web can be seen to offer some demonstrable benefits in terms of 
promoting security, there may still be something of a "catch 22" situation to be faced in 
that the existence of the ISHTAR web server will need to be publicised in order to, in turn, 
promote the security issues. It is considered that sufficient publicity within the on-line 
community should be largely achievable by including references to the server in the many 
WWW catalogue services. However, there is still a potential problem to be overcome in 
that many HCPs may not view the Web as a viable source of information on such matters 
and will need to be encouraged to use the service. One solution in the short term will 
probably lie in sufficient publicity of the ISHTAR project as a whole, which v^ll in turn 
serve to alert HCPs of the potential opportunities offered on-line. In the longer term, the 
fact that the Web is now maturing to offer a range of professional and commercial services 
(Kelly 1994) in a variety of domains (with sites run by research establishments, libraries, 
conunercial organisations and even government agencies) will increase public awareness 
and alter the way in which it is generally perceived. 
Conclusions 
Once appropriate security guidelines have been developed, their dissemination to the 
affected audience is the obvious next requirement. The use of an IT based medium to 
achieve this objective would appear to be a logical choice, and the WWW offers an easy 
and widely accessible option. 
At a project level, it is envisaged that ISHTAR will build upon the success of SEISMED, 
extending the level and types of security guidance available to healthcare professionals, 
and providing various means to promote the information (including the Web service). At 
the HCE level, use of the service will be beneficial where security (and associated 
knowledge) is lacking. Alternatively, the service will both compliment and ease the burden 
on any local security expertise that is present. In either case, the provision of consistent 
advice, free of charge and on a wide scale, will be a significant step in promoting 
healthcare security. 
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Abstract 
Information security is now recognised as an important consideration in modem 
healthcare establishments (HCEs), with a variety of guidelines and standards 
currently available to enable the environments to be properly protected. However, 
financial and operational constraints often exist which influence the practicality of 
these recommendations. 
This paper establishes that the staff culture o f the organisation is o f particular 
importance in determining the level and types of security that wi l l be accepted. This 
culture wi l l be based upon staff awareness o f and attitudes towards security and it is, 
therefore, important to have a clear idea of what these attitudes are. To this end, 
two surveys have been conducted within a reference environment to establish the 
anitudes o f general users and technical staff, allowing the results to be fed back to 
HCE management to enable security policy to be appropriately defmed. These 
results indicated that, although the establishment had participated in a European 
healthcare security initiative, staff attitudes and awareness were still weak in some 
areas. 
Introduction 
The issue of information security is o f increasing importance in modem healthcare establishments. 
The traditional concerns of maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability o f systems and 
data are now compounded by the new requirements that are emerging within the environment. 
Examples here include the interconnection o f computer systems and institutions, the increasing storage 
o f highly sensitive data, the computerisation of primary care practices and the development of 
telemedicine and mobile computing. 
In terms of the specific security requirements in healthcare, it has been suggested (Commission of 
European Communities 1991) that it is "probably not possible to draw a distinction between medical 
requirements and needs and those from other sectors or the general domain". However, whilst this 
may be true from the perspective that many protection methods appropriate to other domains w i l l also 
be applicable in healthcare, the establishments are generally subject to a number o f practical constraints 
that limit the types of security that can be tolerated. These principally include : 
o the generally open and public nature of the environment (which restricts the potential for 
physical access controls); 
« financial constraints (which limit the amount of money that can be directed at non-care 
activities); 
o staff culture (relating to the typical attitudes and behaviour o f members or groups within 
the organisation). 
This last point is closely linked to the need for convenience within the environment, which influences 
the types of security that are appropriate to, and wi l l be tolerated within, a HCE. Young (1991) cites 
that there are often problems enough entailed in trying to get healthcare professionals (HCPs) to use 
information systems in the first place (as a result of system designers ignoring the clinical environment 
and the ways in which HCPs are motivated) and, as such, the addition o f cumbersome or restrictive 
protection measures would only be likely to worsen the situation. For example, effects on staff might 
include demotivation and reduced efficiency, whilst at an organisational level operational costs could 
increase as a result o f tasks taking longer to perform. In some contexts this significantly limits the 
types of security that are appropriate and it is consequently important to determine what can be 
tolerated in order to avoid wasted effort and unnecessary disruption. 
The staff culture often highlights discrepancies in the need for security as perceived by technologists 
and as seen by HCPs. Healthcare users are generally no different to those in other sectors in terms of a 
tendency to regard security as "someone else's problem" and, hence, often have little appreciation o f 
the main issues. However, all healthcare stafT involved in the development, operation, maintenance 
and use o f information systems should be responsible to some degree. It has been observed that 
security is a human issue (Warren and Gaunt 1993) and there is consequently a defmite need to move 
towards a more security conscious culture in HCEs (where security ideally becomes an ever-present 
background consideration for all system users). 
Background and reference environment 
The types o f security that are appropriate within a healthcare environment have been most recently 
assessed as part of the Commission of the European Communities SEISMED (Secure Environment for 
Information Systems in MEDicine) project This work has led to the formulation o f a series of 
guidelines covering all major aspects of security, including high-level policy, security in existing 
system, systems development and healthcare networks ( A I M SEISMED 1991). These 
recommendations are envisaged to be broadly applicable to all European HCEs. 
However, in terms of the actual implementation of security, it is necessary to assess the extent of 
potential obstacles prior to attempting large-scale introduction. Staff attitudes and beliefs regarding 
security are important and wi l l be valuable in ensuring correct implementation strategies. However, 
these attitudes are not necessarily easy to ascertain as they are not routinely documented. As such, it 
was considered useful to assess the anitudes of stafT within an operational healthcare environment in 
order to determine the practical realities and provide a basis for fijture reference. 
The chosen method of assessment was to conduct a survey of healthcare personnel, having the 
advantages of facilitating reasonably detailed data collection whilst also allowing broad staff coverage. 
The investigation was mounted within a local reference environment (namely Derriford Hospital. 
Plymouth, which is the largest HCE in south west England and significantly advanced in terms o f 
Information Technology (IT) usage) and supported by the Trust Information Doctor to encourage staff 
co-operation and ensure a healthy level of response. 
Previous work conducted by the SEISMED project has identified three principal divisions o f HCE staff 
that should be considered when introducing security ( A I M SEISMED 1994): 
• general HCE staff (e.g. clinicians, nurses, administrators); 
• HCE management; 
• IT and Security personnel. 
It was considered most Important for the survey to assess the attitudes of the general users and IT staff, 
so that management would then be able to determine which security concepts needed to be promoted to 
their staff and where resistance or problems would be likely to occur. 
It was initially anticipated that the staff within Derriford hospital would possibly be more security 
aware than those within many other European HCEs. given that the establishment participated as a 
reference centre in the SEISMED project, involving many of them in the implementation and 
validation o f the recommended guidelines. 
Survey of general HCE staff 
The first investigation attempted to determine the attitudes o f the genera! staff within the reference 
environment The survey document ran to four pages and contained a total of 37 questions. These 
were divided into four sections, which obtained general background information followed by responses 
to questions in three key areas of security awareness, as summarised below. 
1. General 
Obtained information on general computer usage (in terms of system, application and data 
access) and opinions on basic aspects of security. 
2. Physical 
A small section which collected basic information concerning attitudes towards the 
physical protection measures employed within the HCE. 
3. Logical / computer system security 
This section concentrated upon respondents awareness o f security breaches and their use 
o f passwords (the latter being the prime method of authentication and access control used 
in operational systems at the time and, therefore, expected to be well understood by the 
staff). 
4. Personnel 
Assessed staff security awareness in respect of their own role within the HCE, including 
specific security and data protection responsibilities and their attitudes towards the level of 
security training provided. 
Although it would have been desirable to explore some areas in more detail, it was considered that the 
inclusion of too many questions would serve to make the questionnaire appear daunting and 
consequently reduce the potential response rate. Amongst the staff targeted were consultants, doctors, 
nurses, administrators and secretaries, with respondents being asked to identify their discipline to allow 
potential for subdivision of the final results. 
A total o f 200 questionnaires were distributed and responses were gathered over a period o f about two 
weeks. At the end of this time, a total of 75 usable responses had been received (i.e. a successful return 
o f 37.5%). Whilst this represented a good overall figure, the distribution o f responses from within the 
individual staff categories was rather uneven and, in some cases, the number o f responses was too low 
to allow any confident analysis (for example only 4 responses were received from doctors, whilst a 
more healthy 18 responses were obtained from nurses). For this reason we did not attempt to assess 
attitude differences between the staff groups and restricted the analysis to the general domain. The 
principal findings of the study wil l now be discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 
From the basic introductory questions there was a general consensus amongst the respondents that 
infomiation security was of most importance to help preserve patient safety and confidentiality. Only 
10% o f staff felt that the current levels of security restricted them in their work. Respondents were 
generally more confident in the effectiveness of the HCEs logical security controls than the physical 
and personnel measures, but even in these cases the consensus appeared to be that the measures were at 
least adequate. 
From the responses to the physical security questions, it was established that almost a third o f staff do 
not wear their identity badges. However, some 83% claimed that they would challenge someone not 
wearing a badge - indicating that many staff do not follow the practice that they expect others to 
observe. Some 16% of respondents were unaware that areas o f the HCE were monitored / under 
surveillance - which provided a first indication that security awareness was not all that it could be. 
In terms oUogical security the results firstly established that only 5% of staff were aware o f security 
breaches within the HCE. However, this figure is still worrying in that it represents violations 
perpetrated by HCE staff. The results relating to the use of passwords and general observance of 
system security were of even more concern. Some 59% of respondents admitted to leaving their 
terminals logged in and unsupervised, whilst an even greater proportion (65%) claimed to have used 
someone else's system when left in such a condition. These factors indicate lax attitudes towards the 
protection and privacy of individual accounts. 
Proceeding from the basis that a password is supposed to represent secret knowledge known only to the 
legitimate user (Jobusch and Oldehoeft 1989), the survey proceeded assess how carefully the HCE 
users attempted to abide by this concept. The responses established that some 2 1 % o f respondents 
legitimately shared a group password with other users. However, a further 18% admitted that their 
password had been shared with other users without authorisation and 15% claimed to know other 
peoples passwords illegitimately, again indicating scant regard for the purpose of the controls. 
Other worrying statistics were that 18% of staff felt that their password could potentially be guessed 
(on the basis that it was related to their name, hobbies or a dictionary word) and almost a third of 
respondents admitted to keeping a written record of their password (which further defeats the point of 
having one - especially i f the information is left around for others to read). 
Finally, respondents were asked what they considered would be a reasonable length of lime between 
password changes. Opinions here varied dramatically, as indicated in figure I below, and it should be 
noted that only 26% of users concurred with the view of 30 days that would be advocated by the 
authors. 
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Fig. 1 : Respondents opinion on optimal frequency of password changes 
The responses to the final secHon^ personnel security, were also rather mixed. Some 64% o f staff were 
aware of security-related clauses in their contracts o f employment (this would appear to be quite 
encouraging in the sense that, at the time of the study, the reference centre was still in the process of 
revising contracts to incorporate such clauses and, therefore, a fair proportion would genuinely not 
have incorporated them). Also encouraging was that almost all staff (92%) claimed to be aware of the 
Data Protection Act (1984) and how it applied to their information. 
However, problems were still apparent in that approximately two thirds of staff were unaware of the 
existence of local or general HCE security documentation. This represents a problem irrespective of 
whether the staffs views were actually correct or not, as it means that the HCE is either failing to 
provide the documentation or promote sufficient awareness of its existence. 
The final questions in the survey actually concerned the issues of security training and on-going 
awareness initiatives. Unfortunately, the indications in both cases were disappointing, with only 25% 
o f staff having received security training and 15% claiming to receive adequate security awareness. 
These figures would tend to explain some of the significant weaknesses observed elsewhere (e.g. the 
poor use of passwords). 
The conduct of the survey and results obtained are described in more detail in Holben (1995). 
Survey of I T personnel 
The second investigation concentrated on the HCE's technical personnel, obtaining information 
regarding the security awareness and attitudes o f the local system administrators. The potential 
response base in this case was obviously somewhat smaller than that of the general user population, 
and 14 usable questionnaires were returned from a total o f 20 distributed (with the document in this 
case containing 13 questions spread over five pages). 
The content of this survey was considerably different in that it was intended to elicit information from 
those who responsible for selecting and implementing security as opposed to those who were 
ultimately affected by i t As such, the prime issues covered were the respondents confidence in their 
own knowledge o f security and the factors that they considered important when trying to incorporate it 
into their systems. As a result, few opportunities existed for direct comparison with the general staff 
responses. 
The first group of questions related to system administrator's knowledge o f security. Some 64% felt 
confident in their knowledge, with 7 1 % indicating that they would like specific training relating to 
security. Although this seems strange, it implies that respondents require on-going training in order to 
improve their security knowledge and that o f their users. 
The next section was concerned with costs and revealed that 50% o f respondents felt that consultancy 
costs were very important when implementing security and 30% thought that subsequent training costs 
were irrelevant. This attitude is important since it indicates that more emphasis is placed on the cost of 
introducing security features than the issue o f training several hundred staff in how to use them. 
The most important issues in implementing security was considered to be ease o f implementation 
(85%). The Icvei o f training required by staff was also considered very important by 77% of 
respondents. 
Considering the priorities relating to the training itself. 75% of administrators felt that the level and 
cost of training was important, whilst only 50% gave priority to the number o f staff to be trained. This 
implies that the administrators are more concerned with training costs (i.e. the expense of in-depth 
training and the associated time lost) than the number of people who require it. 
When the impact of security was considered, it was found that 92% of respondents were concerned i f it 
would affect the way people would use the system, 61.5% were concemed that security would change 
the users job and 30% would be concemed i f new security features in tum created new responsibilities. 
This shows that administrators wish to ensure that the level o f dismption can be minimised. 
The next section was concemed with departmental security set-ups. The survey found that 77% of 
departments had a person concemed with security, 46% had a general computer security policy and 
20% had a policy relating to portable PCs. These results indicate that even though most departments 
have some form of security personnel, these individuals have not taken steps, and indeed may not have 
the appropriate knowledge, to develop departmental or specific security policies. This in tum implies 
that further training may be necessary. 
The final section of this questionnaire was concemed with the security training received by users and 
found that 7 1 % were given initial training, whilst only 23% undertook regular awareness programmes. 
The contrast here is clearly shown in figure 2 and it may also be inferred from the results that there is a 
sizeable group of staff for whom no training is provided at all. 
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Fig. 2 : Security training provided for system users 
These results imply that staff may become less security conscious as time goes on. as ideas are not 
introduced and / or adequately re-enforced. It is interesting to note that the figure of 7 1 % does not 
tally with the earlier perceptions of the general users, where only 25% claimed to have received initial 
training. An explaination for the discrepancy is not obvious, but may be related to recent changes in 
which security training has now been introduced, but has not affected the majority of existing staff. 
The views of users and administrators in relation to the provision of ongoing awareness can, however, 
be considered to be broadly comparable. 
The work described in this section is covered in more detail in Warren (1995). 
Summary of problems identined 
The two surveys were considerably useful in highlighting a variety of potential security weaknesses. 
The results observed, in conjunction with a series of supplementary interviews, identified that the 
following problems existed within the reference environment and some o f its systems : 
o no formal policy relating to IT security; 
• a lack of procedures relating to security matters; 
o poor use of passwords; 
o poor use of access controls (e.g. once set, they are seldom changed or checked); 
o poor use of system security features; 
o inadequate security training and awareness; 
o historical problems with physical security (e.g. equipment theft); 
o historical incidents of attempted "hacking" by staff and outsiders; 
o historical incidents of unauthorised data modification by staff; 
• problems with information control (e.g. staff able to download information onto floppy 
disks). 
The findings, therefore, provided a clear indication o f several problem areas and a represented a good 
starting point from which management could then attempt to address the issue. A number of steps 
have consequently been taken to improve the situation. An IT security committee has been 
established, which has since produced a security policy for the whole organisation. It w i l l also develop 
specialised policies for more specific areas (e.g. PC security). Members o f the committee wi l l also be 
involved in the running of security awareness seminars for both system managers and users. In 
addition, the transition of the local health authority to NHS Trust status has meant that the staff have 
had to sign new contracts. This has been used as an opportunity to incorporate clauses relating to 
security, providing another means o f promoting awareness. 
Conclusions 
Given the relatively small respondent groups, it is obvious that the results o f the investigations should 
not be used to make blanket assumptions o f the attitudes o f all healthcare staff (even within the 
reference environment). However, they do provide a useful illustration o f the areas in which 
weaknesses and misconceptions can occur, and the consequent need for comprehensive training and 
awareness initiatives. They also indicate that there are often notable weaknesses, even in an 
environment where infonnation security has been given a relatively high profile. 
The system administrators perceptions and awareness o f security varied from good to bad, depending 
upon the difTerent individuals and the issues under consideration. The lack o f knowledge in some 
cases can be related to the administrators originally coming from a non-IT background. Given that the 
users o f the different systems wi l l generally seek security advice from the associated system manager, 
it can be seen that the quality of the advice that they receive wi l l vary. As a consequence, this can be 
cited as one of the principal reasons for awareness problems amongst end-users. 
Once the problems have been acknowledged, they can be addressed (and overcome) using a security 
methodology which considers and involves the affected staff (Warren and Gaunt 1993). 
In conclusion, the overall security attitudes observed in the surveys may be considered somewhat 
disappointing, given the reference environment's participation in a European healthcare security 
initiative, and consequently do not bode well for the likely results from other establishments that have 
not had this advantage. That said, however, the situation within the reference environment has 
improved in the months since the survey was conducted, given the points previously mentioned and the 
fact that further implementation and validation of the guidelines from the SEISMED project has 
subsequently taken place. 
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